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Introduction
Ok so #Tahrir anyone?
@Sarahngb – 15 October 2011
On the 29th of July 2011, I happened to be witness to the brutal 
eviction of the protest camp at Tahrir square in central Cairo. 
Erected on the 8th of July, the camp was the third in a series of 
mass sit-ins that had re-occupied the square since the fall of Hosni 
Mubarak, each publicised by its own Twitter hashtag carrying the 
date of its beginning: #Apr8, #Jun28 and #Jul8. Observing the 
scene from behind one of the green metal fences encircling the 
square, I saw platoons of soldiers trashing the tents erected on the 
roundabout. A group of around 200 protesters re-gathered on the 
side of the square nearest to the Mogamma, the grey headquarters 
of Egyptian bureaucracy, their bodies densely packed on the asphalt. 
After a few minutes the troops advanced in square formation and 
made their way into the crowd, their wooden sticks swinging in 
the air. The protestors resisted the first onslaught. But then came a 
second, and a third. The crowd began dispersing, fleeing the soldiers 
alone or in small groups.
A few metres to my left I noticed a young Egyptian woman 
standing by the fence. She was in her early twenties, with long curly 
black hair and a pair of designer glasses. I guessed she was from an 
upper-class area of Cairo like Maadi, Mohandessin or Nasr City. 
She seemed as distressed as I was at witnessing the attack without 
being able (or daring enough) to raise a finger to stop it. Reaching 
into her bag she extracted what I immediately recognised as an HTC 
phone, the kind with a sliding keyboard, a sort of weird marriage 
between an iPhone and a Blackberry. She aimed the phone’s camera 
at the square and snapped a picture of yet another violent arrest. 
Then she started tapping her fingers on the keyboard. She stared for 
a second at the screen before clicking the ‘enter’ button and then 
furtively put the phone away as though worried she might be noticed 
and targeted. At that point a group of protesters ran towards us, 
fleeing from a group of military policemen chasing them. We both 
vanished from the square, running in opposite directions.
1
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While writing this book I have often thought back to this scene. 
It seems to encapsulate so much about the contemporary protest 
experience, with its intersection of ‘tweets and the streets’, of 
mediated communication and physical gatherings in public spaces. 
I never quite managed to track down the tweet the young Egyptian 
woman sent that day. So I was left wondering: What might she 
have written in her message? Was she simply reporting what was 
going in the square? Or was she inciting her ‘tweep’1 comrades to 
join in a counter-attack against the police? Or suggesting the best 
way to elude security when approaching the square? Or was she 
just recording a protest souvenir to show off to her friends? Who 
would be reading her tweet, and how would they be reacting? Would 
they be inspired to join the protests, or would they be scared away? 
Who was she anyway? Some kind of ‘leader’, or a ‘follower’? And 
did all this tweeting and re-tweeting really matter when it came to 
influencing collective action, mobilising and coordinating people on 
the ground? Or was all this just an activist delusion: a way of feeling 
part of the action while in fact always standing on the sidelines?
These and similar questions have haunted me during the 
ethnographic fieldwork conducted in the course of researching 
this book. Visiting the places in which different social movements 
blossomed during 2011 – earning it the label ‘year of the protester’, 
as celebrated by Time magazine2 – from Cairo, to Madrid, Barcelona 
and New York, I have witnessed manifold manifestations of activist’s 
use of social media. Within these ‘popular’ movements – popular 
because they appeal to the ‘people’ (Laclau, 2005) as the majority 
of the population in their home countries – activists have made 
full use of that ‘group of Internet-based applications ... that allow 
the creation and exchange of user-generated content’ (Kaplan and 
Haenlein, 2010: 60). Where self-managed activist internet services 
like Indymedia and activist mailing lists were the media of choice of 
the anti-globalisation movement, contemporary activists are instead 
shamelessly appropriating corporate social networking sites like 
Facebook and Twitter. 
Commenting on this enthusiastic adoption of social media, 
pundits and journalists have readily resorted to expressions 
like ‘the Facebook revolution’3 or ‘the Twitter revolution’. Yet, 
this celebration of the emancipatory power of communication 
technologies has not been much help in understanding how exactly 
the use of these media reshapes the ‘repertoire of communication’ 
(Mattoni, 2012) of contemporary movements and affects the 
experience of participants. One danger when approaching the 
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field of social media is the possibility of being overwhelmed by the 
sheer abundance and diversity of the communicative practices they 
channel. As we will see in the course of this book, uses of social 
media among activists are almost as diverse as their venues. They are 
often used as a means of representation, a tool of ‘citizen journalism’ 
employed to elicit ‘external attention’ (Aday et al., 2010), for 
example in the use of web live-stream services like Bambuser,4 or 
YouTube videos documenting episodes of police brutality. Yet what 
is more interesting, and what has possibly brought them so much 
attention, is their ‘internal’ or ‘local’ use: their use as means of 
organisation of collective action, and more specifically as means 
of mobilisation in the crucial task of ‘getting people on the streets’ 
(Lievrouw, 2009: 154).
The mobilising role of social media, which constitutes the topic 
of this book, has already been duly noticed by a number of pundits 
and journalists commenting on the popular movements of 2011. 
Tweeting on the 27th of January about the Egyptian revolution, 
American author Jared Cohen cited one Egyptian activist summing 
up activist media use as follows: ‘facebook used to set the date, 
twitter used to share logistics, youtube to show the world, all to 
connect people’. In his flamboyant account of what he calls the 
‘revolutions of 2009–2011’, BBC journalist Paul Mason listed 
the functionalities of the ‘full suite of information tools’ used by 
contemporary activists:
Facebook is used to form groups, covert and overt—in order to 
establish those strong but flexible connections. Twitter is used 
for real-time organisation and news dissemination, bypassing 
the cumbersome ‘newsgathering’ operations of the mainstream 
media. YouTube and the Twitter-linked photographic sites—
Yfrog, Flickr and Twitpic—are used to provide instant evidence 
of the claims being made. Link-shorteners like bit.ly are used to 
disseminate key articles via Twitter. (Mason 2010: 75)
But what difference do social media really make to the ways in 
which participants are mobilised and protest is organised, besides 
trivial operations like ‘fixing dates’ and ‘opening groups’? Is their 
importance merely ‘technical’, as quotations like this one seem 
to suggest?
To understand the social significance of media practices and 
of social media in particular it is helpful to historicise things, 
contrasting contemporary forms of communication with past 
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ones. In a way, modern media have always constituted a channel 
through which social movements not only communicate but also 
organise their actions and mobilise their constituencies. One 
need only think here of Lenin’s classic description of the Party 
newspaper as ‘propagandist’, ‘agitator’ and ‘organiser’ of collective 
action (Lenin 1902/1969: 156). Social media can be seen as the 
contemporary equivalent of what the newspaper, the poster, the 
leaflet or direct mail were for the labour movement. They are means 
not simply to convey abstract opinions, but also to give a shape 
to the way in which people come together and act together, or, to 
use the metaphorical language that will be adopted in this book, to 
choreograph collective action. With its hierarchical and centralised 
structure the Party newspaper appeared a perfect reflection of the 
Leninist vanguard Party. So what do social media like Twitter and 
Facebook, with their constitutive evanescence and multiplicity, tell 
us about the movements that have adopted them as key means of 
communication? How do the communicative practices constructed 
through them reflect the forms of organisation of contemporary 
social movements? 
To explore these questions, I will undertake a qualitative analysis 
of activist use of social media in the popular movements of 2011, 
focusing on their role as means of mobilisation of collective action. 
The volume proceeds chronologically, beginning with the Arab 
Spring and the use of social media during the Egyptian uprising, 
and looking in particular at the role played by the cosmopolitan 
‘Facebook youth’ as the leading force in the mobilisation. It then 
goes on to discuss the adaptation and transformation of the ‘Tahrir 
model’ in the context of the ‘indignados’ in Spain, documenting 
the way in which organisers used social media before and after 
the watershed protests of the 15th of May (15-M). Finally, I will 
discuss the use of social media in the mobilisation of the Occupy 
movement in the US, and the tortuous interaction between online 
communication and on-the-ground organising which characterised 
the emergence of this movement. These different social movements 
are analysed diachronically, tracing the different stages of their 
development, reconstructing the role played by social media in 
each of them, and looking at their interaction with other forms 
of communication.
Empirically, I draw on a body of ethnographic research 
comprising 80 interviews with activists and many observations of 
public gatherings mainly conducted in Egypt, Spain and the US. 
This methodology allows an appreciation of the use of social media, 
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not from the ‘God’s-eye view’ offered by quantitative research with 
its surveys of participants’ media use and its info-visualisations of 
Twitter traffic, but from the ‘ground-level’ view of the activists 
and participants using these tools. The book was initially set to 
incorporate case studies from Greece, Tunisia and the UK, where I 
have also conducted fieldwork. I eventually decided for reasons of 
space to drop these additional case studies. However, the interviews 
conducted in these countries have been used as background data to 
verify the general applicability of the claims I am developing, and 
I will refer directly to some of them in the comparative Chapter 5. 
Here in the introduction I will explain the gist of my approach 
to the study of social media and activism – an approach developed 
in opposition not only to the unbounded techno-optimism of social 
media theorists such as Clay Shirky, but also to the techno-pessimism 
of commentators like Evgeniy Morozov and Malcom Gladwell. I 
argue that both positions are characterised by an essentialist vision 
of social media as being automatically either suitable or unsuitable as 
means of mobilisation. These approaches tend to look at social media 
in the abstract, without due attention to their intervention in specific 
local geographies of action or to their embeddedness in the culture 
of the social movements adopting them. I propose that the crucial 
element in understanding the role of social media in contemporary 
social movements is their interaction with and mediation of emerging 
forms of public gatherings and in particular the mass sit-ins which 
have become the hallmark of contemporary popular movements. 
My claim is that social media have been chiefly responsible for 
the construction of a choreography of assembly as a process of 
symbolic construction of public space which facilitates and guides 
the physical assembling of a highly dispersed and individualised 
constituency. Together with the stress on the imbrication between 
media and locality which animates this book, my key contention is 
that the introduction of social media in social movements does not 
simply result in a situation of absolute spontaneity and unrestrained 
participation. On the contrary, influential Facebook admins and 
activist tweeps become ‘soft leaders’ or choreographers, involved in 
setting the scene, and constructing an emotional space within which 
collective action can unfold. 
BeyOnd TwITTer feTIShISm
During the clashes between protesters and police in central 
Cairo in December 2011, not far from where I witnessed the first 
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scene portrayed in this book, I noticed some graffiti in which the 
Twitter blue bird was overlaid by a red back-lashed circle. Below 
it figured the script ‘the revolution will not be tweeted’, a pun on 
Gil Scott-Heron’s famous song-title ‘The Revolution Will Not be 
Televised’, the last verse of which proclaims that instead ‘it will be 
live’. It is not hard to understand why many activists in Egypt and 
beyond feel the need to reiterate this opinion regarding tweeting 
(first uttered by techno-pessimist Malcom Gladwell [2010]), given 
the extent to which the Egyptian revolution has been banalised as 
a ‘social media revolution’ by news media obsessed with the latest 
technology fad.
At least since the anti-globalisation movement’s adoption of the 
internet as a major tool, news media have constantly approached 
the emergence of any new movement in terms of the technology 
defining it. This discourse reached a climax with the blossoming of 
the Arab Spring in 2011. From CNN to the BBC, ‘Facebook protest’ 
or ‘Twitter protest’ became obsessively repeated catch-phrases 
during the 18-day revolution that brought down Mubarak. After 
Mubarak fell, Egyptian bloggers and tweeps like Gigi Ibrahim and 
Sandmonkey were instantly cast as the celebrities, or ‘micro-celeb-
rities’, of an otherwise supposedly ‘leaderless’ social movement, 
while new shows like Al-Jazeera English’s The Stream were created 
to applaud the emancipatory power of social media. 
The celebration of the social media revolution also reached the 
higher echelons of politics. The long-awaited and duly prophesised 
emergence of a ‘Facebook revolution’ was read as a confirmation 
of the good work done by the US State department and its ‘internet 
freedom’ agenda. Topping the wave of self-congratulation in June 
2011, Alec Ross, Hillary Clinton’s senior adviser, called the internet 
the ‘Che Guevara of the twenty-first century’. Thanks to the rise of 
new media, ‘hierarchies are being levelled’, he declared, in a tone 
that would not have been out of place coming from an anarchist. 
‘People at the top of those hierarchies are finding themselves on 
much shakier ground.’5 The message was clear: the revolution had 
been made in Cairo, but it would not have taken place without the 
latest technologies engineered in Silicon Valley. Mark Zuckerberg 
(Facebook CEO) and Jack Dorsey (Twitter CEO) may not themselves 
have been on the barricades, but they were operative in the virtual 
supply lines, as it were.
No one has contributed more to this techno-celebratory discourse 
within academia than NYU professor Clay Shirky. Reading his 
books Here Comes Everybody (2008) and Cognitive Surplus (2010), 
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one is drawn into a passionate apology for everything technological. 
Shirky argues that social media are new tools enabling new forms 
of group formation. These new tools are making our lives easier; 
making our communication faster and faster, that is, invariably 
better: ‘as more people adopt simple social tools, and as those tools 
allow increasingly rapid communication, the speed of group actions 
also increases’ (Shirky, 2008: 161). In Shirky’s world, transaction 
costs are lowered, obstacles to collective action removed, new more 
efficient forms of coordination created. Now that, thanks to these 
new tools, ‘group-forming has gone from hard to ridiculously easy, 
we are seeing an explosion of experiments with new groups and 
new kinds of groups’ (Shirky, 2008: 54).
Commenting on the events in Tunisia and Egypt, Shirky has 
further emphasised the almighty power of social media as a means 
of collective action. In an article published in Foreign Affairs, he 
affirmed that ‘as the communication landscape gets denser, more 
complex, more participatory, the networked population is gaining 
greater access to information, more opportunities to engage in public 
speech, and an enhanced ability to undertake collective action’ 
(Shirky, 2011). Here, more information is seen as automatically 
entailing more possibilities for collective action. This view is also 
exemplified in Paul Mason’s account of contemporary activism: 
‘one fact is clear: people know more than they used to ... they 
have greater and more instant access to knowledge, and reliable 
ways of counteracting disinformation’. ‘Why should a revolution in 
knowledge and technology not be producing an equally dramatic – 
albeit diametrically opposite – change in human behaviour?’ Mason 
asks (2012: 147).
Not everyone agrees with this seamlessly optimistic vision of 
the influence of social media on contemporary social movements, 
according to which more information automatically translates into 
more collective action. If Shirky is king of the techno-optimists, 
Belarusan scholar Evgenyi Morozov is the prince of techno-
pessimists. Morozov, who had himself initially contributed to the 
celebratory discourse on social media, has more recently vigorously 
denounced the risks of ‘slacktivism’, or activism for slackers. For 
Morozov slacktivisim is ‘feel good activism that has zero political 
or social impact’ but creates ‘an illusion of having a meaningful 
impact on the world without demanding anything more than joining 
a Facebook group’.6
In his book The Net Delusion (2011), Morozov has further 
attacked the idea that the diffusion of communication technology 
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made in the United States will automatically bring democracy to 
each and every corner of the world. He criticises techno-optimistic 
visions holding that ‘technology empowers the people who, 
oppressed by years of authoritarian rule, will inevitably rebel 
mobilising themselves through text messages, Facebook, Twitter, 
and whatever tool comes along each year’ (Morozov, 2011: xii). As 
Morozov notes, social media like Twitter and Facebook are mostly 
used for entertainment purposes, for sharing one’s own daily doings 
rather than for political organising. Moreover, he rightly alerts us to 
the fact that social media can create serious risks for activists, given 
the increased possibilities for monitoring by state security apparatus.
This kind of critical analysis of the impact of social media on 
activism has also been taken up by the New Yorker writer and 
best-selling author Malcom Gladwell, whose argument may be 
summed up in the Cairo graffiti formula ‘the revolution will not be 
tweeted’. Radical political actions, Gladwell argues, require strong 
ties, like those identified by Stanford sociologist Doug McAdam 
among participants in the Freedom Summer of the 1960s in the Jim 
Crow South, where many were killed by segregationists (McAdam, 
1988). Social media at best provides weak ties and is therefore 
unsuitable for revolutionary action, Gladwell argues. His position 
has been ridiculed by many theorists after the evidence of the role 
played by social media in the Arab Spring. However, at least he and 
Morozov have had the courage to go against the tide of boundless 
optimism spawned by the likes of Shirky.
In and of itself there is nothing wrong in asserting the importance 
of communication technologies in social movements. Scholars of the 
calibre of Sidney Tarrow (1994) and Benedict Anderson (1991) have 
eloquently discussed the influence of print technology on the rise of 
modern social movements. In fact, it would be hard to talk about 
such movements without mentioning all the technologies involved in 
publicising and organising their actions: flyers, posters, megaphones, 
banners, television, newspapers and the like. Furthermore in a 
society that has turned technology and science into a sort of secular 
religion (Ellul, 1964), it is hardly surprising that social movements 
are eager to experiment with the latest electronic gadget and to cast 
themselves as drivers of innovation.
The problem comes though, when social media are turned into 
a ‘fetish’ of collective action; in other words, when such media are 
endowed with mystical qualities that only obscure the work of the 
groups and organisers using them. When this happens, the techno-
visionary discourse on social media appears as the reflection of a 
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neoliberal ideology, incapable of understanding collective action 
except as the result of some sort of technological miracle fleetingly 
binding together egotistical individuals. Morozov and Gladwell are 
right to be suspicious of the excessive optimism of Shirky and his 
acolytes, and of the neoliberal politics which underlies it. Yet they risk 
committing the opposite error, assuming that a certain technology 
is inherently unsuited for becoming a channel of mobilisation. In so 
doing, they disregard the fact that the process of mobilisation cannot 
be reduced to the material affordances of the technologies it adopts 
but also involves the construction of shared meanings, identities and 
narratives (Johnston and Klandermans, 1995).
To elucidate these aspects of the problem, in this book I propose 
a cultural and phenomenological interpretation of the role of social 
media as means of mobilisation. Rather than being concerned 
merely with the efficiency or otherwise of different communication 
technologies, I pay attention to what activists actually do with them, 
to the concrete and local ‘media practices’ (Couldry, 2004) activists 
develop in their use. This approach to the study of social media 
allows us to recuperate so much of what gets lost in contemporary 
techno-deterministic accounts. In particular, I devote much attention 
to the role played by identity and emotions in the process of 
mobilisation, and their contribution in the symbolic construction 
of a sense of togetherness among activists. The role of emotions has 
been a highly neglected topic in social movement studies (Goodwin, 
Jasper, Polletta, 2001) and in new media studies alike (Ben-Ze’ev, 
2004). Nevertheless, as I will show, this aspect is crucial to an 
understanding of the way in which social media contribute to the 
process of mobilisation in contemporary popular movements, as a 
reflection of their ‘personal’ orientation, and of the importance of 
sustaining an imaginary of ‘friendship’ and ‘sharing’ in their use. 
SOcIal medIa and OccupIed SquareS
In order to overcome the abstraction and essentialism underlying 
the contemporary debate about social media, we need to leave these 
‘new tools’ aside for a moment and foreground the larger picture. 
It is impossible to understand the role of these media as means for 
mobilisation without an appreciation of the ways in which they 
intervene on specific social movements and of the way in which 
their use among activists reflects and enacts the values, identities 
and narratives which typify these movements. For this purpose we 
need to develop a situated analysis of social media practices paying 
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attention to their interaction with other forms of communication 
and with the particular physical geography of those cities within 
which social movements have manifested themselves. 
The social movements analysed in this book – the Egyptian 
uprising, the Spanish indignados and Occupy – are marked by 
a huge diversity in terms of culture, social composition and the 
nature of the political system in which they operate. It is evident 
for one thing that given the level of repression encountered by 
participants and the intensity of the mobilisation, the Egyptian 
revolution has little in common with the movements that tried to 
imitate it in the West. Likewise, between the indignados and Occupy 
the differences are huge, despite the fact that both movements target 
the economic crisis and the politics of austerity and have adopted 
similar tactics and organisational forms. Given the extent to which 
these movements are more national than global, they necessarily 
reflect the specificity of their national cultures. Notwithstanding 
these differences, however, there are also remarkable elements of 
commonality, which will allow us to see them as part of a common 
protest wave, sharing similar cultural traits. 
First and foremost, all three social movements considered in 
this book are ‘popular’ movements: movements which appeal to 
the ‘people’ (Laclau, 2005) as the majority of the population. This 
feature is perfectly condensed in the Occupy slogan ‘we are the 99%’, 
but is also well represented in the Egyptian uprising with its slogan 
‘we are one hand’, and in the indignados claim to represent ‘normal’ 
Spaniards. This majoritarian character has been clearly reflected 
not only in the discourse and imaginary of each movement, but 
also in the diversity of its constituency, encompassing many people 
outside of the metropolitan and idealist middle-class youth who in 
recent years have constituted the ‘mobilisation potential’ of so-called 
‘new social movements’ (Kriesi et al., 1995). The majoritarian 
character of contemporary movements registers a clear difference 
from the anti-globalisation movement. The latter was marked by a 
self-conscious minoritarian identity famously expressed in Zapatista 
Subcomandante Marcos’ statement: ‘Marcos is all the exploited, 
marginalised, oppressed minorities resisting and saying “Enough’’’.7 
This minoritarian orientation of the anti-globalisation movement, 
with its emphasis on diversity and autonomy, has also had a strong 
influence on the scholarly analyses of new media practices in social 
movements, which have seen the internet as a means of producing 
autonomy and diversity. Arguably, however, we need to question 
many of the concepts developed in these analyses of the anti-
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globalisation movement’s use of the internet, since they can be shown 
to have little purchase on contemporary popular movements. In fact, 
as we will see in the course of this book, in contrast to the ‘logics 
of networking’ (Juris, 2008) of the anti-globalisation movement, 
contemporary popular movements are marked by a stress on unity 
and the adoption of practices of ‘centring’ which strongly resonate 
with Laclau’s description of ‘populism’ (Laclau, 2005). 
The most evident manifestation of this stress on unity has been 
the tactic of the mass sit-in, the physical occupation of public space 
which often evolves into a semi-permanent protest camp. This has 
led some to refer to the contemporary forms of protest as ‘take the 
squares movements’8 or ‘occupy movements’.9 These movements 
have all been involved in a struggle for the ‘appropriation of public 
space’ (Lefebvre, 1974/1991), reclaiming streets and squares for 
public use and political organising. If Egyptian activists managed 
to capture the attention both of their fellow citizens and of the 
world at large, it was thanks less to their Facebook pages and 
tweets than to their physical occupation of Tahrir square in central 
Cairo. Inspired by that example, on the 15 May 2011, Spanish 
activists angered at the ‘politicos y banqueros’ managed to earn the 
respect of the majority of Spaniards, and to trigger the euphoria of 
thousands of ‘indignants’, by peacefully occupying Puerta del Sol in 
Central Madrid, holding it for one month, and inspiring hundreds 
of other occupations across the country. After the ‘Arab Spring’ 
and the ‘European Summer’, the ‘American Autumn’ has also seen 
a revival of the importance of public space, through the actions of 
the Occupy movement, whose very name carries an incitement to 
take back the streets from which people had been kept away during 
the long years of the neoliberal consensus. These occupations can be 
understood as rituals of popular reunion in which individuals are 
‘fused’ (Alexander et al., 2006: 38) into a collective subject going 
under the name of the ‘people’ (Laclau, 2005). 
The importance of the struggle for public space in contemporary 
social movements invites us to rethink the way in which we 
understand the role of new media and social media in particular. 
For a long time theoretical analysis has located these forms of 
communication in another space, a ‘cyberspace’ or online space 
as opposed to offline space. This perspective is well exemplified by 
Manuel Castells description of the internet as a ‘network of brains’ 
(Castells 2009), which will be fully examined in the next chapter. 
Counter to this disembodied view we need to understand media in 
general and social media in particular as processes responsible for 
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‘re-cast[ing] the organisation of the spatial and temporal scenes of 
social life’ (Barnett in Couldry and McCarthy, 2004: 59) rather than 
as involved in the construction of another ‘virtual’ space bereft of 
physical geography. 
It is evident that at this level there is a deep contradiction between 
the spatial relationships intrinsic to the two practices which have 
become the trademarks of contemporary protest culture: social 
media and protest camps. Social media like Twitter and Facebook 
are means of facilitating interpersonal connections across a distance. 
They appear as a perfect reflection of the condition of individ-
ualisation (Bauman, 2001; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002) of 
contemporary societies, allowing us to deal with others while not 
having to engage fully with them. From a spatial perspective, the 
experience of the protest camp, with its density of bodies in close 
physical proximity, appears as precisely the opposite of the kind 
of ‘virtual proximity’ (Bauman, 2003) facilitated by social media. 
Protest camps are sites of an intense communitarianism, as seen in 
the context of assemblies, and the day-to-day experience of collective 
eating, sleeping, cleaning and defending the space, which at first 
sight seems to have little in common with the experience generated 
by social media. What are the practices involved in connecting these 
two contradictory poles of contemporary collective action? How 
are Facebook users and tweeps transformed into ‘occupiers’?
an emOTIOnal chOreOgraphy
In this book I argue that social media have indeed had an important 
impact on the social movements of 2011, but that this impact is 
far more complex and ambiguous than gurus like Shirky would 
allow for. Their main contribution, among the different roles that 
have been assigned to them, has been at the level of the creation 
of what in this book I call a choreography of assembly. This has 
to be understood as a process of symbolic construction of public 
space, which revolves around an emotional ‘scene-setting’ and 
‘scripting’ (Alexander et al., 2006: 36) of participants’ physical 
assembling. This practice is made visible in the use of social media 
in directing people towards specific protest events, in providing 
participants with suggestions and instructions about how to act, 
and in the construction of an emotional narration to sustain their 
coming together in public space. Thus, contrary to those authors 
who see social media and new media generally as creating an 
alternative virtual- or cyber-space (for example McCaughey and 
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Ayers, 2003), I stress how social media use must be understood as 
complementing existing forms of face-to-face gatherings (rather 
than substituting for them), but also as a vehicle for the creation 
of new forms of proximity and face-to-face interaction. Countering 
the spatial dispersion of contemporary societies, Facebook messages 
and activist tweets have contributed in constructing a new sense 
of social centrality, focused around ‘occupied squares’, which are 
thereby transformed into trending places, or venues of magnetic 
gatherings, with a great power of emotional attraction. 
At the same time, I also highlight the risk of seclusion that the 
use of social media can create, when their use is not accompanied 
by street-work and interaction with those on the other side of the 
digital divide, who, to use a recurrent activist expression, ‘do not 
have a Facebook account’. 
The adoption of the term ‘choreography’ crucially serves to 
indicate that the process of the symbolic construction of public space, 
for all the participatory character and techno-libertarian claims of 
protest culture, has not been entirely ‘spontaneous’ or ‘leaderless’ 
– as many pundits, journalists, activists and academics alike have 
suggested.10 In a theoretical frame, my main target throughout the 
book is the discourse of ‘horizontalism’ (Juris, 2008) informed by 
notions like ‘networks’ (Castells, 1996, 2009) and ‘swarms’ (Negri, 
Hardt, 2000, 2005), which will be discussed and criticised in the 
following chapter. I argue that far from inaugurating a situation of 
absolute ‘leaderlessness’, social media have in fact facilitated the rise 
of complex and ‘liquid’ (Bauman, 2000) or ‘soft’ forms of leadership 
which exploit the interactive and participatory character of the new 
communication technologies. Influential Facebook admins and 
activist tweeps have played a crucial role in setting the scene for 
the movements’ gatherings in public space, by constructing common 
identifications and accumulating or triggering an emotional impulse 
towards public assembly. Just like conventional choreographers in 
the field of dance, these core organisers are for the most part invisible 
on the stage itself. They are reluctant leaders or ‘anti-leaders’: leaders 
who, subscribing to the ideology of horizontalism, do not want to be 
seen as leaders in the first place but whose scene-setting and scripting 
work has been decisive in bringing a degree of coherence to people’s 
spontaneous and creative participation in the protest movements. 
As I will show in the course of the book, this choreographing 
role of social media cannot be reduced to a purely instrumental 
activity, as a quasi-military form of tactical coordination (Arquilla 
and Ronfeldt, 2001; Rheingold, 2003) allowing activists to become 
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‘as free as dancers, as quick-witted as football players, as surprising 
as guerrillas’ (as prophesied by Magnus Enzensberger in Hands, 
2011: 50). Instead, and crucially, it entails the symbolic construction 
of a sense of togetherness and the fuelling of an emotional tension 
extending from distant mediated connections to the ‘effervescence’ 
of physical proximity (Durkheim, 1912/1965: 162). The form of 
‘soft’ leadership conjured up by the notion of choreography is one 
which exploits the personal character of social media and their 
everyday use as a means of maintaining diffuse spheres of friendship 
and intimacy characterised by a vibrant emotionality. Facebook 
messages, tweets and blog posts have constituted not simply channels 
of information but also crucial emotional conduits through which 
organisers have condensed individual sentiments of indignation, 
anger, pride and a sense of shared victimhood and transformed 
them into political passions driving the process of mobilisation. 
These and other social media have been used to create a sense of 
commonality among participants essential for the mobilisation of 
a spatially dispersed and socially diverse constituency.
This emotional character of the choreography of assembly 
fundamentally reflects not simply the nature of the media used 
but also the popular character of these movements. Contemporary 
protest culture is sustained by a narrative of popular reunion, which 
revolves around a re-composition or ‘fusion’ of individuals in a 
collective subject with majoritarian ambitions. In this context, social 
media have acted as a means of collective aggregation, facilitating 
the convergence of disparate individuals around common symbols 
and places, signifying their unity despite diversity. Naturally, the 
downside of this construction of unity against a corrupt and brutal 
system is a tendency to elide the differences among participants. This 
is an issue which has understandably troubled some anti-authori-
tarian activists, especially those who ‘grew up’ during the years of 
the anti-globalisation protests around the turn of the millennium. 
Having teased out the general argument to be put forward in 
what follows, it is worth making explicit an important political 
caveat. This book is written from a perspective highly sympathetic 
to the social movements under discussion. Nonetheless, one of 
my key concerns is to avoid becoming merely an apologist for 
their actions. This is in my view an error often made by activist 
researchers, who risk turning academic work into a celebratory 
homage to collective action, which neither adds a great deal to our 
understanding nor serves as effective movement propaganda. To 
the contrary, throughout the volume I am constantly concerned 
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with identifying the contradictions, obstacles, and risks faced in 
the development of collective action and in the use of social media. 
This critical approach derives from my conviction that only by 
unearthing such negative elements can we hope to gain a better 
understanding of contemporary protest culture and thereby to aid 
activists in their development of new forms of communication and 
organisation. 
chapTer Summary
Chapter 1 develops a theoretical framework within which to 
analyse the significance of social media practices for contemporary 
popular movements. It begins by critically assessing dominant 
understandings of collective action, and in particular the concepts 
of ‘swarms’ and ‘networks’ advanced by authors such as Manuel 
Castells and Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt. I argue that by 
putting the emphasis on spontaneity and irreducible multiplicity 
these notions tend to obscure the lines of force inherent in the 
process of mobilisation, and to neglect the fact that it involves 
the creation of a sense of togetherness and a common identity. 
This is particularly relevant in the case of contemporary popular 
movements, as spectacularly illustrated by their creation of physical 
centres in public space. Counter to Castells and Hardt and Negri, I 
rescue the importance of the construction of a sense of unity at the 
core of the process of mobilisation. I propose to look at mobilisation 
as a process of symbolic and material gathering or assembling, 
staged against the situation of spatial dispersion which characterises 
post-industrial societies. This process is not only physical, but also 
involves complex forms of mediation, which I endeavour to capture 
through the idea of a choreography of assembly. 
Chapter 2 discusses the role of social media in the 2011 
revolution against Mubarak in Egypt. The Egyptian revolution was 
characterised by the protagonism of the cosmopolitan internet-
connected youth, the so-called shabab-al-Facebook (Facebook 
youth). Social media, and in particular Facebook pages like 
Kullena Khaled Said (We are all Khaled Said) were instrumental in 
instigating the coming together of the movement in public space 
by facilitating an emotional condensation of people’s anger at 
the regime, and acting as a springboard for street-level agitation. 
Once the movement hit the streets, however, these media became 
less important than face-to-face communication. Tahrir square, 
with the bodily density it attracted, came to constitute a physical 
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beacon for the coordination of the movement, which was why the 
communication blackout imposed by the Mubarak regime had only 
a limited effect. Apart from the shabab-al-Facebook, I also discuss 
the role of another section of the movement, the activist elite of the 
so-called ‘Twitter pashas’, highlighting the risk of isolation from 
mainstream society entailed in their obsessive engagement with the 
micro-blogging site.
Chapter 3 discusses the use of social media in the indignados 
protest in Spain in 2011. I show how organisers used the participatory 
imaginary of social media and the internet to ‘harvest’ the individual 
frustration of many Spaniards who did not feel represented by any 
organisation, and to transform that frustration into a collective 
political passion made visible in public space. In the second part of 
the chapter I turn to the use made of social media in the attempt 
to sustain the protest. I argue that the occupation of Puerta del 
Sol, and the social media messaging radiating out of it, created a 
symbolic centre and focal point for maintaining a diffuse sense of 
participation. Twitter feeds and live-streaming video in particular 
generated an attraction to the square, facilitating the mobilisation 
of supporters and sympathisers towards this symbolic centre.
Chapter 4 analyses the use of social media as means of mobilisation 
in the Occupy Wall Street movement in the US. It argues that here, 
in contrast to the protests in Egypt and Spain, the use of social 
media initially failed as a rallying point for emotional condensation 
and as a symbolic springboard towards participation. The original 
call launched by Adbusters failed to secure the mobilisation of a 
large number of participants, and it needed a long and laborious 
phase of organising on the ground before the movement found 
some degree of coherence and a common identity. Only once 
activists had occupied Zuccotti Park did websites like the ‘We are 
the 99%’ Tumblr blog contribute to the construction of a popular 
identification and the gathering of a diverse constituency beyond the 
activist community. In the case of Occupy Wall Street, social media 
for the most part featured as an extension of the actions which were 
taking place on the ground. Using Twitter, activists entered into 
emotional conversations with sympathisers, sustaining a diffuse 
sense of solidarity. Only a few of these sympathisers actually joined 
the occupation, however, testifying to the difficulties involved in 
turning sympathy into actual participation.
Chapter 5 develops a comparative analysis of the use of social 
media as means of mobilisation and their role in the construction of 
a choreography of assembly. It highlights the fact that social media 
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are used as the conduits for liquid organisational practices developed 
against the negative backdrop of bureaucratic organisations. 
However, this liquid and informal character of contemporary 
movements does not mean that they are leaderless as they often 
claim to be. In fact, the use of social media is paralleled by the 
emergence of new forms of indirect or ‘choreographic’ leadership, 
making use of the interactive and personal character of social media. 
In this framework, Facebook and Twitter are assigned different 
roles. While Facebook is used as a recruitment platform to bring 
new people in, Twitter is mainly employed as a means of internal 
coordination within the activist community. The role of both 
websites as organisational means is further elucidated by looking at 
the way in which they are used in constructing an emotional tension, 
creating an impetus towards and attraction to places of gathering. 
The Conclusion draws together the findings emerging from the 
previous chapters and discusses their implications. It highlights how 
within contemporary social movements social media have been 
employed to generate a new experience of public space, staged 
against the background of a society of dispersion. Here I look 
at some of the more problematic questions emerging from the 
preceding discussion, including the tensions between the tactical 
and emotional uses of social media, between organisation and 
spontaneity, and between evanescence and continuity, and the 
question of the sustainability of contemporary social movements 
in their current forms. 
Finally, in the Appendix, the reader will find a list of the 80 
interviewees whose testimonies have been used in the book, 
alongside a description of the sampling and interviewing methods 
adopted in the course of the empirical investigation. All unattributed 
quotations in the text are drawn from these interviews.
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‘friendly’ reunions: Social media  
and the choreography of assembly
In late December 2010, a few weeks after the UK student movement 
had been defeated by the parliamentary approval of the proposed 
university reforms, the Guardian website became the venue for 
a curious war of words between young activist ‘tweep’ and New 
Statesman columnist Laurie Penny, and Alex Callinicos, the chair of 
the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party (SWP). The exchange began 
on December 24th with a ‘Comment is Free’ column entitled ‘Out 
with the Old Politics’, in which Penny criticised the SWP and its 
forms of engagement with protesters:
It is highly likely that even after a nuclear attack the only 
remaining life-forms will be cockroaches and sour-faced vendors 
of the Socialist Worker. Stunningly, the paper is still being peddled 
at every demonstration to young cyber-activists for whom the 
very concept of a newspaper is almost as outdated as the notion 
of ideological unity as a basis for action.1
In the article, Penny contrasted the young, leaderless, ‘multi-headed 
hydra’ student movement, whose favourite media were Twitter and 
Facebook, with the bureaucratic, centralist and sluggish Old Left, 
perfectly condensed in the outdated form of the newspaper and in 
the invasiveness of its street vendors. In his scathing reply, Callinicos 
criticised Penny’s ‘delusion of absolute novelty’:
The student protests have in many ways been highly traditional 
forms of collective action. True, the internet and in particular 
Facebook and other social media have emerged as very powerful 
means of communication and mobilisation. But what they have 
helped to deliver were demonstrations that have confronted both 
the forces and the symbols of the British state, not in cyberspace, 
but on the streets.2
The argument between Penny and Callinicos is illustrative of 
much of the public debate about the impact of social media on 
18
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contemporary social movements. In Penny’s interventions we 
encounter a series of key ideas which have come to characterise 
the way in which contemporary activists understand the shift from 
‘old’ to ‘new’ forms of collective action facilitated by technological 
innovation. Because of the availability of contemporary social 
media, activists like Penny argue, social movements can finally 
become leaderless, horizontal, and spontaneous. They no longer 
have to face the question of unity so obsessively important for 
dinosaurs like the Socialist Workers Party, which seems to be stuck 
in the era of Gutenberg. Much of the scholarship produced in the 
last few years about the impact of new media on contemporary 
society, and on activism in particular, has followed a similar line 
of reasoning. It asserts that the internet allows for more flexible 
relationships, enabling individuals to interact without the need for 
central coordination or a sense of unity in the display of collective 
action. This narrative is also exemplified by Paul Mason’s account 
of contemporary protest movements in which he describes them 
as ‘networked’ and activists as ‘horizontalists’. In his book Why 
It’s Kicking Off Everywhere (2012), there are 118 instances of the 
words ‘network’ or ‘networked’. There is little doubt that the idea 
of networked protest is reaching its climax in the debate about 
contemporary activism. But is this really the best image with which 
to capture the dynamics of the mobilisation of contemporary social 
movements and the role played by social media in this process?
As someone who considers himself a leftist libertarian and who 
has participated in direct action campaigns, I have little doubt 
over whom to sympathise with between Penny and Mason or 
Callinicos. Yet, after years of hearing the terms ‘horizontal’, ‘open’ 
and ‘networked’ floated around in activist circles, I have grown 
increasingly suspicious not only of them but of the whole ideology 
of ‘horizontalism’ (Juris, 2008). I am convinced that this idea 
tends to obscure the forms of organising underlying contemporary 
collective action and the forms of hierarchy, or the ‘hierarchy of 
engagement’ (Haunss and Leach, 2009), which continue to exist also 
within informal organisations like contemporary social movements 
(Freeman, 1972). The ideology of horizontalism obscures the 
fact that the process of mobilisation is constitutively ridden with 
imbalances and asymmetrical relationships between those who 
mobilise and those mobilised, between those leading the process 
and those following (Melucci, 1996a: 345). Moreover, this idea 
returns to an image of collective action as a static process, and 
thus overlooks the dynamic character which we associate with the 
Gerbaudo T02575 01 text   19 30/08/2012   11:04
20 TweeTS and The STreeTS
concept of social movements, the fact that they are ‘things that 
move’, as evident in the etymology of this sociological notion across 
a number of languages from Arabic to German and English.
But there is a more fundamental critique which needs to be 
directed at the imaginary of horizontalism with its emphasis on 
de-centralisation and irreducible multiplicity. The critique turns on 
the fact that the process of mobilisation chiefly involves a process of 
gathering or assembling of individuals and groups around something 
they share in common. While this feature is arguably common to all 
social movements, it is particularly important in the case of popular 
movements, given their attempt to mobilise a diverse and dispersed 
constituency under the name of the ‘people’. This aspect has been 
spectacularly illustrated by the movements of 2011, which have 
constructed long-term mass sit-ins resembling rituals of popular 
reunion, in which a dispersed constituency is ‘fused’ (Alexander et 
al., 2006) into a collective actor. While emphasising multiplicity, 
network theorists have neglected the continuing importance of 
the question of unity and togetherness among participants. It is 
my contention that this question continues to be as relevant as 
ever in the era of social media. If anything, the multiplication of 
communicative channels and the individualisation of our mediated 
interactions, epitomised by the popularity of social media, make 
this question all the more urgent.
In this chapter I want to engage critically with this libertarian 
discourse of ‘horizontalism’, while developing a conceptual 
framework for analysing the role of social media in the process 
of mobilisation. The starting point is a discussion of the two main 
concepts which have informed this discourse: the metaphors of 
‘network’ and ‘swarm’, as employed by, respectively, Manuel 
Castells (1996, 2009) and Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004, 2009). 
These authors correctly identify a condition of dispersion as the 
fundamental feature of spatial experience in post-industrial societies. 
They are opposed to the industrial imaginary of the mass and the 
crowd, and aim at advancing new subjectivities which escape the 
reduction ad unum: the fusion of individuals into a collective actor. 
The limit of this theoretical lineage is that it accepts dispersion and 
individualism as constitutive dimensions of contemporary society, 
rather than as the point of departure in the process of construction 
of collective action. The risks we face in a society of network and 
multitudes are made visible by the dispersion and seclusion which 
dominates the urban landscape, and by the danger of isolation 
inherent in social media, with their tendency to exacerbate the 
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dynamics of social fragmentation. In and of themselves social media 
do not automatically allow for collective action to unfold without 
becoming channels for the construction of common identities and 
thick networks of solidarity and trust. 
Building on the work of an array of authors including Zygmunt 
Bauman (2000, 2001), Hannah Arendt (1958), Alberto Melucci 
(1996), Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (Laclau, 1996, 2005; 
Laclau and Mouffe, 1985), I develop an alternative understanding 
of the process of mobilisation, based on the notion of ‘assembling’ 
or ‘gathering’ rather than ‘networking’. Nevertheless, the spatial 
dispersion which characterises contemporary social space with its 
‘fear of crowds’ (Davis, 1992a) makes this process of gathering 
particularly problematic and requires complex practices of 
symbolic and technological mediation. In conceptualising this 
process of mediation of physical assembling through the notion 
of a choreography of assembly, I put forward the hypothesis that 
collective action is never completely spontaneous given that pure 
spontaneity does not exist (Gramsci, 1971: 196). Rather, in the 
absence of a formal organisational structure, collective action is 
always structured by the forms of communication responsible for 
‘setting the scene’ for its display. 
neTwOrkS wIThOuT cenTreS
When contemporary activists like Laurie Penny describe social 
movements as leaderless, horizontal aggregates, they often do so 
by resorting to the language of networks. No concept has been as 
influential in capturing the impact of new media on activism, as 
testified by the sheer number of instances of the term in contemporary 
activist discourse. The concept in itself is not all that new. At 
least since the times of the French philosopher de Saint Simon, 
fantasising about networks of canals uniting the whole of Europe, 
it has been used to invoke an imaginary of modernisation and social 
connection (Mattelart, 1996: 85). Moreover, since the 1960s the 
term has been used in sociology in relation to the dynamics of 
groupings of friends, relatives, colleagues, and comrades. But it was 
the Catalan sociologist Manuel Castells who popularised the term 
among contemporary activists, transforming it from an analytic, 
almost technical, category into an overarching spatial metaphor for 
describing the ‘morphology’ of post-industrial societies. Used to 
express the idea of increasing flexibility and de-centralisation, the 
concept quickly became a standard reference point for many authors 
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studying the impact of new media on contemporary activism (see 
for example, de Donk et al., 2004; McCaughey and Ayers, 2003).
In essence, the thesis proposed by Castells asserts an historical 
shift from the pyramidal structures characteristic of bureaucratic 
organisations – the company, the party, the state – to networks. 
For Castells the ‘solid’ and ‘rigid’ economic, social and political 
institutions of mass society, well described by Max Weber, have 
given way to more flexible and adaptable structures. This is first 
and foremost the consequence of technological innovation. The 
revolution in micro-electronics, beginning in the 1960s, created 
the necessary conditions for new forms of communication and 
cooperation which no longer required central coordination (Castells, 
2000). Such societal shifts invest different social activities: from 
the economy, to social movements, to drug trafficking, the whole 
of society is restructured after the model of networks (Castells, 
1996, 2000).
This account of the development of network technologies also 
has a bearing on the working of the so-called web 2.0. Social media 
in particular are characterised by a high degree of interactivity, 
and by a focus on user-generated content. Practically speaking, 
this means that users are also to a great extent ‘producers’ in 
communicative interactions. Social media typify the nature of the 
‘participatory culture’ Henry Jenkins suggests is an underlying 
feature of the contemporary media landscape, in which people are 
no longer simply positioned at the receiving end of processes of 
communication (Jenkins, 2006). Castells has described this media 
landscape as dominated by a paradigm of ‘self mass-communication’ 
in which individuals and groups can broadcast their messages to 
large audiences (Castells, 2009: 416). For Castells, the advent of 
mass self-communication carries the promise of autonomy from 
bureaucratic structures and increasing scope for political and 
social engagement from below.
This evolutionary narrative is evidently coloured by an anti-
authoritarian spirit. Castells’ discussion resonates deeply with the 
emphasis on self-determination and self-management put forward 
by the cultural movements of the 1960s and ’70s. Castells himself 
notes that, apart from the rise of new technologies, the ‘networking 
paradigm’ was informed by the libertarian and participatory culture 
inaugurated by new social movements such as environmentalism, 
feminism, and the student movement (Castells, 2004). Crucial in 
this context is the emphasis on horizontality and decentralisation, 
since ‘by definition a network has no center’ (Castells, 2000: 15). 
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For Castells, these new forms of networked cooperation emancipate 
social groups from the top-down logic of command and from the 
need for leaders. 
Given this anti-authoritarian twist, it is not surprising that the 
language of networks came to be enthusiastically adopted by activist 
groups within the emerging anti-globalisation (or more positively 
‘alter-globalisation’) movement. David Graeber was probably right 
when he observed that even though many in the movement would 
not have defined themselves as anarchists, nevertheless ‘anarchism 
is the heart of the movement, its soul; the source of most of what’s 
new and hopeful about it’ (Graeber, 2002: 2). Since its inception 
with the protests in Seattle in 1999, the anti-globalisation movement 
was marked by a libertarian emphasis on self-organisation and 
direct action. For these activists, the imaginary of networks came 
to provide a useful term of reference for defining flexible and anti-
hierarchical forms of organisation, at a time marked by the diffusion 
of the internet as a major platform for protest communications. 
Emails, listservs, Indymedia websites, and web-forums became 
the communicative toolkit of a ‘new way of doing politics’, whose 
fundamental logic was ‘networking’ (Juris, 2008). In a 2002 article 
published in the New Left Review, the Canadian campaigning 
journalist Naomi Klein described the relationship between the 
movement and the internet in the following terms:
Rather than a single movement, what is emerging is thousands of 
movements intricately linked to one another, much as ‘hotlinks’ 
connect their websites on the Internet. This analogy is more than 
coincidental and is in fact key to understanding the changing 
nature of political organising. Although many have observed that 
the recent mass protests would have been impossible without the 
Internet, what has been overlooked is how the communication 
technology that facilitates these campaigns is shaping the 
movement in its own image. Thanks to the Net, mobilisations are 
able to unfold with sparse bureaucracy and minimal hierarchy; 
forced consensus and laboured manifestos are fading into the 
background, replaced instead by a culture of constant, loosely 
structured and sometimes compulsive information-swapping. 
(Klein, 2002: 4)
The anti-globalisation movement came to be seen (and to see itself) 
as a reflection of its communicative structure. What in previous 
movements would have been called groups, associations or 
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collectives, now often took the name of networks so as to express 
their adherence to this new model of organising.
The level of popularity of the network paradigm within the 
anti-globalisation movement can be appreciated by reading the 
ethnographic account produced by Jeffrey Juris, himself a student 
of Manuel Castells. Developing his analysis from the standpoint of 
activist groups in Barcelona, and analysing the protests in Prague and 
Genoa, Juris affirms the ‘networking logic’ at the core of the politics 
of these new movements, who practice a leaderless politics based on 
consensual decision-making and participation. Crucial for sustaining 
these values is an investment in the production and circulation of 
information, as testified by practices such as ‘Indymedia, culture 
jamming, guerrilla communication, and electronic civil disobedience’ 
(Juris, 2008: 284). For Juris, ‘expanding and diversifying networks 
is more than a concrete organisational objective; it is also a highly 
valued political goal’. Networks are ‘an emerging ideal’, the 
pre-figuration of a society which is ‘self-produced, self-developed, 
and self-managed’, a model for re-organising society in the direction 
of an ‘informational utopics’ (Juris, 2008: 15).
The problem with this analysis is that while being a faithful 
reflection of activist discourse it risks accepting the latter at face-value 
as an empirical description of what happens ‘on the ground’. The 
space of participation of the anti-globalisation movement, or at 
least of those groups which Juris calls ‘networked movements’, is 
described as an ‘open’ and ‘horizontal’ one. Juris himself admits 
that everything is not as smooth and friction-less as these terms 
might suggest, and that there are always obstacles which limit 
radical possibilities (Juris, 2008: 9). Yet he seems to overlook the 
fact that the continuing presence of hierarchies is less an isolated 
anomaly to be superseded with perseverance and good will than 
an ineliminable element of the kind of informal politics nurtured 
by direct action groups.
We know from activist scholars like the feminist writer Jo Freeman 
that the informal types of organisation which have dominated the 
so-called ‘new social movements’ since the 1960s, and of which 
contemporary ‘networked movements’ can be considered the 
inheritors, develop their own kinds of informal hierarchies. Despite 
the refusal to have formal leaders and clear organisational structures 
they nevertheless often come to be dominated by narrow and 
exclusive cliques formed around friendship networks. Structureless-
ness, understood as a healthy reaction to ‘overstructured societies’, 
becomes a ‘goddess’ in its own right (Freeman, 1972: 2). In the 
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absence of formal organisational structures, exclusive friendship 
networks become channels of coordination within social movements, 
breeding ‘new informal elites’ (Freeman, 1972: 3). The ideology of 
structurelessness thus becomes an astute way of side-stepping the 
question of leadership, and allows the de facto leaders to remain 
unaccountable because invisible. While I sympathise with Juris’ 
critique of Leninist politics, I am convinced that his reliance on 
almost metaphysical concepts such as ‘openness’ and ‘horizontality’ 
constitutes an ideological obstacle for understanding the dynamics 
of the contemporary space of participation. 
This intellectual impasse is to a great extent the result of that 
abstraction from material and local contexts of interaction which the 
language of networks carries with itself. As Kevin McDonald rightly 
notes, this discourse ‘expels the body and the senses’, neglecting the 
constitutive immersion of individuals in a physical environment. For 
him, ‘networks appear disembodied and too located in a culture 
of simultaneity’, and convey a static image of social movements 
insofar as ‘typically researchers attempt to “map” networks in a 
way that disembodies them, and locates them in a one-dimensional 
time’ (McDonald, 2006: 37). The accusation to be levelled at 
Castells is that he is, fundamentally, a cognitivist: one who, along 
with Descartes, sees the mind as detached from the body. This 
is particularly evident in his recent book Communication Power 
(2009), in which he draws on several insights from neuroscience to 
define contemporary society as informed by an all encompassing 
‘network of brains’ or ‘neural network of brains’. His discussion of 
communication resembles the abstraction of Habermas’ idea of the 
public sphere, which interestingly Habermas has himself re-defined 
as a ‘network for communicating information and points of view’ 
(Habermas, 1996: 360). What is missing in his treatment is the 
corporeal character of contemporary activism, whose importance 
is testified to by the array of physical occupations of sites in Cairo, 
Madrid, New York and hundreds of other cities.
Besides the bodily character of collective action, its emplaced 
nature is also overlooked. Following a thread which goes back to 
Debord’s analysis of the society of the spectacle, Baudrillard’s notion 
of hyper-reality (Baudrillard and Poster, 1988: 166–84), and Augé’s 
concept of non-places (1995), Castells is convinced that modern 
technologies of communication entail a withering away of the logics 
of place. In his treatment of the network society, the ‘space of flows’ 
of the internet overtakes the ‘space of places’, marginalising local 
interactions and the identities constructed therein (Castells, 1996: 
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429). But how are we to understand the Arab Spring, the indignados, 
or Occupy, if we do not retain a sense of the importance of place 
in contemporary societies? Castells’ definition of these movements 
as ‘wiki-revolutions’, ‘self-generating and self-organising’, seems 
to add little to the journalistic cliché of the ‘Facebook (or Twitter) 
revolution’. ‘Fearful around the world, but united on the Web’3 
read the title of a lecture Castells delivered at Berkeley about the 
Spanish indignados movement. This techno-visionary attitude does 
not seem able to provide us with a vocabulary and imaginary that 
would capture the gist of contemporary forms of collective action.
SwarmS wIThOuT hIveS
A network with wings: thus one could jokingly condense the 
similarities and differences between Castells’ and Hardt’s and 
Negri’s pet concepts. The venerable Italian post-operaismo thinker 
and Duke’s maverick professor employ the notion of swarms as 
part of their ambitious project of defining a new social class: the 
multitude (Hardt and Negri, 2000, 2004, 2009). The multitude 
is for them what the proletariat was for Marx: the revolutionary 
subject. Yet differently from the working class, the multitude, as 
its name suggests, is characterised by an irreducible multiplicity. 
Hardt and Negri contrast the multitude with industrial society’s 
imaginary of the crowd and the people. As the anthropologist 
William Mazzarella, himself a Marxist autonomist, observes, ‘It 
would not be an exaggeration to say that the coherence of the figure 
of the multitude, in the writings of Hardt and Negri, depends on 
its opposition to the figure of the crowd’ (Mazzarella, 2010: 71). 
Hardt and Negri see the emergence of this actor as a consequence 
of the shift in the productive system from material to immaterial 
production, where communication, the construction of social 
relations, and affectivity become the central terrain of capitalist 
accumulation. In Empire, they describe the multitude as rising 
in opposition to the force of global capitalism, as ‘a force that 
sustains Empire and at the same time the force that calls for and 
makes necessary its destruction’. They describe the multitude as 
characterised by ‘nomadism’ and ‘deterritorialising power’, building 
on the Deleuzian contrast between the State, with its territoriality 
and fixity, and the War Machine, with its smooth space continuously 
traversed by flows (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 61). The concept of 
the swarm comes to represent this nomadic corporeality, this ‘body 
without organs’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 40), a multitude 
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which can act together without being reduced to one identity or 
one place.
Communicative processes are crucial in the coordination of 
swarms. Thanks to the availability of complex technical linkages 
the swarm comes to establish and maintain a particular form of 
general intellect, what Hardt and Negri call the ‘swarm intelligence’, 
without the need for a central structure: 
recent researchers in artificial intelligence and computational 
methods use the term swarm intelligence to name collective and 
distributed techniques of problem solving without centralized 
control or provision of a global model ... the intelligence of the 
swarm is based fundamentally on communication ... the members 
of the multitude do not have to become the same or renounce their 
creativity in order to communicate and cooperate with each other. 
They remain different in terms of race, sex, sexuality and so forth. 
What we need to understand, then, is the collective intelligence 
that can emerge from the communication and cooperation of such 
a varied multiplicity. (Hardt and Negri, 2004: 91–2)
The resonance between the concept of the swarm and the social 
phenomenon of ‘flash-mobs’ is apparent. Flash-mobs emerged in 
2003, after a social experiment conducted by Wired! journalist Bill 
Wasik, who circulated an email inviting people to gather in front 
of a jewellery shop and then disperse, as a form of extravagant 
artistic performance. The idea was quickly taken up around the US 
to organise festive events, ranging from pillow fights to collective 
mockeries. But it was soon also adopted by activists as a way to 
exploit the potential of flexible coordination offered by the internet 
and mobile media. With their rapid assembly and sudden dispersion, 
flash-mobs came to capture the sense of a liquid sociality, made up 
of transient ad-hoc gatherings facilitated by modern technologies of 
communication. Californian techno-visionary Howard Rheingold 
talked of these groups as ‘smart mobs’, social aggregates ‘which 
cooperate in ways never before possible because they carry devices 
that possess both communication and computing capabilities’ 
(Rheingold, 2003: 12).
If Castells – who began publishing his path-breaking trilogy The 
Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture back in 1996 – was 
the social theorist of the rise of the World Wide Web, Hardt’s and 
Negri’s joint work, which came at a later stage, bears the stamp of 
the era of mobile media and the new forms of collective action their 
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diffusion inspired. Compared to Castells’ discussion of networks, 
Hardt and Negri do recuperate an appreciation of the role of the 
body and of its mobility, by way of that vitalistic stream of thought 
which runs from Spinoza to Deleuze. Yet they too fail to take into 
account the emplaced character of collective action, the fact that 
it requires physical locations as stages for its performances. They 
see the multitude as the reflection of a de-centred Empire, which 
‘establishes no territorial center of power and does not rely on fixed 
boundaries or barriers’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: xii, xiii). Within 
this framework they discount the ‘politics of place’ proposed by a 
number of radical thinkers and geographers. They distrust attempts 
‘to recompose sites of resistance that are founded on the identities of 
the social subjects or national and regional groups, often grounding 
political analysis in the localization of struggle’ (Hardt and Negri, 
2000: 40).
The place of the multitude, Hardt and Negri suggest, is a 
‘non-place’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 40). In a global world, appealing 
to a logic of place is not an option. This theme also appears in 
writings by Negri’s comrade, Paolo Virno, who, in the concise and 
punchy Grammar of the Multitude, interestingly contrasts two 
derivations of the Greek word ‘topos’: a place, as in ‘topology’; 
or a figure of language as in the English ‘topic’. The multitude, 
Virno argues, has no place, which means that its members are all 
bound to an experience of ‘Unheimlichkeit’ or foreignness (Virno, 
2004: 58). What binds them together is instead the presence of a 
common language. Virno is more pessimistic than Hardt and Negri 
in making this assertion, and sees more clearly the risks of isolation 
and solitude which underlie contemporary social experience. But 
equally he evades the question of how it is possible to construct a 
political project without at the same time constructing places and 
constructing territories.
Playing with the metaphor of ‘swarm’ as used by Hardt and 
Negri, one could say that what they are describing is in fact ‘swarms 
without hives’. We know from biology that while honey-bees fly 
across great distances they also need a fixed place to return to, and 
some comrade bees to remain there to keep the hive in place. But 
there is little sense of the importance of such local geographies 
in Hardt and Hegri’s account, framed as it is within the nomadic 
and fluid space of globalisation. In sum, both Castells and Hardt 
and Negri’s work can be seen as attempts to rethink new forms 
of collective action beyond the imaginary of industrial society 
and its social formations and to make sense of the impact of new 
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media on contemporary collective action. Hardt and Negri repeat 
several times that the multitude, unlike the crowd, goes beyond the 
reduction of plurality to a singularity – the so-called reduction ad 
unum. Similarly Castells defines the network in opposition to the 
mass and mass society, constantly represented as authoritarian and 
undemocratic. This rejection of the imaginary of the crowd or the 
mass interestingly also brings about a disregard for the importance 
of places as sites for the display of collective action – which clearly 
leaves little room for an understanding of the ‘take the square 
movements’ of 2011, and the importance that the occupation of 
public spaces has acquired in their unfolding.
a landScape Of dISperSIOn
Despite the criticisms made of both Castells’ and Hardt and Negri’s 
analysis, there is no denying that they correctly identify a situation 
of radical heterogeneity and multiplicity at the root of contemporary 
society. They are right in asserting that the post-industrial age is 
characterised by a social complexity which largely escapes the 
‘capture’ of traditional bureaucratic organisations like parties 
and trade unions. The problem, however, is that they accept this 
condition of multiplicity as also automatically defining collective 
action, rather than as the point of departure for a complex process 
of social re-composition and symbolic articulation, facilitating the 
‘fusion’ of individuals into a new collective agent. While celebrating 
the anti-authoritarian nature of contemporary social formations, 
they seem unconcerned about the challenges this situation of radical 
multiplicity poses, and the obstacles to mobilisation it raises. 
The phenomena captured by terms like ‘swarm’ and ‘network’ 
can, from a critical perspective, be seen as fundamentally involving 
an experience of individualisation, perfectly epitomised by the type 
of interactions channelled through social media. Since the 1990s 
theorists like Zygmunt Bauman, Ulrich Beck and Alberto Melucci 
have noted how post-industrial societies are invested by a process 
of restructuring in which individuals become the ‘fundamental units 
of the social system’, as described by Melucci (1996a: 91). In this 
context, individuals are to a great extent disembedded from pre-
established and stable collective identities. They are faced with a 
situation Bauman describes as one of ‘liquidity’ – as opposed to 
the ‘solidity’ of industrial societies – in which social relationships 
are characterised by uncertainty and have an ‘until-further-
notice’ character. Deprived of strong collective identifications, 
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individuals are compelled to seek ‘biographical solutions to systemic 
contradictions’ (Beck, 1992: 137). 
It is evident that this trend towards individualisation creates 
obstacles for the development of collective action. Traditionally, 
social movement theorists have seen the existence of a strong 
identity and a sense of collective solidarity as crucial pre-conditions 
for collective action. This idea is encapsulated in the notion of 
‘cat-net’ (a portmanteau of category and network) adopted by 
social movement historian Charles Tilly. On the one hand social 
movements require a common identity among participants as 
members of a collective category, distinct from other categories (for 
example, workers as distinct from students or the unemployed). On 
the other hand they rely on the presence of dense social networks 
based on strong ties (Tilly, 1978: 62–4). The condition of social 
individualisation described by Bauman and Beck is to some extent 
precisely the opposite of the circumstances Tilly would envisage 
as facilitating collective action. In contemporary society strong 
collective identities appear the exception rather than the norm, 
and social networks are dominated by ‘weak ties’ (Granovetter, 
1974) rather than strong ones.
Social movements have traditionally relied on the existence of 
local face-to-face networks, which have been considered almost 
unanimously by scholars as the most important channel for 
mobilisation (see for example Melucci, 1996a: 292). Throughout 
modern history, social movement organisers have regularly tapped 
into the energy of urban centres and their ‘public geography’ (Sennett, 
1977: 41), encompassing the places in which people rub shoulders 
with one another and construct lasting relationships of solidarity. 
This phenomenon is well testified by Georges Rudé’s description 
of the French Revolution as a drama unfolding between key sites 
in Paris such as the Île de la Cité, Les Tuileries, the Cornmarket, 
and the Faubourg St. Antoine, ‘soon to be distinguished as the 
most revolutionary of all the faubourgs’ (Rudé, 1964: 97). Charles 
Tilly notes that from the eighteenth century onwards London ‘was 
segregated into small subcommunities’, wherein protest actions 
‘capitalized on authorized public gatherings such as markets, 
hangings, and ceremonies’ (Tilly, 1981: 47). Finally, for Marx, the 
industrial factory introduced a condition of spatial concentration 
in which workers were isolated from broader society but shared 
a common everyday experience which came to form the basis for 
their political organisation (Kohn, 2003: 46).
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This kind of spatial concentration in the workplace described 
by Marx, or in city space as described by Tilly and Rudé, is, 
however, precisely what appears to be mostly missing in the social 
space of contemporary post-industrial societies. The dispersed 
spatial arrangement we face today is well captured by the Marxist 
Autonomist theory of the ‘social factory’, that is (as Negri puts 
it) a ‘factory without walls’ in which the entire urban fabric is 
the terrain of capitalist accumulation but at the same time also 
a stage for resistance (Negri, 1989: 97). While for some people, 
including Negri himself, this situation allows for the development 
of new forms of resistance (such as the so-called ‘metropolitan 
strike’, aimed at blocking the city as a whole rather than a specific 
economic activity), for others it constitutes a serious obstacle to 
the emergence of collective action. Bauman in particular offers a 
pessimistic diagnosis of contemporary social space by affirming 
that ‘contemporary hardships and sufferings are dispersed and 
scattered; and so is the dissent which they spawn’. In this context, 
‘the dispersion of dissent, the impossibility of condensing it and 
anchoring it in a common cause and unloading it against a common 
culprit only makes the pain yet more bitter’ (Bauman, 2000: 54). 
The dispersion Bauman talks about here is first and foremost a 
physical one, inscribed in an urban space shaped by the emergence of 
sprawls, new towns and gated communities, which shift populations 
away from the crime and dangers (real or supposed) of inner city 
areas. From the US to Egypt, urban development has followed 
this pattern, creating a space conforming to the individualist 
ideology of a globally dominant neoliberalism. The model for this 
reshaping of space has been Los Angeles, with the development 
of the city as a sprawl, a physical network without centres, much 
like the communication networks described by Castells. Socialist 
writer Mike Davis has been a trenchant critic of this development 
(1992a, 1992b, 1998). For him, the contemporary policies of 
urban management perfectly mirrors the contradictions of global 
capitalism. The upper middle classes, who own a disproportionate 
amount of society’s wealth, escape into gated communities, while 
the slums expand ever further. The desire for a privatised intimacy 
and a sense of security which fuels the advance of the diffused space 
of suburbia is underscored for Davis by a strategy of segregation: 
the neoliberal elite’s modern adaptation of the old adage ‘divide 
and rule’ (Davis, 1992a).
The rise of sprawls is accompanied by a ‘privatization of the 
physical public sphere’ whose consequence is ‘the destruction of 
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any truly democratic space’ whereby constitutional rights to public 
assembly are de facto curtailed and social encounter is frowned 
upon (Davis, 1992a: 155). For Davis, at its core, the spatial logic 
of contemporary capitalism is driven by a ‘fear of crowds’ (1992a: 
178–9) in which public gatherings are criminalised. The sprawling 
neoliberal city described by Davis appears to mark a new stage in 
that process of the ‘fall of the public man’ described by Richard 
Sennett, as the city withers away as ‘a milieu where strangers are 
likely to meet’ (Sennett, 1977: 48). Gathering places are carefully 
regimented and encounters between different classes or ethnic 
groups are frowned upon. Public spaces are deprived of their life, 
only to be later simulated in a corporate form inside shopping 
malls and plazas. These sanitised public spaces, Bauman reflects, are 
‘inhospitable’, conducive neither to social encounter nor to political 
organisation: ‘public space is increasingly empty of public issues. 
It fails to perform its past role of a meeting-and-dialogue place 
for private troubles and public issues’ (Bauman, 2000: 40). The 
condition of spatial dispersion which affects contemporary societies 
has thus to be seen as the very material enactment of individuali-
sation, whereby in the absence of stable and intense face-to-face 
contacts, people resort to transient mediated connections or 
‘transactions’ (Bauman, 2001: 73).
It is important to note that spatial dispersion and the crisis of 
public space are not just Western phenomena; just as neoliberalism 
has spread well beyond Europe and the US and been adopted 
as the economic and social policy of authoritarian regimes like 
Mubarak’s Egypt. In recent decades Cairo has witnessed a decline 
of the city centre locally known as ‘Downtown’, accompanied by 
the creation of new peripheral neighbourhoods for the rising middle 
classes. Since the 1990s huge shopping malls have mushroomed in 
the city’s suburbs, catering for middle-class consumption, next to 
which extends the ashwaa’iyyat, the slums wherein reside those 
who provide labour for the needs of the middle classes (builders, 
cleaners, gardeners and the like) (see for example Singerman and 
Amar, 2006; Singerman, 2009). Egyptian sociologist Mona Abaza 
describes how these ‘new cities in the desert mainly consist of walled, 
gated communities, landscaped compounds and condominiums, 
connected by highways that are easily accessible to “Carrefour” 
mega stores’ (Abaza, 2011). The rise of these gated communities 
has been accompanied by a sanitisation of the ‘popular life’ which 
used to thrive in the city centre around Tahrir square, which was 
to become the hotspot of the 2011 Egyptian revolution.
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prOmISeS Of cOnnecTIOn, ThreaTS Of ISOlaTIOn
It is remarkable how in the face of this situation of spatial dispersion 
and individualisation contemporary technologies of communication 
constantly offer us a redemptive promise of ‘connection’. As 
Bauman observes, mobile phones and internet websites offer a 
‘virtual proximity’ which ‘no longer requires physical closeness’ 
(Bauman, 2003: 62), a closeness so hard to find in contemporary 
social space. Following a similar line of reasoning, theorist Mark 
Poster argues that media has been substituted for place as a means 
of aggregation in contemporary society:
Contemporary social relations seem to be devoid of a basic 
level of interactive practices that, in the past, was the matrix of 
democratising politics: loci such as the agora, the New England 
Town Hall, the village church, the coffee house, the tavern, the 
public square, a convenient barn, a union hall, a park, a factory 
lunchroom, and even a street corner. Many of these places remain 
but no longer serve as organising centres for political discussion 
and action. It appears that the media and especially television 
have become the animating source for political discussion and 
action. (Poster, 2001: 178)
If, for Poster, television and more recently the internet have come 
to make up for the decline of places as sites of social and political 
aggregation, the irony is that while they ‘aggregate’ people around 
common symbols, these media also contribute to the tendency 
towards dispersion and fragmentation inherent in contemporary 
urban space. While enabling connection at a distance and establishing 
‘virtual proximity’, contemporary media interactions also run the 
risk of isolating us from our local community, enclosing us in a 
mediated ‘capsule’ (Cauter, 2004). 
The fragmenting and ‘encapsulating’ dynamics of communication 
technologies are well illustrated by the use of mobile media and the 
way in which they create barriers between different social groupings. 
Norwegian media researcher Richard Ling has examined how the 
diffusion of mobile phones has heavily reshaped the ‘microco-
ordination’ of everyday life – the ways in which we arrange our 
social interactions with others. This ‘can be seen in the iterative 
agreement as to when and where to meet friends’ and ‘in the ability 
to call ahead when we are late to an appointment’ (Ling, 2004: 
70). Thanks to these affordances, mobile media eliminate the need 
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to rely on specific meeting points – i.e., places where one might 
also unexpectedly bump into others – thus potentially secluding 
people within very specific social circles. According to Ling, the 
mobile phone ‘sets up a barrier between ourselves and our physical 
situation’ and thus ‘supports the development of cliques’, or what he 
calls ‘virtual walled communities’ (Ling, 2004: 190). While mobile 
media do indeed ‘bring us together’, at the same time they also 
‘tear us apart’ (Ling and Campbell, 2009). The trade-off for the 
extensive connections they offer is a numbing of our experience of 
locality and a reduction in our contacts with people outside of our 
mediated social circles. 
Similar observations can be made with respect to social media, 
insofar as they are effecting an increasing ‘mediatisation’ of 
interpersonal communication (Konijn, 2008). As the very adjective 
‘social’ in ‘social media’ suggests, they are means through which 
people mediate and manage their connections to extensive social 
networks of friends and acquaintances from a distance. These 
services have become particularly useful precisely because of the 
spatial dispersion characteristic of post-industrial society. The 
problem is that by encouraging us to focus on our extended but 
nevertheless still exclusive circles of mediated friendship and 
acquaintanceship, social media run the risk of exacerbating our 
‘elective affinities’ (Bourdieu, 1984: 241), that is, our tendency 
to relate with those who are similar to us, regardless of where 
they are located. Todd Gitlin has rightly argued that the internet 
has tended ‘to reproduce the dynamics of secession, exclusion 
and segmentation’ of contemporary societies and exacerbated the 
separation between the ‘information-rich’ and the ‘information-
poor’ (Gitlin, 1998: 172). Instead of one unitary public sphere à la 
Habermas, the internet has produced many ‘sphericules’.
If the city of sprawls is the spatial embodiment of a situation 
of individualisation, electronic communication points to what 
American sociologist Barry Wellman has called a ‘networked 
individualism’ – a situation in which the person rather than a specific 
place becomes the ‘portal’. 
Because connections are to people and not to places, the technology 
affords shifting of work and community ties from linking people-
in-places to linking people at any place. Computer-supported 
communication is everywhere, but it is situated nowhere. It is 
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I-alone that is reachable wherever I am: at a home, hotel, office, 
highway, or shopping centre. (Wellman, 2003: 17)
Social media allow to construct connections with distant others. 
However, these connections run the risk of taking energy and 
time away from interactions based on physical proximity. This 
tendency of new media to engender dynamics of seclusion from 
local communities and the thickness of face-to-face networks is an 
aspect overlooked by both Castells and Hardt and Negri, who, while 
celebrating the new possibilities of cooperation these technologies 
offer, tend to ignore their negative side-effects. 
To sum up, the contemporary situation of spatial dispersion 
and communicative fragmentation does not seem to bode well 
for facilitating a process of mass mobilisation. This issue is well 
illustrated in a thought experiment proposed by Gerald Marwell, 
Pamela E. Oliver and Ralph Prahl in their attempt to theorise the 
‘critical mass’ factor in social movements. They ask us to consider 
the condition of workers living in two ideal-typical cities: Alpha 
(characterised by spatial and communicative density), and Beta 
(characterised by dispersion):
Alpha is fairly isolated, and most of its affected employees live 
in a single suburb, Centauri. They attend Centauri’s churches; 
their children attend Centauri’s public schools; they belong to 
Centauri chapters of social and service clubs; they all are served 
by the same local telephone exchange. In contrast, Beta is part 
of an ethnically diverse two-state megalopolis, and its affected 
employees are scattered across a dozen different suburbs in 
two states and four counties. Thus, they rarely see one another 
after work. They go to different churches, send their children to 
different schools, read four or five different newspapers, and pay 
toll charges for telephone calls between many of the suburbs. 
(Marwell et al., 1988: 505)
‘We would find virtual unanimity among sociologists in predicting 
that the employees in Alpha are more likely than those in Beta 
to act collectively’, the researchers conclude. They affirm that the 
spatial and communicative structure of Alpha is more conducive 
to sustaining a sense of unity among individuals. In the same way, 
they suggest that there would also be ‘universal unanimity’ among 
sociologists that the type of space and media system we are dealing 
with today resembles Beta rather than Alpha. 
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The perfOrmaTIvITy Of aSSemBlIng
As we have seen, the dispersed and individualised nature of 
contemporary social experience raises irksome questions about the 
possibility of collective action. And yet the 2011 wave of social 
movements offered the most blatant empirical demonstration that 
mass protest is still possible even in the fragmented conditions of 
contemporary society. But how did these movements manage to 
coalesce despite the dispersion? How was a ‘critical mass’ achieved 
in a context which seemed ill-suited to its formation?
To understand contemporary social movements we need to depart 
from the classical literature for which a strong common identity 
and thick networks invariably have to pre-exist collective action 
(e.g., Tilly, 1978). At the same time, however, we also need to 
be suspicious of interpretations (such as those offered by Hardt 
and Negri and Castells) that view collective action as springing 
forth spontaneously, without the need for organisational mediation 
or symbolic articulation to shape and guide it. Counter to both 
these positions, and following Ernesto Laclau, I am convinced 
that the ‘proliferation of points of ruptures’ which characterises 
contemporary social experience, and is epitomised by the forms 
of interaction underlying social media, ‘makes necessary political 
forms of social aggregation’ (Laclau, 2005: 230). In the absence of 
embedded identities and thick social networks to sustain collective 
action, these elements need to be created pro-actively and ad-hoc 
in the course of the process of mobilisation. 
The renewed importance of the question of unity in the context of 
contemporary popular movements has also recently been recognised 
by network theorists like Jeffrey Juris. Analysing the Occupy 
movement in the US, Juris has argued that it is underscored precisely 
by ‘logics of aggregation’ in contrast to the ‘logics of networking’ he 
had earlier identified as the trait of the anti-globalisation movement 
(Juris, 2012). He describes these logics of aggregation as involving 
the ‘assembling of masses of individuals from diverse backgrounds 
within physical spaces’, arguing that ‘whereas the use of listservs and 
websites in the movements for global justice during the late 1990s 
and 2000s helped to generate and diffuse distributed networking 
logics, in the #Occupy movements social media have contributed 
to powerful logics of aggregation’ (Juris, 2012: 260–1).
The risk in Juris’ description is to see this shift from networking to 
aggregation as simply a consequence of the different technical tools 
employed, rather than as a reflection of the specific culture of the 
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new movements and of their ‘popular’ character and majoritarian 
ambitions. Moreover, Juris appears somewhat suspicious of these 
‘logics of aggregation’ and is reassured by the fact that the ‘logic of 
networking’, with its emphasis on diversity, continues to survive.
If the practices of contemporary popular movements pose serious 
theoretical and analytical problems for network theorists like Juris, 
this is because the forms of assembly or gathering in public space 
they involve are to a great extent at odds with the vision of society 
as a network without centres, as proposed by Castells, but also with 
the image of a constantly moving swarm without a hive, as portrayed 
by Hardt and Negri. As we will see in later chapters, the protest 
camps of the indignados, of the Egyptian revolution, of Occupy 
Wall Street, are marked by a striving for the construction of a sense 
of centrality and spatial fixity which is in effect precisely the reverse 
of the constitutive diffuseness of networks, and of the nomadism 
of swarms. The emergence of these new forms of popular assembly 
raises questions not only about their internal working and the type of 
communities constituted within them (see for example, Feigenbaum, 
Frenzel, and McCurdy, forthcoming), but also about the processes 
through which these assemblies come into being, or in other words 
about the nature of mobilisation as a process (rather than a state) 
of spatial assembling, with its own specific choreography. 
The problem of mobilisation as deployed in social movement 
theory is precisely the question of how people are assembled, starting 
from a situation of varying spatial dispersion. As in the military 
sense of the term, mobilisation involves a physical concentration of 
participants in space and time, which precedes the phase of combat 
(Clausewitz, 2004). For Melucci, mobilisation is ‘the process by 
which a social movement is created and begins to take action’. It is 
the operation ‘by which a collective actor gathers and organises its 
resources for the pursuit of a shared objective against the resistance 
of groups opposing that objective’ (Melucci, 1996a: 288). Similarly 
for Anthony Oberschall, mobilisation is ‘the process whereby 
activists build loyalty and commitment for their cause and assemble 
followers, funds and resources, all of which increase their capacity 
to act collectively’ (Oberschall, 1973: 384). 
It is evident that within each specific social movement this process 
of assembling acquires very different dynamics depending on the 
degree of spatial dispersion of the constituency being mobilised. 
There is a huge difference between mobilising a constituency 
which is in some ways already partly assembled around common 
workplaces, neighbourhoods, social and subcultural scenes, and 
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mobilising a constituency which is by and large deprived of these 
common poles of aggregation. For example, the anti-globalisation 
movement relied on the presence of local activist scenes like the one 
described by Haunss and Leach (2009) in order to hold itself together 
between phases of mobilisation. The situation is very different with 
contemporary popular movements, for which there is no social 
scene capable of encompassing the diverse constituency they aim to 
mobilise, and where the ad-hoc creation and maintenance of spaces 
of gathering thus acquires a fundamental importance. This process 
of assembling in public space thus come to require a great deal of 
attention, proportional precisely to the degree of spatial dispersion 
and social fragmentation they are attempting to recompose.
Hannah Arendt’s reflections on political action and public 
space offer some useful insights for making sense of the process 
of mobilisation as the re-composition of a prior situation of 
spatial dispersion. For Arendt, action (by which she exclusively 
means political action, as opposed to ‘work’ and ‘labour’) never 
happens in isolation. It always requires the construction of a sense 
of ‘togetherness’ among those involved, manifest in what Arendt 
calls a ‘space of appearance’:
The space of appearance comes into being wherever men are 
together in the manner of speech and action ... Its peculiarity 
is that, unlike the spaces which are the work of our hands, it 
does not survive the actuality of the movement which brought it 
into being, but disappears not only with the dispersal of men—
as in the case of great catastrophes when the body politic of 
a people is destroyed—but with the disappearance or arrest of 
the activities themselves. Wherever people gather together, it is 
potentially there, but only potentially, not necessarily and not 
forever. (Arendt, 1958: 199)
Arendt suggests that public space is not a datum or a material 
architecture acting as a venue, but rather a form of experience 
resulting from the process of gathering and its re-composition of a 
prior situation of dispersion. Public space, in other words, needs to 
be performatively constructed and re-constructed through the act 
of gathering of otherwise dispersed individuals.
Arendt’s analysis of togetherness and assembly resonates 
deeply with Emile Durkheim’s description of the gatherings of 
Australian tribes:
Gerbaudo T02575 01 text   38 30/08/2012   11:04
SOcIal medIa and The chOreOgraphy Of aSSemBly 39
The life of Australian societies alternates between two different 
phases. At times the population is scattered in small groups that 
go about their business independently. Each family lives by itself, 
hunting and fishing – in short striving by all possible means to 
provide for its needs. At other times, by contrast, the population 
is concentrated and condensed in particular places for a period 
varying from several days to several months. This concentration 
takes place when a clan or tribal group is summoned to meet, and 
on this occasion they hold either a religious ceremony or what 
ethnographers call a corroboree. (Durkheim, 1912/1965: 162)
Durkheim famously describes the gathering as a moment of ‘collective 
effervescence’ in which emotions are stirred up. He observes that 
‘the very fact of assembling is an exceptionally powerful stimulant. 
Once the individuals are assembled, their proximity generates a 
kind of electricity that quickly transports them to an extraordinary 
degree of exaltation’ (Durkheim, 1912/1965: 162). 
Drawing on these insights from both Arendt and Durkheim, we 
can offer a provisional definition of the process of mobilisation 
as a performative act of gathering or assembling which spatially 
re-composes together in a temporary unity what was previously 
torn apart, and which in so doing creates public space as a form 
of collective and emplaced experience. In the remainder of this 
chapter, I conceptualise the forms of symbolic and organisational 
mediation which intervene in this process, by coining the notion of 
‘choreography of assembly’. Working through this term, I discuss how 
processes of identity-building and emotional motivation are involved 
in giving a coherence to the spontaneity of protest participation
chOreOgraphIng prOTeST
The act of bodily assembling, which in general terms constitutes 
the spatial logic of the process of social movement mobilisation, 
revolves around the construction of a situation of bodily density 
dominated by face-to-face communication. Yet in turn, in the context 
of a ‘mediatised society’ (Thompson, 1995), the physical coming 
together of a previously dispersed group of people could hardly 
take place without a complex process of technical and symbolic 
mediation involved in summoning from a distance dispersed 
individuals. The act of assembling comes to be underscored by 
complex communicative and organisational practices, allowing for 
groups which are spatially dispersed but united by the same interests 
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or convictions to act together. Within the field of social media, the 
most obvious examples of such a process come from websites like 
MeetUp,4 informing users about ‘offline’ meetings they might be 
interested in; Doodle,5 a web-polling application used to schedule 
meetings and other appointments; and of course the popular 
Facebook event function, used to invite people to various activities. 
These services are testament to the extent to which the assembling of 
social groupings in our fragmented and dispersed societies relies on a 
complex process of symbolic and technical mediation, or what I will 
refer to here as a ‘choreography of assembly’. As I will argue in the 
course of the book, contemporary forms of protest communication, 
including activist tweets, Facebook pages, mobile phone apps and 
text messages revolve to a great extent precisely around acts of 
choreographing: the mediated ‘scene-setting’ and ‘scripting’ of 
people’s physical assembling in public space.
Interestingly, in recent years the term ‘choreography’ has been 
widely used by anti-globalisation activists – including John Jordan, 
the initiator of the anti-road movement Reclaim the Streets – to 
refer to the process of protest organising. Dance historian Susan 
Leigh Foster (2003) has coined the term ‘choreography of protest’ 
to describe how a number of forms of protest – from the anti-HIV 
activism of ACT UP and the Seattle anti-WTO protests – were marked 
by a ‘physicality’ similar to that of dance (Foster, 2003). Taking a 
cue from Jeffrey Alexander’s discussion of ‘social performances’ 
(Alexander, 2006: 36–9), my emphasis in adopting of the notion 
of choreography is not simply on the bodily and emplaced nature 
of collective action, but also crucially on its symbolic and mediated 
character, on the fact that media practices intervene in preparing the 
terrain, or setting the scene, for people coming together in public 
space. 
Deriving etymologically from the Greek words for ‘dance’ and 
‘writing’, the term choreography incorporates the idea of a symbolic 
mediation of bodily action. It can thus be used to describe how 
contemporary popular movements, despite their anti-authoritarian 
stress on improvisation and creative participation, nevertheless rely 
on a ‘writing of movement’, or in more general terms a ‘writing of 
action’, mostly hidden to external observers, but nevertheless highly 
effective in structuring the way in which people come together and 
act together in public space. 
The choreographing of public gatherings in which social media are 
involved cannot be reduced to the circulation of practical information, 
or the logistics of organising protest events. The choreography of 
Gerbaudo T02575 01 text   40 30/08/2012   11:04
SOcIal medIa and The chOreOgraphy Of aSSemBly 41
assembly of contemporary movements has its own cultural narrative, 
and it chiefly requires the construction of common collective 
identifications among participants, without which such practical 
information would fall on deaf ears. Throughout the history of social 
movements, media like newspapers, radio and TV have contributed 
in condensing symbolic assemblages which can later materialise 
into bodily assemblies. A number of theorists from Melucci to 
Laclau have remarked on the importance of identity-building in 
facilitating the coming together of social movements in public 
space. For Melucci the construction of a collective identity is one 
of the first tasks to be dealt with during the process of mobilisation, 
alongside ‘the identification of an enemy, the definition of a purpose 
and an object at stake in the conflict’ (Melucci, 1996a: 292). These 
different phases entail the progressive ‘fusion’ of participants into a 
common social body since, as Melucci suggests, through the process 
of mobilisation ‘the different fragments joining together to form a 
movement are integrated into a new system of relations in which 
the original elements change their meanings’ (Melucci 1996a: 292). 
Thus through the construction of common identities a dispersed 
constituency is condensed into a common subjectivity with the 
capacity ‘to act as a unified and delimited subject and to retain 
control over their own action’ (Melucci, 1996a: 72).
This process of condensation around a common identity cannot 
be reduced to the simple sharing of information, since it crucially 
involves an ‘emotional investment’ on the part of participants. For 
Melucci, ‘passions and feelings, love and hate, faith and fear are 
all part of a body acting collectively’. He criticises those authors 
who see these aspects of collective action as ‘irrational’, insisting 
that ‘there is no cognition without feeling and no meaning without 
emotion’ (Melucci, 1996a: 72). Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta (2001) 
have likewise reasserted the importance of emotions in collective 
action. Jasper in his later work has highlighted the importance 
of an ‘emotional energy’, defined as ‘a mood of excitement and 
enthusiasm’ around a common identity, which constitutes a 
fundamental resource for protest participation (Jasper, 2011: 297). 
Valuable insights for understanding collective identification 
in contemporary social movements can be drawn from Laclau’s 
discussion of ‘populism’ as a process of the construction of the 
people, as developed in his Populist Reason (2005). For Laclau, the 
‘people’ is a subject which does not pre-exist as an actor but needs 
to be pro-actively created through specific discursive operations. 
The creation of the people as a subject is for Laclau the task of 
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‘populism’ – a notion to which he does not attach the usual negative 
connotations. Populism is here simply a type of politics which differs 
from ‘democratic’ politics with its emphasis on difference and single 
issues, and which cuts the political space in two, pitting the people 
against corrupt institutions, incapable of responding to widespread 
social grievances. 
The emotional condensation of the people around a common 
identity requires the presence of what Laclau calls an ‘empty signifier’: 
a leader, an image, a collective name or possibly also a place around 
which the unity of the people can be performatively created (Laclau, 
1996: 36; 2005: 69). The empty signifier is a ‘signifier without a 
signified’, that is, a symbol which has been deprived of its particu-
laristic content and can thus create a ‘chain of equivalence’ (Laclau, 
2005: 93) between different groups of people with their respective 
grievances. Against the emphasis on multiplicity of authors like 
Castells and Hardt and Negri, Laclau thus suggests that the process of 
mobilisation entails to a great extent a reductio ad unum, a reduction 
of the ‘complexity of the social’ (Laclau, 2005: 94).
The choreography of assembly also crucially encompasses a 
process of material precipitation from symbolic assemblages to 
bodily assembly in public space. The nature of this process can be 
gleaned by looking at Frantz Fanon’s discussion of the role played 
by the radio stations of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) 
in organising the struggle against the French colonizers in Algeria 
(1959–67). The FLN radio station Voice of Fighting Algeria was, 
Fanon says, ‘of capital importance in consolidating and unifying 
the people’. Through its coverage,
the fragments and splinters of acts gleaned by the correspondent 
of a newspaper more or less attached to the colonial domination, 
or communicated by the opposing military authorities lost their 
anarchic character and became organised into a national and 
Algerian political idea, assuming their place in an overall strategy 
of the reconquest of people’s sovereignty. The scattered acts fitted 
into a vast epic. (Fanon, 1967: 84)
Fanon reflects at length on how listening to the radio created a new 
sense of mediated community among the people which sustained the 
mobilisation of the national liberation movement. While previously 
possessing a radio had been considered a sign of complicity with the 
colonial regime, with the inception of the Voice of Fighting Algeria 
the ‘radio receiver lost its identity as an enemy. The radio set was 
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no longer part of the occupier’s arsenal of cultural oppression’. On 
the contrary, for Algerians, having a radio now ‘meant paying one’s 
taxes to the nation, buying the right of entry into the struggle of an 
assembled people’ (Fanon, 1967: 84). 
What is crucial, however, is that the role of radio did not stop 
at the level of creating a symbolic community, but also facilitated 
the physical gathering of people in public space. The assemblage 
described by Fanon was not only symbolic but also physical, since, 
given the scarcity of radios, people would crowd around one set 
in order to listen together. This coming together of the disparate 
constituted a fundamental threat for the French coloniser. The spread 
of these intimate gatherings in fact constituted the initial nuclei 
around which a process of mobilisation would form, in a world 
already ‘cut in two’ along a ‘dividing line ... shown by barracks and 
police stations’ (Fanon, 1965: 34). The radio thus facilitated the 
material precipitation of the movement, and the transformation of 
dissenting publics into protesting crowds. 
The notion of a choreography of assembly is employed not simply 
to highlight the deeply mediated character of the process of physical 
assembling well represented in Fanon’s example. It also crucially 
refers to the fact that such process of mediation express the nature 
of contemporary forms of indirect, emotional or ‘choreographic’ 
leadership which revolve around setting the general scene for 
participation, leaving participants to creatively ‘navigate’ the space 
thus created. Leadership here needs to be understood in general terms 
as a relatively centralised form of influence over the course a collective 
action will take. It is evident that if one looks within contemporary 
movements for a charismatic leader acting as ‘figurehead’ – a Gandhi 
or a Martin Luther King – one will find no such singular person. But 
leadership does not necessarily need to take such a form, and can 
acquire more discreet and diffuse manifestations. 
As we know from the work of scholars such as Jo Freeman, also 
within anti-authoritarian, social movements there often tends to 
be an activist elite which exercise an elusive influence on internal 
organising. The kind of soft and invisible leadership proper to 
informal organisations can be understood as a form a ‘dialogical 
relationship’ which ‘seeks understanding and agreement’ (Barker 
et al., 2001: 18). This form of choreographic leadership works 
through a logic of consensus rather than a logic of command, in 
which leaders instead of giving orders are involved in ‘proposing to 
these differentiated entities [that social movements are] how they 
should and can identify themselves and act together’ by proposing 
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‘collective images’ and ‘forms of action, and organisation’ (Barker 
et al., 2001: 18) – or in terms of the metaphor of choreography, 
‘scripts’, which participants are invited to perform. Rejecting the 
absolute spontaneity propounded by Castells and Hardt and Negri, 
the notion of choreography emphasises the importance of leaders 
and leading groups in giving a coherence – a common sense of unity, 
of place and of direction – to collective action. 
The utility of the notion can be appreciated at three different 
levels: First, it allows us to analyse the organisational dynamics of 
the process of mobilisation and to ask who are the ‘choreographers’ 
of public gatherings, the people initiating and guiding them. Second, 
the utility of the term revolves around its capacity to capture the 
temporal character of the process of mobilisation. We know from 
social movement literature that mobilisation is a dynamic process 
involving different stages, in particular a phase of initiation and a 
phase of sustainment, the latter being particularly important in the 
case of long-term mass sit-ins. Likewise, we can see the choreography 
of assembly as fundamentally involving two different moments: the 
symbolic condensation of people around a common identity and 
their material precipitation in public space. Last but not least, the 
notion of choreography allows us to analyse the spatial character 
of the process of mobilisation and the way in which it connects 
dispersed participants with specific places of gathering. We can see 
this process as involving the weaving together of a spatial ‘texture’ 
(Lefebvre, 1974/1991: 222), a symbolic overlaying of physical space 
with cultural meanings and narratives. This in turn can be broken 
down into two separate moments of emotional tension: an impetus 
towards public gatherings during the phase of initiation, and an 
attraction to those gatherings during the phase of sustainment.
The ways in which social media may be utilised in the construction 
of a choreography of assembly will now be analysed in detail in the 
remaining chapters, looking at the different popular movements of 
2011, from Egypt, to Spain, to the United States. For the reader’s 
convenience in the next section I have included an overview of the 
cases studies covered in the book and a timeline of relevant events. 
OvervIew Of The caSe STudIeS
The 2011 egyptian revolution
A few days after the successful overthrow of Tunisian president Ben 
Ali, on the 25th of January 2011, thousands of Egyptians took to 
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the streets to protest against the dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak. 
After an uprising lasting for 18 days, which had its centre-point 
in Tahrir square in central Cairo, Mubarak relinquished his post, 
and a military council took power. The protests were celebrated 
as a demonstration of the power of social media as a vehicle of 
mobilisation. But how were social media actually concretely used 
by activists? And how did they interact with other forms of street 
level of communication in the process of gathering in public space?
The indignados movement in Spain
The 15th of May 2011 marked the day of beginning of a movement 
which drew inspiration and borrowed tactics from the Egyptian 
uprising. The ‘indignados’ or indignants as they came to be called 
took to the streets to voice their outrage against the politics of 
austerity and economic crisis which had put almost half of young 
people out of work. In imitation of Tahrir square they occupied 
Puerta del Sol in central Madrid for a month, after a demonstration 
which similarly to the Egyptian uprising had been called for on 
Facebook by a group of young activists with little prior political 
experience. The movement established a series of local assemblies, 
and organised marches throughout the country to collect people’s 
demands. What was the role of social media in the process of 
mobilisation? How did the organisers use social media to harvest 
a common feeling of indignation?
Occupy wall Street in the uS
After the call launched by the countercultural magazine Adbusters 
on the 17th of September 2011, 300 people occupied a small park 
in central Manhattan. After a couple of weeks, they finally managed 
to attract news media’s attention and to capture the imagination of 
US citizens. They appealed to the 99% of the population, all those 
fallen victim to the financial crisis. The movement soon spread to 
hundreds of locations across the US and beyond, while the ‘meme’ of 
Occupy came to be applied to different campaigns and actions. How 
were social media used in the process of participants’ mobilisation 
in the case of Occupy Wall Street? And how does their use differ 
from that which characterised Egypt and Spain?
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TImelIne
Date Event Location
06/06/10 Khaled Said, a 28-year-old blogger and 
entrepreneur, is brutally killed by secret police in 
Alexandria after having posted on the internet a 
video documenting police corruption. Two days 
later, Google executive Wael Ghonim opens a 
Facebook page called Kullena Khaled Said (We are 
all Khaled Said).
Alexandria
17/12/10 Mohammed Bouazizi a 26-year-old street vendor, 
sets himself on fire in the small town of Sidi Bouzid 
in South Tunisia after having been harassed by a 
police officer. His suicide sparks demonstrations 
against President Ben Ali’s regime.
Sidi Bouzid
14/01/11 Ben Ali flees Tunisia after several days of unrest 
in the country, putting an end to his 23 years in 
power.
Tunis
25/01/11 An estimated 50,000 people take to the streets of 
Cairo on Police Day, to protest against the 30-year 
regime of Hosni Mubarak. In the night they were 
violently dislodged from Tahrir square. But protests 
continued in the following days.
Cairo
28/01/11 Up to a million people take to the streets of Cairo 
on the ‘Friday of Rage’ demonstrations. After a 
long battle with police forces they occupy Tahrir 
square. In the evening army tanks move into the 
city. In the early morning the Mubarak regime shuts 
down all electronic communications, in what came 
to be known as the ‘kill switch’.
Cairo
02/02/11 Day of the ‘battle of the camel’. Demonstrators 
successfully defend Tahrir square against the 
attacks of pro-Mubarak thugs and plain-clothes 
policemen.
Cairo
11/02/11 Mubarak resigns after 18 days of uprising, leaving 
the country in the hands of the Supreme Council of 
Armed Forces (SCAF).
Cairo
08/03/11 Democracia Real Ya (Real Democracy Now) 
sets up its Facebook page which will serve as 
an organisational platform for the ‘indignados’ 
(outraged) movement.
Spain
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Date Event Location
15/05/11 Hundreds of thousands of Spaniards take part in 
the demonstrations against austerity and corruption 
called by Democracia Real Ya. On the evening of 






17/05/11 After the eviction of the encampment in the early 
morning, thousands of citizens converge on Puerta 
del Sol and set up a protest camp that will last for 
one month. Soon other acampadas spread across 
the country.
Madrid
25/05/11 Thousands of citizens flood Syntagma square in 
Athens, in imitation of the Spanish indignados 
movement, during a phase of rising social 
opposition against austerity measures put forward 
by Papandreou’s government.
Athens
19/06/11 A huge demonstration in Madrid and several cities 
across Spain, a few days after the main occupations 
are voluntarily lifted by activists. In the summer the 
indignados organise a series of marches throughout 
the country, and set up neighbourhood assemblies.
Madrid
12/07/11 The Canadian countercultural magazine Adbusters 
launches on its website the first call to Occupy Wall 
Street.
Vancouver
02/08/11 First General Assembly of Occupy Wall Street, in 
Bowling Green next to the Wall Street bull statue. 
Sparks fly between socialist and anarchist activists.
New York
17/09/11 Protesters occupy Zuccotti Park in Downton 
Manhattan, near to the New York Stock Exchange 
in Wall Street.
New York
01/10/11 The mass arrest (700+ people) of Occupy protesters 
on Brooklyn Bridge draws the attention of 
mainstream media.
New York
15/10/11 ‘15O’ global day of action for global change. Called 
by the Spanish indignados, and enacted worldwide 
in 950 cities in 82 countries. In New York activists 
occupy Times Square. In London activists set up a 
camp at the steps of St Paul’s cathedral, which they 
will hold until February 2012.
Global
15/11/11 The Occupy Wall Street protest camp in Zuccotti 
Park is evicted by the NYPD. Two days later, 
30,000 people take part in a protest against the 
financial system in the streets of Manhattan.
New York
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‘we are not guys of comment and like’: 
The revolutionary coalescence of 
Shabab-al-Facebook
All we do is post on Facebook. We are the Facebook generation. Period.
comment by a user on the kullena khaled Said page (quoted in ghonim, 2012: 135)
During the sit-in held in July 2011 against the continuation of military 
rule, behind one of the green fences surrounding Tahrir square, a 
street vendor was busy selling revolutionary souvenirs. Among them 
was a T-shirt carrying the script ‘25th of January Revolution’, next 
to which were two words: ‘freedom’ and ‘Facebook’. Nearby, in 
Talaat Harb street, a graffiti painting reproduced the blue and white 
logo of Zuckerberg’s social networking website. A little further on, 
one could still make out scanty painted letters composing the word 
‘Twitter’ on a shop shutter.
These scripts looked quite awkward to Western eyes, used to 
seeing website logos like those of Facebook and Twitter flickering 
on a computer screen rather than daubed on the streets, and even 
less so as the content of political graffiti. But it is precisely this 
awkwardness that reveals something important about the dynamics 
of the Egyptian revolution as a process driven by an internet-savvy 
youth, the shabab-al-Facebook (Facebook youth). As I will explain 
in this chapter, in the course of the Egyptian revolution, social media 
became the means of a choreography of assembly, facilitating the 
coalescence of this cosmopolitan Facebook youth around a common 
identity, and its material precipitation into a ‘street youth’. Derided 
for years by the state-owned media as ‘guys of comment and like’, 
the internet generation became infused with a missionary spirit of 
national salvation, incited by Facebook pages, blog posts, and tweets. 
Social media and in particular Facebook functioned as a training 
ground for this politically inexperienced but media-savvy youth, 
and as a launching pad for the protests. The shabab-al-Facebook 
thus became street agitators of the shaabi, the lower classes which 
make up the great majority of Egyptian society. It was through 
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this interaction with groups separated by the digital divide that 
the shabab-al-Facebook successfully turned into the catalyst of a 
process of mass mobilisation. If social media played only a limited 
and very specific role in that process, it was nonetheless crucial in 
the coalescence of the initial revolutionary nucleus around which a 
number of ‘rings’ of participants would progressively cluster.
As we have seen, the uprisings in Egypt and before it in Tunisia 
have been celebrated in the media as ‘Facebook revolutions’, 
‘Twitter revolutions’, or ‘wiki-revolutions’. These labels rightly 
highlight the important role played by the internet and social media 
as platforms for protest communications. However, they overlook 
the fact that only a limited constituency was actually mobilised 
by such media, simply as a consequence of low levels of internet 
connection. In 2011 only 25 per cent of Egyptian households were 
connected to the internet, only 4 per cent of Egyptian adults were 
members of Facebook, and only a miniscule 0.15 per cent of them 
had a Twitter account (Dubai School of Government, 2011b). As the 
‘Tahrir media project’, which surveyed the media uses of over 1,000 
(mostly middle-class) protesters, shows, only a fraction of those who 
took to the streets were mobilised by Facebook and an even smaller 
number by Twitter. Only 16 per cent of the protesters interviewed 
in Cairo used Twitter, while 42 per cent of them used Facebook, 
despite the fact that, as Dunn and Wilson put it, they were part of 
a ‘highly wired sample’ (Wilson and Dunn, 2011). For the great 
mass of participants in the Egyptian uprising, mobilisation worked 
through more traditional channels such as oral communication and 
the mass media.
This evidence clearly urges us to be aware of the limited impact 
of social media as a means of mobilisation during the Egyptian 
revolution. More positively, it also invites us to ascertain the specific 
contribution to the process of mobilisation of that specific group 
for which the internet was indeed, alongside oral communication, 
the main medium of mobilisation: the so-called Facebook youth. 
It is this section of the movement whose experience and media-use 
I will focus on in here. As a consequence, the account proposed in 
this chapter is admittedly limited in its coverage and scope. First and 
foremost, it focuses on the 18 days of the uprising against Hosni 
Mubarak, rather than on the later protest waves, and specifically 
on the preparation of the protests and the first days of the uprising. 
I do not consider the communication strategies of the Muslim 
Brotherhood or of the trade unions, however much both groups 
may have been decisive in the success of the revolution. Finally, I 
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do not discuss the role played by mass media, and in particular 
by Al-Jazeera, despite the fact that they played an important part 
in mobilising large sectors of the population beyond the young 
internet-connected middle class (Cottle, 2011).
The chapter begins by looking at how the Mubarak regime’s tight 
control on public space prior to the revolution obliged activists to 
turn to the internet to share their dissent. Among the several activist 
blogs and websites, a leading role was played by the Kullena Khaled 
Said Facebook page, which acted as a site of emotional condensation 
for a largely un-politicised Facebook youth prior to the protests. 
Moreover, it served as a launch pad to create a sense of anticipation 
and an impetus prior to the material precipitation of the movement. 
This early online organising was soon paralleled by an intense 
ground-level effort to agitate the ‘shaabi’: the popular classes. 
From the very first days of the uprising, face-to-face communication 
overtook social media as medium of choice for the movement. In the 
last section of the chapter I turn to the role played by Twitter in the 
uprising. I argue that compared to Facebook, Twitter had a more 
limited impact. It was mostly geared at eliciting external attention, 
while also playing a role as a channel for tactical communication 
within the activist elite. Nevertheless, this medium has been seen 
by some activists as carrying the risk of isolation from mainstream 
Egyptian society, taking time away from street campaigning and 
more accessible forms of internet communication. 
deSerT In The STreeTS, OaSIS On The InTerneT
Analyses of the role of the internet in the Egyptian revolution 
often overlook the fact that its popularity as a vehicle for protest 
organisation was a consequence of the strict policing of public space 
under Mubarak. Naturally the authoritarianism of the regime affected 
all basic civil and political rights. But of the three fundamental 
liberal-democratic freedoms – freedom of expression, of association, 
and of assembly – possibly the most repressed was the latter (Osman, 
2010). In fact, under Mubarak a handful of opposition parties 
were allowed to exist, including the liberal el-Wafd, the social-
democratic Tagamma, and the Nasserist el-Karama, though they 
acted for the most part as window-dressing for the regime, given 
that elections were systematically rigged. Also some opposition 
papers including Masry Al-Youm and el-Shorouq were formally 
permitted to operate, even though they were the target of constant 
legal harassment, and their editors were subject to intimidations. 
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The regime half-heartedly tolerated their existence given that they 
reached only limited sections of the Egyptian population, and thus 
did not endanger its maintenance of consensus. What the regime 
could in no way tolerate were public demonstrations in the streets, 
which could create a dangerous interaction between the activist 
community and the lower classes. 
State of emergency laws maintained almost without interruption 
during Mubarak’s tenure in power especially targeted the right 
of assembly in public space. The secret police, the notorious 
‘mukhabarat’, was an infamous presence whose phantom-like 
existence acted as a powerful deterrent for all those harbouring 
aversion towards the regime (Bradley, 2008). The use of torture, 
violence, kidnappings and sometimes arbitrary killings of political 
opponents was common knowledge among the populace. The 
presence of police informants bred a common feeling of distrust 
even among relatives and friends – a common experience under a 
totalitarian regime. Yet for all the regime’s attempt to silence dissent 
in public space, the thriving street life and thick social networks of 
Egyptian cities (Bayat, 2010) offered some room for the cultivation 
of defiance towards the regime. The tens of thousands of ‘ ‘ahwa’ 
coffee shops in Cairo, Alexandria and other major cities provided 
a highly diffuse infrastructure for the nurturing of dissent at 
street-level. It was not uncommon to hear people insulting Mubarak 
in private conversations. But the fear of police reprisals limited 
dissent to very specific private or semi-public locations and circles. 
Open dissent in the form of public demonstrations was restricted to 
a small community of activists, bloggers, opposition politicians and 
NGO workers with limited connection with the broader populace. 
The average demonstration during the Mubarak years would 
number a few hundred people. A typical venue might be the stairs 
at the entrance of the journalists’ syndicate, and other progressive 
syndicates acting as protest sanctuaries. People would gather for few 
minutes, unfold a banner, shout some slogans to a small audience 
of passers-by, before the police arrived to squeeze people in a tight 
containment cordon. ‘We were looked at as crazy people’ – recounts 
Sally Zohney, a 27-year-old political science graduate from Cairo 
University who regularly attended such demonstrations. ‘People 
weren’t really understanding why we were doing that. They weren’t 
believing that it was possible to do away with the regime anyway.’ 
The only major exception during the 2000s was the demonstration 
against the Iraq war in February 2003. Around 40,000 people, 
according to optimistic calculations, converged to Tahrir square 
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but were soon dispersed by police charges and tear gas. It was 
only in the mid to late 2000s that a series of strikes and labour 
protests including sit-ins in front of parliament would set the basis 
for a popular ‘repertoire of contention’ (Tilly, 2003) which deeply 
informed the 2011 revolution.
Bearing in mind this ‘inhospitability’ of public space under 
Mubarak, we can better understand the reasons why the internet 
and Facebook in particular came to constitute such a popular 
platform for encouraging dissent against the regime. Using an 
admittedly stereotypical but nonetheless apt image, one could say 
that if Egyptian public space had become a desert for dissenting 
groups, where they could easily be identified and targeted, the 
internet came to constitute something like a diffuse oasis where 
oppositional identities could develop without being immediately 
crushed by the state. 
In the 2000s the ICT sector experienced a momentous growth in 
Egypt (Abdulla, 2007). Cairo witnessed a rise of web start-ups and 
the development of local telephone companies including Etisalat 
and Mobinil. One man became the face of this ‘Egypt 2.0’ with its 
promise of political liberalisation. Ahmed Nazif, prime minister from 
2004 until the revolution, and formerly minister of communication, 
put much effort into improving internet connectivity. Between 2005 
and 2010 the internet penetration rate went up from 9 per cent to 
24 per cent of household, still quite low given that the United States 
had by 2010 reached almost 80 per cent, but also underrated given 
Egyptians’ intense use of internet cafés.1 Realising that it could not 
effectively censor the internet without unleashing an avalanche of 
disapproval from its Western allies, the Mubarak regime presented 
the relative degree of online freedom enjoyed by Egyptians as proof 
of its agenda of political liberalisation (Hofheinz, 2005).
By leaving the internet relatively open, the regime also hoped to 
maintain the support of the young middle-class, that new generation 
of Egyptians which came to be known as the shabab-al-Facebook 
(Peterson, 2011). The regime’s relative lenience towards internet 
access was not without its risks though. The expansion in ICT 
trained a workforce in the use of communication technologies 
which could, and did, become a dangerous weapon in the hands 
of the enemies of the regime. Moreover, blogs and Facebook groups 
became sites that were to breed a culture of irreverence and anti-
authoritarianism, all the more explosive under the pressure of the 
authoritarian or ‘pharaonic’ system of government of Egypt.2 In 
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the late 2000s bloggers like Hossam al-Hamalawy (also known 
as Arabawy) and Alaa Abdel Fattah began drawing a significant 
following with their caustic commentaries on Egyptian politics. 
These and other bloggers were often arrested and harassed by the 
police, and the National Democratic Party of Mubarak even created 
a specific ‘Electronic Commitee’ to counter internet activists, while 
other bloggers and Facebook users were paid to post pro-regime 
messages (Ghonim, 2012: 69–70). Despite the repression of digital 
activism, Nazif often vaunted the opening of limited spaces of 
dissent on the internet as a consequence of his own policies. When 
heckled in January 2009 by a group of activists at Cairo University, 
the prime minister scathingly replied that the protesters were ‘the 
same young people who used the Internet to express their opinions!’3
The Cairo activists were part of the ‘6th of April’ group which 
led the experimentations in the use of the internet as a platform 
for protest mobilisation. The group was mostly composed of 
young middle-class Cairenes and Alexandrians led by a young civil 
engineer Ahmed Maher. Many of them had joined the group out 
of disillusion with Kifaya (‘Enough’), a movement formed in 2005 
to demand an end to Mubarak’s regime, but which displayed a 
Figure 2.1 The facebook logo turned into a graffiti in Talaat harb, cairo. 
(author: paolo gerbaudo)
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disregard for economic problems closer to the heart of the majority 
of the population. To address this issue, the new 6th of April 
movement tried to build contacts with the labour movement. The 
group took its name from the date of a strike by textile workers in 
Mahalla el-Kobra, an industrial town in the Nile Delta, with which 
it expressed solidarity, calling for a national general strike on 6 April 
2008.4 The event was publicised on the 6th of April Facebook page 
and organised as a flash-mob. Supporters were invited to wear black 
clothes and line the public streets with their backs to the traffic to 
express their indignation at the regime.
The strike in Mahalla el-Kobra was brutally repressed by the 
police, with one dead and hundreds wounded, while the supporting 
demonstration in Cairo had a limited degree of success. But the 
regime this time took notice and arrested Israa Abdel Fattah, the 
admin of 6th of April Facebook page, who came to be known in the 
Egyptian media as ‘Facebook girl’. The event added to a repertoire 
of protest practices which were progressively clustering around a 
common revolutionary identity, as summed up by Noor Ayman 
Noor, the activist son of prominent opposition figure, and former 
presidential candidate, Ayman Noor:
The 6th of April set foundations for the fact that you can organise 
big protests online. Kifaya set foundations for the fact that you 
can go down on the streets and say ‘kifaya Mubarak’ [enough 
of Mubarak]. 25th of January didn’t happen overnight. It was 
years of things building up, of people setting things in stone. And 
the best example of this is that on the 25th of January many of 
the chants that we were chanting were chants that we had been 
chanting in earlier demonstrations. Everything is a build-up, 
nothing happens overnight.
It was on this established ‘repertoire of contention’ (Tilly, 2003), 
not simply on the availability of powerful technologies of 
communication, that the conditions for the Egyptian revolution 
were set. 
khaled SaId: a cOllecTIve prOfIle pIcTure
It was summer 2010 and I wasn’t really into politics. I was reading 
the news, sometimes I would write something on Facebook. But 
that was it. I wasn’t really caring much about politics. Then 
Khaled Said’s page began, and it spread very fast. A friend sent 
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me an invitation ... and I started looking at the news and really 
caring about what is happening to my country. And I watched 
the pictures which were brutal. And the guy did nothing but ask 
why are you searching me. A lot of people like me started really 
caring about this after they saw the photo of Khaled Said’s face, 
which was very brutal, and I really thought sometimes that this 
could happen to me.
For many young middle-class Egyptians like Mustafa Shamaa, a 
20-year-old student at Cairo Nile University, joining the Kullena 
Khaled Said Facebook page was akin to a ritual of political 
initiation which facilitated their participation in the revolutionary 
movement. ‘That page is what got me into politics’ says Mustafa. 
The Kullena Khaled Said and other Egyptian opposition Facebook 
pages contributed to motivating and uniting a constituency of young 
people otherwise lacking in strong political identifications. 
The page was created to protest against the death of Khaled 
Said, a 28-year-old middle-class Alexandrian with a passion for 
blogging who had completed part of his studies in the US. On the 
6th of June 2010, Said had been picked up at an internet café by 
two secret-police officers and beaten to death on the street allegedly 
for having posted online a video which documented the implication 
of members of the police force in a drug deal. The image of his face 
completely devastated by blows began circulating on the internet, 
awaking many to the brutal reality of Mubarak’s Egypt. In reaction 
blog posts were written, videos published, and Facebook pages 
opened. The Kullena Khaled Said page duly became an emotional 
rallying point for the Facebook youth, who not only felt compassion 
for Khaled Said but also identified with him, thinking, as Mustafa 
himself did, ‘that this could happen to me’.
Conspiracy theories continue to abound about the creation of 
the Khaled Said page and who was behind it. The ‘official’ version 
is that it was created by Wael Ghonim, a 30-year-old Egyptian 
working in Dubai as the Google marketing executive for the Middle 
East. The mystery surrounding the page was increased by the fact 
that Ghonim, in order to protect his identity, decided to use a 
fake account with the name ‘elshaheed’ (‘the martyr’ as Said was 
considered to be), and used the Tor software5 to guarantee his online 
anonymity. Ghonim was a young liberal Egyptian and a devoted 
Muslim. He came from the Egyptian middle class and studied for an 
MBA at the elite American University in Cairo, as did many other 
digital activists. However, compared to many, Ghonim arguably 
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had a more direct understanding of the condition and experience 
of the lower classes in Egypt, having studied at the state-run and 
overcrowded Orman high school in Cairo. An ‘internet fanatic’ since 
an early age, Ghonim did not have the typical skills and charisma of 
a revolutionary leader. As he himself admitted he found it easier to 
relate with people online rather than face-to-face (Ghonim, 2012: 
13). But he was not completely new to activism either. In 2009 he 
had set up a Facebook page to support the presidential campaign 
of the former chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) Mohammed el-Baradei, who he had also met in person at 
his mansion in Cairo.
The response to the opening of the Kullena Khaled Said page 
was impressive. A whopping 36,000 users joined the page on the 
first day, quickly helping it to become the most popular anti-regime 
Facebook page. The massive participation registered by the page 
was testament to the degree of indignation many Egyptians felt, 
and indicative of the extent to which Facebook pages were one of 
the very few places through which it could be channelled. However, 
the popularity of the page was also the result of Wael Ghonim’s 
marketing skills and particularly of his ability to construct a 
compelling emotional conversation with the page’s users. Ghonim 
exploited the techniques he had learned during his MBA and 
perfected through his management of a number of successful Arabic 
websites before joining Google. His model in planning the campaign 
was the classic three-step ‘sales tunnel’:
The first phase was to convince people to join the page and read 
its posts. The second was to convince them to start interacting 
with the content by ‘liking’ and ‘commenting’ on it. The third was 
to get them to participate in the page’s online campaign and to 
contribute to its content themselves. The fourth and final phase 
would occur when people decided to take the activism onto the 
streets. This was my ultimate aspiration. (Ghonim, 2012: 67–8)
The success of the page rested on its ability to attract a diverse 
public of users, beyond those who were already politicised. For 
this purpose Ghonim used the Egyptian dialect Ammeya rather 
than the high-brow standard Arabic, and employed abundant visual 
material, videos, pictures and the like capable of attracting people 
with low literacy skills. Moreover, he carefully avoided the kind 
of confrontational language used on other Egyptian anti-regime 
Facebook pages, which he thought could discourage unpoliticised 
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users. Finally, Ghonim tried to make users feel that they were not 
just ‘liking’ a page but were actually engaging in a conversation. To 
this end, he spent much time and effort answering user comments.
Through his posts – written in the first person, as if he were himself 
Khaled Said speaking from the tomb – Ghonim catalysed a process of 
emotional identification on the part of young middle-class Egyptians 
with someone with whom they had much to share. Exemplary of 
this process of collective identification was the fact that many users 
adopted the photo of Said as their own Facebook profile picture. 
In anticipation of the 25th of January demonstration, the Brazilian 
radical cartoonist Carlos Latuff, at the request of Egyptian activists, 
represented Said in a youthful grey jumper, holding a mouse-sized 
and scared-looking Hosni Mubarak. Said’s profile as a blogger and 
the story of his ‘martyrdom’ made him a perfect hero for the shabab-
al-Facebook: a dead leader that young middle-class people could 
rally around in the absence of living heroes. In this sense, Said was 
quite a different figure from Mohammed Bouazizi, the Tunisian 
street vendor from the small town of Sidi Bouzid who by setting 
Figure 2.2 we are all khaled Said cartoon. (courtesy: carlos latuff)
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himself on fire on the 17th of December 2010 in protest against an 
episode of police repression would light the fuse of the Tunisian 
revolution, and thereby of the Arab Spring as a whole. In a heavily 
class-ridden society like Egypt, Said’s middle-class background 
played an important role in politicising that part of the population 
which had been the most reluctant to voice its discontent at the 
regime. As Mustafa Shamaa suggests, the main users of the page 
were those ‘who had access to good food, access to the Internet ... 
who had been educated abroad, who went to international schools, 
who had been outside of Egypt, and had more awareness [but] who 
wouldn’t care about the problems’.
In the words of Ahmed Sabry, a 48-year-old architect involved in 
the revolution, Facebook was for many a sort of ‘training ground’, 
which prepared the shabab-al-Facebook psychologically for the 
tough challenges that awaited them in the streets. It allowed them to 
build up a confidence in their own abilities from the relatively safe 
cover of a computer screen. Activist Nora Shalaby observes that the 
Facebook page ‘showed that there were many people thinking the 
same, and wanted the torture to stop and wanted to see a regime 
change’. The mere existence of opposition Facebook pages was 
for many politically inexperienced young people proof of the fact 
that Mubarak’s regime was less powerful than it pretended to be. 
Mustafa Shamaa recounts how ‘the first time I watched the Khaled 
Said’s page I got a bit scared. But then I saw that they didn’t arrest 
the admin. And I realised that there was some safety and that we 
could write whatever we wanted to.’
If the figure of Khaled Said allowed this unpoliticised Egyptian 
middle-class youth to identify with one hero, it also allowed them to 
identify against a common enemy – not just the regime as a whole 
but more specifically the police. ‘Ours was first and foremost a hate 
for police’, explains Sally Zohney. ‘The police represented everything 
that was wrong with Egyptian society.’ Different categories of people 
had different reasons for harbouring this anger. Football ‘ultras’ – 
fans of popular clubs like Zamalek and el-Ahly – hated the police 
because of the frequent clashes after matches.6 Microbus drivers 
hated them for being constantly targeted with arbitrary road fines, 
with which officers were topping up their miserly salaries. Young 
people resented them because of random searches and harassment. 
The Kullena Khaled Said page became a stage for collecting and 
cataloguing the extent of the baseness of the regime, gathering all 
the evidence in one place and thus creating a ‘chain of equivalence’ 
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(Laclau, 2005: 94) between the grievances of different groups of 
people. As Sally Zohney reports:
Everybody started posting videos of police brutality. Things 
people were shooting with their mobile phones: how they would 
rape prisoners, how they would electrify them etcetera ... It’s 
overwhelming you know when you enter the page, and you see ten 
videos, and you see it is not one case or two cases, it is something 
very common ... You see police laughing while slapping people, 
and cursing them, and making them run naked on the floor.
The call for a demonstration on the 25th of January, ‘Police Day’, 
would provide this convergence of popular sentiment against the 
security forces which had coalesced on Facebook with a date on 
which to materialise.
rSvpIng TO The revOluTIOn
The organisational challenge faced by the admins of prominent 
anti-regime Facebook pages was how to transform the vocal 
publics gathered online into protesting crowds. While this was a 
daunting task given the widespread fear of police repression, it is 
remarkable how many users of these pages were impatient to move 
from Facebook to the streets. Nora Rafea, a 26-year-old activist, 
describes her feelings on using the Kullena Khaled Said page:
Facebook for me was like oooh! We really need to stop this 
virtual world. If we really want to do something we really need 
to stop this. We have to go down. This was my idea. It’s too 
comfortable, and you feel that you are just shouting words but 
you didn’t actually do anything. For me it was like we need to get 
out of our circles. I say things and the people who like, like, like. 
They come from the same background and the same perspective, 
somehow unrelated from the ground, from reality, from the real 
people on the streets.
The fear of endangering users initially led Ghonim and the other 
admin of the page, Abdel Rahman Mansour, to ‘focus on online 
activities that we could promote, to instil a sense of optimism and 
confidence that we could make a difference, even if only in the 
virtual world for the time being’ (Ghonim, 2012: 67). However, 
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just a few days after its opening, the page was already publicising 
street demonstrations.
At the suggestion of an Alexandrian user, a series of ‘silent stands’ 
were organised and publicised on the Facebook page (Ghonim, 
2012: 70). The idea of the silent stands followed the format of 
the flash-mob, like those organised in previous years by the 6th 
of April group through its own Facebook page. People were 
asked to convene in a central area of the city at a given time to 
perform a small collective action. They would stand in silence in 
a public area, some of them reading the Koran or the Bible, as a 
way of expressing peacefully their indignation at the regime. In 
the first of these events, held on the 19th of June 2010, only a few 
hundred joined the gatherings in Cairo and Alexandria, a fraction 
of the thousands who had answered positively to the invitation on 
Facebook. This was just proof of the fact that Facebook RSVPs only 
rarely translate into actual attendance – a phenomenon we will see 
again in the different movements discussed in this book. Despite the 
relatively low turnout, the event was considered a moderate success 
by Ghonim, and a confirmation of the possibility of transforming 
Facebook publics into protesting crowds. In the following months, 
a number of other ‘silent stands’ were publicised on the page, even 
though after a while the format seemed to be wearing out through 
force of repetition.
Compared to the ‘silent stands’ of 2010, the call launched by the 
page for a mass demonstration on the 25th of January 2011 was 
understandably a much more daring act. In his autobiographical 
book, Ghonim explains the fixing of the date as a decision taken 
alone in a rush, on the evening of the 29th of December. He had just 
been discussing the options with Ahmed Maher, the leader of the 
6th of April movement, on an internet chat. But Maher had asked 
for time to consider the date, and did not seem too enthusiastic, 
given that his group wanted to concentrate all its effort on the 6th 
of April. Ghonim however could not resist his own drive and posted 
the message ‘January 25th is Police Day and it’s a national holiday 
... I think the police have done enough this year to deserve a special 
celebration ... What do you think?’ (Ghonim, 2012: 121). With 
471 likes, and 119 comments, the users’ response was positive but 
not enthusiastic. A couple of days later, the Islamist bombing of a 
Coptic Church in Alexandria on the 1st of January, which killed 
21 people, shifted attention away from the idea. It wasn’t until the 
14th of January, the day Ben Ali escaped from Tunisia, that Ghonim 
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floated again the idea of an action on the 25th. This time the message 
attracted 3,022 likes and 1,748 comments, giving a clear sign that 
users enthused by the events in Tunisia were ready for action.
It is evident that the organisation of the 25th of January 
demonstration, which was to mark the beginning of the 18-day 
revolution, was not undertaken on the internet alone. It required 
a complex and laborious groundwork to sort out the logistics 
and publicise the protests among the populace. Seeing the event 
as a ‘political opportunity’ (Tarrow, 1994: 17–18) not to be 
missed, a ‘Revolutionary Youth Coalition’ formed on the ground, 
encompassing 6th of April activists, revolutionary socialists, 
members of el-Baradei’s group the National Association for Change, 
and young dissidents from the Muslim Brotherhood. As Ahmed 
Sabry puts it, the demonstration ‘was much more organised than 
people in the West think. There were several meeting places and 
phone numbers and mobile numbers for the lawyers.’ The 6th of 
April Youth Movement played a particularly important role in 
coordinating events on the ground. They set up a ‘war-room’ in an 
office nearby Tahrir square from which they would coordinate on the 
phone activists in the different marches. Moreover, in anticipation 
of the 25th, they organised a series of rehearsal demonstrations in 
popular neighbourhoods to experiment with different tactics and 
test the reaction of the people on the streets. Activists also tried 
to convince established opposition groups to join them. While the 
Muslim Brotherhood and all other opposition parties initially turned 
down the invitation, key figures in the ultras pledged their support.
 The Kullena Khaled Said Facebook page progressively came to 
function as a sort of megaphone through which, from its safe base 
in Dubai, Ghonim would relay to a broad and diffuse public the 
decisions taken by activists on the ground in Cairo and Alexandria. 
The Facebook page became a platform from which to share and 
streamline information, but more importantly to create a sense 
of anticipation about the upcoming event. A Facebook event was 
created titled ‘January 25: Revolution against Torture, Poverty, 
Corruption and Unemployement’. On Friday the 21st, four days 
before the first protest, the page counted 100,000 confirmed 
attendees and many others would join in the following days.
But would all those appearing under the ‘attending’ list actually 
turn out? Or would the Facebook youth remain just a Facebook 
youth? These were the questions many people asked themselves 
on the eve of the demonstration, in a testament to the difficulty of 
constructing a sense of trust online (Tarrow, 1998). Previous protest 
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events had already acquainted participants with the gulf between a 
Facebook count of attendees and the actual street count. Scepticism 
was thus unsurprisingly rife: ‘I saw that people were saying they 
would take part in the protests but I didn’t believe they would’, 
recounts Reda a photographer and member of the ultras of el-Ahly 
who took to the streets on the 25th. Sally Zohney came to realise 
that many of her friends who had confirmed their attendance were 
not actually intending to participate:
Before the 25th we had the event on Facebook of the 25th of 
January revolution, and you have many people saying attending, 
attending, attending and you say: ‘alright, whatever’. And you 
see how many of those you know and you ask them are you 
guys really going? And they would say: no! Then why are you 
saying that you are going to attend on Facebook? Because we are 
supportive! And then you start realising that only one or two are 
actually going out of twenty people who said yes!
Fear of police repression, and mutual distrust among Facebook 
users, constituted two formidable obstacles on the way to achieving 
a good turnout on the day. Ghonim was aware of the risk. During 
the final days before the demonstration he put much effort into 
countering the defeatism reflected in some of the comments posted 
on the page, as epitomised by the following message: ‘no one will 
do anything and you’ll see. All we do is post on Facebook. We are 
the Facebook generation. Period’ (Ghonim, 2012: 135). To dispel 
this impression, Ghonim focused on positive messages emphasising 
the people’s determination to take to the streets, exemplified by the 
statement: ‘we won’t stand and watch other people on Facebook’. 
The motivational work done by Ghonim in preparation for the 
protests is exemplified by a message published on the 24th, which 
appealed to people’s sense of pride:
A person decided not to participate tomorrow, he is sitting in 
front of his computer and writes comments on Facebook saying: 
the people are cowards and nobody is really going to participate 
... like I said before there is a phenomenon in psychology called 
projection ... you have a certain problem, in order to avoid pangs 
of your conscience you are saying to yourself that all the people 
are cowards ... Unfortunately my friend ... I am not a coward, I 
am demonstrating on the 25th Jan.
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The same urge to dispel people’s fear and uncertainty underscored 
the action of young activist Asmaa Mafhouz, who in anticipation 
of the protest posted a now-famous YouTube video in which she 
incited people to join the protests:
If you think yourself a man, come with me on 25 January. 
Whoever says women shouldn’t go to protests because they will 
get beaten, let him have some honor and manhood and come with 
me on 25 January. Whoever says it is not worth it because there 
will only be a handful of people, I want to tell him, ‘You are the 
reason behind this, and you are a traitor, just like the president 
or any security cop who beats us in the streets.’7
This call to heroism cleverly used the machismo prevalent in 
Egyptian society as an expedient through which to mobilise young 
men, who would fear being ridiculed for having been surpassed in 
bravery by a young girl. On the eve of the protest similar videos 
and status messages confirmed the impression that ‘it was going to 
be big’ – as Ahmed Sharqaui, an Egyptian activist from the town of 
Zagazig, reflects. The last status message published on the Kullena 
Khaled Said page on the morning of the 25th, a few hours before 
the time set for the public gathering, took the tone of a generational 
challenge: ‘today we are going to prove that we are not guys of 
“Comment and like” as they claim. We are REALITY on Earth we 
are demanding our rights and we are all participating.’
‘Our peOple cOme dOwn!’
If on the eve of the revolution Facebook groups played a crucial role 
in organising dissent against the regime, as soon as the movement 
‘landed’ on the streets its communications shifted drastically. 
As Osama Hoon, a 6th of April activist, sums it up: ‘before the 
25th of January it was 80% Facebook, 20% face-to-face. After 
the 25th of January it was 20% Facebook, 80% face-to-face.’ For 
all the sophistication achieved by the revolutionary movement on 
the internet in the preparation phase, it is remarkable how far the 
mobilising effort relied on a creative reinvention of the ancient art 
of face-to-face agitation. Facebook had proven a useful rallying 
point precisely because of the obstacles to communication imposed 
by the authoritarian regime on the streets. But for the revolution to 
gain sufficient support a direct interaction with the lower classes at 
street level was imperative, especially given the huge digital divide 
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in Egyptian society where three quarters of the population have 
no internet access.
As Ghonim himself affirmed in a message on the Facebook page: 
‘reaching working class Egyptians is not going to happen through 
the Internet and Facebook’. In the status updates he posted in the 
days before the 25th, Ghonim put great emphasis on the need for 
people to ‘get out’, to ‘spread out to streets, factories, mosques, and 
churches’ (Ghonim, 2012: 143). A message posted on the 21st read: 
‘we have to guarantee that our messages are widespread especially 
in poor areas ... We all should move to the streets now and lessen 
the usage of Facebook.’ On the 23rd, the admin appealed again to 
its users to speak to the Egypt that was not part of the shabab-el-
internet: ‘We have gathered on Facebook and our voice is very high 
now and can be heard clearly ... On Tuesday we have to be many on 
the streets ... we have to reach the other 60 million people who don’t 
have [access to the] Internet.’ Reaching out to those people was 
coming to be seen as the most important aim of the demonstrations.
The incitements launched by Ghonim through the Khaled Said 
Facebook page were matched by an intense effort to spread the 
message locally. Young ‘internet people’ thus turned into street 
agitators trying to persuade others among their network of friends 
and acquaintances to join the protests. ‘We, the people of the Internet 
made ordinary people know that something is going to happen. 
That was the important thing for the 25th’ – reflects Abdallah, a 
member of the ultras of el-Ahly. ‘The people of the Internet and the 
Facebook activists, they went to speak with the normal people who 
are without Internet.’ Ahmed Sabry recounts how ‘before the 25th 
we were leafleting, and distributing flyers and talking to people. 
Myself I went to have a haircut and I convinced everyone in the 
barber shop that we are going on the 25th.’ When the day came, 
the physical passage of marchers across different areas of Cairo 
provided the movement with an opportunity for agitating among 
the shaabi, many of whom resented the regime for the economic 
hardships they were suffering. Taking to the streets was the only 
way for the movement to break the double barrier of the digital 
divide and the censorship of the state-owned news media. 
In order to maximise the movement’s visibility on the streets 
and the possibility of contact with the local population, activists 
resorted to the tactic of ‘feeder marches’. Instead of assembling 
directly in Tahrir square, protesters were invited to join up at four 
separate meeting points in different areas of Cairo, including the 
working-class neighbourhoods of Shubra and Imbaba. The exact 
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locations were announced on the Kullena Khaled Said Facebook 
page only three days before the protests, in order to give the 
police little time to prepare. Before heading towards Tahrir, the 
marchers would make several turns in small residential streets in the 
neighbourhoods close to their initial assembly point, so as to gather 
more people along the way. The tactic was concisely explained in 
a small booklet distributed online in advance of the protests on 
Friday the 28th:
1) Assemble with your friends and neighbours in residential streets 
away from where security forces are.
2) Shout slogans in the name of Egypt and the people’s freedom 
(positive slogans).
3) Encourage other residents to join (again with positive language).
4) Go out into the major streets in very large numbers in order to 
form the biggest possible assembly.
5) Head towards important government buildings while shouting 
positive slogans, to take them over.8
‘The idea was that the demonstration was like a bus and everybody 
was riding it’, explains Ahmed Sabry. ‘The bigger the march became, 
the more people get confidence and want to join it.’ The marching 
protesters thus formed not simply a ‘contentious gathering’9 (Tilly, 
1978: 115), but also a contagious one: a gathering which would in 
turn gather more people on its passage through the streets. As Nora 
Shalaby explains: ‘We always made sure we were going through 
small streets, where there are residential areas, not the big streets, 
where there are no residential buildings ... because that way you 
encourage people to come down and see the stuff.’
Using this tactic, the marchers managed to gather great numbers 
of people on the way, fuelling enthusiasm among those who 
participated and generating the confidence that they could prevail 
over the police forces. Abdallah recounts the itinerary of the march 
he joined on the 25th from Giza on the western bank of the Nile:
On the 25th I went to Mustafa Mahmud square in Giza. We 
were about 700 people, very few, in fact. Yes we were so stupid 
all of them Facebook activists, and like that, only coming there 
from the Internet. We moved there and it was about 11am in 
the morning ... We met and we went to Tahrir by foot ... When 
we reached the square we were 50,000 people. Yes many people 
came. They don’t know anything. But when they hear what we 
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are saying and when they saw us they joined us. They came from 
everywhere: from the shops, from the streets, from their homes, 
from everywhere.
To invite people to join the demonstrations, the marchers 
continuously repeated ‘positive slogans’ like ‘aysh, hurreya, wa 
adala egtimaya’ (bread, freedom and dignity), and the more famous 
‘el-shaab ureed iskat el-nisam’ (the people want the fall of the 
regime). These were slogans many Egyptians could easily identify 
with. They avoided ideological language and instead concentrated 
on simple political and social demands particularly targeted at 
the plight of working-class people and the poor. The slogans were 
accompanied by direct exhortations to join the protests, like ‘inzil, 
inzil, inzil’ (come down! come down! come down!) and ‘ya ahlina 
andamulina’ (our families join us), addressed to bystanders on the 
streets and people watching the marchers go by from their windows 
and balconies. With these forms of street-level communication, the 
Facebook youth created a face-to-face contact with ‘those Egyptians 
who don’t have the internet’, to use Ghonim’s words. This involved 
a learning process, since for many people like Mohammed Saidi, a 
22-year-old political science graduate, ‘it was the first time that I’d 
done this, talking politics with strangers on the streets’.
On the 26th and 27th the movement continued to make 
itself visible in Cairo and Alexandria, while fighting between 
demonstrators and police raged in Suez. All the attention was now 
focused on preparation for the 28th: the ‘Friday of Anger’. Meeting 
points for the feeder marches were once again publicised on the 
Kullena Khaled Said Facebook page. However, by this point the 
website had become just one among many poles of mobilisation and 
coordination, among which featured established organisations like 
the Muslim Brotherhood which had eventually pledged its support. 
On the day, the format of the feeder marches was intensified by 
using mosques as gathering points, and the noon Friday prayers as 
the pre-established gathering time. Nora Shalaby describing one 
march leaving from the shaabi area of Dar-el-Salam:
We waited until the prayer was over. And then a small protest 
came out of the mosque and we joined and we started walking. 
And then all of a sudden out of nowhere ... thugs started appearing 
... We separated very quickly. We were not used to being attacked 
by thugs ... So we got kind of worried and we hid. And then we 
decided to go to Old Cairo to see whether we could find another 
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march and we saw people just standing, waiting for more people 
to join until they started walking. And we joined them and we 
were calling to people on the balconies: ‘Join us! Join us!’
If on the 25th the crowd was composed of ‘70% to 80% 
middle class people’, as activist Hannah el-Sissi put it, on the 28th 
‘everybody joined’, including the shaabi. An anecdote recounted by 
Marwa Hussein, a journalist on the el-Ahram newspaper, testifies 
to the diversity of the crowd: ‘On the 28th I met one guy who was 
very confused about all this Facebook hype, who didn’t know at 
all what this Facebook thing was and in the middle of the demo 
I had to explain it to him.’ On the day, hundreds of thousands of 
people took to the streets in Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and other 
Egyptian cities. Many police stations across the capital, and the 
HQ of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (NDP), were set 
ablaze. After several hours of battling with the police, during which 
hundreds of protestors lost their lives, the marchers finally occupied 
Tahrir square, which they would defend from the attacks of thugs 
and plain-clothes policemen for 15 more days until the resignation 
of Hosni Mubarak.
never mInd The kIll SwITch
Overnight on the 27th, in anticipation of the ‘Friday of Rage’, 
the Egyptian government had taken the unprecedented step of 
switching off all internet and mobile phone communications in 
the country (Dunn, 2011). Just after midnight, all major internet 
service providers such as Telecom Egypt, Link, Etisalat, and others 
were shut down in a matter of minutes. The government exploited 
the presence of a series of infrastructural bottlenecks in the Egyptian 
network. Only one ISP, Noor Data Networks, which serves the 
Egyptian stock exchange, was unaffected by the attack. In the early 
hours of the 28th, mobile phone services (Vodafone, Mobinil and 
Etisalat) were also shut down in most areas of the country.
The regime clearly hoped that the move would disrupt the 
activists’ capacity for coordination and scare most people off the 
streets. And indeed, my interviewees concur in describing the sense 
of disorientation which the unavailability of internet and (more 
importantly) of mobile phones caused on that day. But the shutdown 
did not prove a fatal blow for the movement. In fact, on the day, 
many more people took to the streets than they had done on the 
25th. The fact is that the government’s move was ‘too little too late’, 
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as Ahmed Sabry puts it. Once the revolutionary process had been 
set in motion, a spatial automatism was established: ‘people simply 
knew they needed to go to Tahrir’, says Mohammed el-Agati of 
the NGO Arab Forum for Alternatives. The square rather than the 
internet became the main coordination platform of the revolutionary 
movement. In response to police repression and the communication 
shutdown, people established a permanent sit-in in Tahrir. As the 
blogger Mahmoud Salem explained in an interview with American 
broadcaster PBS: ‘when they shut down the internet they brought 
back the people together in a way they never even imagined’.10 
The ‘thickness’ of Egyptian face-to-face social networks provided 
an effective and ready-made substitute for Facebook and Twitter.
Not only did the kill switch fail to disrupt the internal coordination 
of the movement, it also proved to be a formidable mobilising 
factor by revealing the wickedness of the regime and thus motivating 
many who were still undecided. Nora Rafea tells the story of her 
cousin, for whom the kill switch was a moment of conversion to 
the movement:
My cousin was very sceptical of the revolution. Before the 28th he 
really criticised us and wrote on his status: ‘are you guys joking? A 
revolution through Facebook? What the hell! There is no hope...’ 
And then the moment they shut down the communications this 
person turned 180 degrees and said ‘OK, this is too much, I am 
going to take to the streets.’ It was a changing point for him ... 
he found that action ridiculous ... and he joined the streets. In 
the morning I saw his wife and she told me that he had gone to 
the demonstrations. And I couldn’t believe it.
The decision taken by the government also revealed the distance 
between the regime’s official version of events on the state-owned 
media and the reality on the streets. ‘This made a lot of people very 
angry’, explains Mustafa Shamaa. ‘How come you are doing this? 
On state TV you are saying that there is no protest and you are 
switching off the internet and mobile phones?’ For Noor Ayman 
Noor, the government’s decision was perceived as a betrayal by the 
middle-class youth:
Over the last several years the former regime had gotten us so 
addicted to our mobile phones, so addicted to our computers, 
and to the internet and so many things ... and suddenly we wake 
up one morning and we have nothing ... Many people including 
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those who were not planning on going down, when they saw the 
police doing what they did, they said no we have to go down.
If some people took to the streets out of rage at the government’s 
actions, others did so mainly for practical reasons: to look for their 
friends and relatives they could not otherwise get in contact with 
because of the communications shut-down. As discussed in Chapter 
1, mobile phones have introduced forms of microcoordination (Ling, 
2004: 70) which have reshaped our everyday social interactions. 
When the mobile services were switched off, the capacity for micro-
coordination was severely disrupted, obliging people to take to the 
streets if they wanted to get in contact with their peers. Mustafa 
Shamaa illustrates this point in his testimony:
Some of my friends they ran into the protests because the phone 
was off and they couldn’t get in touch with their brothers and 
sisters. So they went to the protests to look for them and they 
made the numbers increase. I know a lot of people who did that 
... my cousin for example came to the protests looking for me. 
And this actually made the difference.
The internet shut-down made it impossible to maintain a safe distance 
by following events on the internet or talking on the phone to one’s 
friends on the streets. The government’s decision thus eliminated 
the possibility of a passive though sympathetic spectatorship. To get 
even a glimpse of what was going on, one had to take to the streets. 
The kill switch thus demonstrated the ambiguous role of modern 
communication technologies in the process of mobilisation, and the 
extent to which they can also simply be used to maintain a virtual 
connection with activism without ever joining them physically.
With the communications shut-down the occupation in Tahrir 
square became an immersive face-to-face communicative event. ‘We 
had no idea that the world was following us, we had no idea of what 
the media was saying, what the TV was saying, what Al-Jazeera 
was reporting, what the people in the streets were doing’ recalls 
Sally Zohney, ‘we were living in another dimension’. Many of my 
interviewees recounted with melancholy the experience of national 
and cross-class brotherliness in the square, and the encounters they 
had with people they would never have got to know otherwise. As 
Nora Shalaby recounts, the square gathered ‘people of different 
backgrounds, of different classes, just sitting together talking.’ For 
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some activists like Sally Zohney it was even frustrating when the 
government reversed the kill switch after five days:
I really regret that they brought the internet back during the 
revolution ... It divided people ... Protesting you think that 
everyone is with you ... And even if you don’t see them you 
just think that everyone is in the same spirit, and everyone is as 
supportive and as excited ... But then they brought back Facebook 
and you saw people writing ‘enough with the criminals in the 
streets’ ... and you begin having an argument on Facebook with 
them and tell them ‘I am not a criminal, why do you call me a 
criminal’ and them answering ‘yes you are a criminal if you do 
this’... and people accusing each other over who is really patriotic 
who is not, who is with what and blablabla ... and it created more 
divisions ... And at some point I didn’t want to use the internet 
anymore except for information: ‘OK tomorrow we are going 
that way.’ I didn’t want to enter in debates, I didn’t want people 
accusing me, or seeing people unfriending people ... oh this person 
... whenever I see a person with a photo of Mubarak as profile 
picture he is no longer my friend.
With the revolution the Facebook youth took to the streets and 
contributed to opening up a public space where different classes 
could interact, as they could not do on social media, a preserve of 
the middle class. However, when Mubarak resigned on the 11th of 
February, that exceptional space of encounter which the revolution 
had created dissolved. The sit-in was almost immediately lifted, 
and the ‘Facebook people’ who had initiated the revolution went 
for the most part reluctantly back to the dispersion of their own 
mediated friendships. They would reappear only intermittingly 
during the various waves of protest that would later target the 
new power-holders: the military rulers of the Supreme Council of 
Armed Forces (SCAF), headed by Mubarak’s former minister of 
defence, field-marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi.
The TwITTer paShaS
In Egypt the word ‘pasha’ has a number of complex connotations. 
It is used in everyday life much in the same way as the English 
expression ‘sir’. But the word still holds its original meaning as 
the honorific title of the Ottoman aristocracy which ruled Egypt 
for centuries. As Galal Amin observes in his latest book, Egypt in 
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the Era of Hosni Mubarak (2011), this class kept itself aloof from 
the doings of the local population. Pashas were of Turkish origins, 
and often flaunted this foreignness. For some participants in the 
revolution like Mohammed ‘Saidi’, the Egyptian Twitter activists 
who have become famous in the West after the uprising are just 
that: ‘pashas’, an aloof activist elite, detached from the feelings 
of common Egyptians. Even if one does not buy into the class 
hatred which seems to underlie opinions like Saidi’s, it is evident 
that during the revolution the use of Twitter was for the most part 
restricted to a tiny activist community numbering a few hundred, 
and that it thus had a limited impact on the general mobilisation. 
If, as Mustafa Shamaa puts it, ‘the revolution would have happened 
without Facebook’, the same applies even more strongly to Twitter.
The micro-blogging website’s penetration rate in Egypt is very 
low, standing at only 0.15 per cent in November 2011 (Dubai 
School of Government, 2011b). Naturally, the ‘uptake rate’ within 
the community of those participating in revolutionary protests is 
much higher than that. But of the 20 people I interviewed in Cairo, 
only around half were on Twitter (while almost all of them were 
on Facebook), despite the fact that my sample of interviewees 
exclusively comprised middle-class and upper-middle-class activists, 
the demographic with the highest degree of new media connectivity. 
Optimal Twitter use in fact requires owning a smart-phone which, 
given its expense, is materially inaccessible to the great majority 
of Egyptians, including many from the middle class. Moreover, 
it entails a higher level of education, and a better knowledge of 
the English language than does Facebook. As Hannah El-Sissi 
points out, ‘you cannot use Twitter much if you are an Arabic 
speaker, things like hashtags, the main features of Twitter cannot 
be used if you only have an Arabic keyboard’. In fact, during the 
18-day revolution itself, most of the tweets on popular hashtags 
like #jan25, #tahrir, #egypt were written in English (Wilson and 
Dunn, 2011: 1271).
Since the fall of Mubarak, and the increasing popularity gained 
by Twitter in the wake of the uprising, more people have started 
writing in Arabic or the local dialect Ammeya, but the top tweeps 
continue for the most part to write in English.
Given the limited audience that could be reached at home through 
Twitter, its main role was thus mainly as a means of eliciting 
‘external attention’ (Aday et al., 2010), ‘as a key resource for getting 
information to the outside world, perpetuating the feeling that the 
world was watching, which was an important factor for morale 
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and coordination on the ground’ (Wilson and Dunn, 2011: 1252). 
During the days of the revolution, famous activist ‘tweeps’ like 
Gigi Ibrahim (@Gsquare86), and Mahmoud Salem (@sandmonkey) 
allowed people abroad to follow minute by minute the events taking 
place in the Egyptian streets. Besides being a channel to the outside 
world, Twitter also served as a means of coordination within the 
activist elite, for which it came to constitute a sort of ‘information 
HQ of the movement’, as Ahmed Sabry puts it. As described by 
activist tweep Nora Shalaby:
Twitter gave you an on the spot account ... Go from here don’t go 
from there. Try to take this entrance not that one, because there 
you wouldn’t be able to come in ... Don’t go in that area because 
it is full of thugs ... we were trying to get as much information as 
possible for people to come in and know what was happening.
Such tactical use of Twitter was to be further refined in the protests 
taking place after the revolution, aimed at the SCAF. For example 
during the clashes in Mohammed Mahmoud street in November 
2011, in which over 70 protesters were killed, activists used the 
#TahrirNeeds hashtag to share information about medicines and 
other materials required by field hospitals and other logistical issues. 
Arguably more important than these tactical affordances has been 
Twitter’s role in creating a sense of emotional cohesion within the 
upper-middle-class activist community, as illustrated by the selection 
of messages published in the book Tweets from Tahrir (Nunns 
and Soueif, 2011). On the eve of the 25th of January protests, 
@TravellerW confessed ‘Yes, I’m worried about tomorrow. Which 
is exactly why I am going – we cannot, will not let them scare us. 
#25Jan’, while @monasosh condensed well the emotions of the eve 
in three words: ‘scared, excited and hopeful #Jan25’.
While providing a platform for generating a sense of solidarity 
within the activist elite, their intensive Twitter use has, however, run 
the risk of isolating these leaders from the feelings and experience 
of poorer and less internet-connected Egyptians. It is worth noting 
that most of the Egyptian top tweeps are children of rich upper-
middle-class families. They almost invariably live in luxurious 
neighbourhoods like Nasr City, Heliopolis, Maadi and Zamalek, 
and have been educated in English schools and then at the exclusive 
American University in Cairo. Their frequent visits to the US and 
the UK, to receive prizes or participate in TV shows, have drawn 
harsh comments from within the movement, and accusations that 
Gerbaudo T02575 01 text   72 30/08/2012   11:04
The revOluTIOnary cOaleScence Of ShAbAb-Al-FAcebOOk 73
they are detached from the experience of common people in Egypt. 
While some of these tweeps have become activist stars abroad, 
they are almost unknown inside Egypt, as testified by the fact that 
the bulk of my Egyptian interviewees had never heard of them. 
Indicative of this mismatch between global fame and relative local 
obscurity is the fact that those few Twitter activists who ran for the 
2011 parliamentary elections were badly defeated. Among them 
was the witty blogger and tweep Mahmoud Salem (@sandmonkey), 
who enjoys a following of 70,000 people on Twitter, but managed 
to secure only 16,000 votes in the Heliopolis constituency.
In the months following the revolution, some activists have 
recognised this danger of disconnection from the broader populace 
and have developed new practices combining social media with 
street-level agitation. In fact, for some, the amount of time dedicated 
to maintaining their Twitter streams runs the risk of taking precious 
energy away from campaigning both on-the-ground and through 
more accessible forms of internet communication. This problem has 
been explicitly denounced by the activist tweep Hassan Hamad, one 
of the promoters of Tweet Shara’a (#tweetshare3), which translates 
in English as ‘tweet the streets’. As part of this initiative young 
Figure 2.3 Twitter hashtags painted on the walls of Tahrir square during the July 2011 
sit-in against the military council. (author: paolo gerbaudo)
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middle-class activists are invited to take part in street campaigning, 
to discuss politics with random passers-by, while documenting the 
event on YouTube and Twitter. Through this kind of interaction, 
activists hope to break out of the closed circles of like-minded people 
which inevitably tend to cluster on social media. Interviewed by the 
Egyptian state-owned daily newspaper al-Ahram, Hamad stated:
Twitter is indeed isolated from the street; it is like there is an ocean 
between them. On Twitter you have these opinion leaders who 
have thousands of followers. These opinion leaders are usually 
activists who have their own political and ideological beliefs from 
the start, and they tweet what they believe is right whether it 
reflects the street or not. These followers retweet it and believe 
it, creating a gap between them and the street, which includes 
every political and social group and class in society.11
For Salma Hegab, a 21-year-old activist and co-founder of 
#tweetshare3, ‘it is true that activists have been thinking too much 
about talking among themselves and that they did lose touch with 
Egyptian population at large. Many have enclosed themselves in a 
comfortable activist-only internet world.’ The fact is that, as Nour 
Ayman Nour observes, ‘internet circles become an echo room where 
everyone is hearing each other. They are hearing their own views 
being bounced back. And sometimes there is an increasing divide 
between the internet community and the people on the streets.’ In 
the aftermath of the revolution, as protests continue against military 
rule, Egyptian activists are still trying to find a balance between 
the use of social media and local street campaigning. In so doing, 
they are creating a hybrid of the two, a mediated public space, as 
signalled by the appearance of Twitter hashtags as graffiti tags on 
the walls of Cairo during any renewed wave of mobilisation against 
the military council.
cOncluSIOn
Social media played a crucial role in the Egyptian revolution, but 
not an exhaustive one. They were crucial for motivating the core 
constituency of the movement, the so-called shabab-al-facebook and 
for constructing a choreography of assembly to facilitate its coming 
together in public space. However, social media alone would not 
have ‘done the trick’ without young internet-connected activists 
also engaging in street-level agitation to cross the digital divide and 
Gerbaudo T02575 01 text   74 30/08/2012   11:04
The revOluTIOnary cOaleScence Of ShAbAb-Al-FAcebOOk 75
engage with the lower classes. When social media are not used in 
interaction with face-to-face communication, they can exacerbate 
social tendencies towards fragmentation and seclusion as seen in 
the case of the ‘Twitter pashas’. In conclusion, it is worth offering 
a general remark on the role played by social media in constructing 
the choreography of assembly during the Egyptian revolution, 
and on the digital activists who acted as the choreographers. The 
revolution has often been described by pundits and journalists as 
essentially leaderless and spontaneous; and indeed this supposed 
‘leaderlessness’ is what made it so attractive to anti-authoritarian 
activists throughout Europe and the US. The account proposed 
in this chapter suggests a more complex picture. Although the 
revolution did not throw up a singular charismatic leader who 
grabbed all the attention (even if Wael Ghonim came close to being 
one), it was characterised by the leading role taken by one section of 
society, the shabab-al-Facebook, which came to act as the catalyst 
for the process of mass mobilisation. 
Besides social media and street communication, a wide range 
of other forms of communication also played a role in mobilising 
participants. The television channels of course, in particular 
Al-Jazeera and its Egyptian spin-off Al-Jazeera Mubashir, which 
became a mass medium for the channelling of information about 
the events taking place (Miles, 2011; Cottle, 2011). More could also 
be said about the role of newspapers and street media like flyers 
and posters, which also had an important role in the ecology of 
communication of the movement. Given the very specific scope of 
this chapter, however, these elements could not be considered. What 
is particularly significant for the purposes of this book is the fact that 
the Egyptian uprising and its use of social media as ‘choreographic’ 
tools it foregrounded came to inspire copy-cat movements in the 
West. As we will see in the following chapters, activists in Spain 
and in the US were driven by a desire to imitate and build on the 
‘Tahrir model’. In some cases, however, failing to appreciate the 
specificity of the Egyptian case, they also failed to learn from the 
errors committed by Egyptian activists. In the following chapter I 
will turn to the indignados of Spain, and their attempt to import 
into the West the Tahrir model of protest, together with the social 
media practices it foregrounded.
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‘we are not on facebook, we are 
on the streets!’: The harvesting of 
Indignation
because we are more humane. because we are more decent.
because we are more respectable. because we are more.
youTube video of democracia real ya promoting the 15th of may 2011 demonstration1
While the world was still under the spell of the Arab Spring, a new 
social movement, inspired by the events taking place in Tunisia and 
Egypt, made its tumultuous appearance in debt-stricken Europe. 
Spain, one of the European countries worst affected by the global 
economic crisis, became the first site in the West to adopt the ‘Tahrir 
model’ of popular protest, with its combination of social media and 
mass sit-ins. Beginning on the 15th of May 2011 (known in Spain as 
15-M), the day on which the first demonstrations were called in 58 
Spanish cities, it was a ‘#revolution’ or, better, a ‘#spanishrevolution’ 
in ‘#sol’, as its supporters were to celebrate it in the language of 
Twitter hashtags. After the demonstrations, a handful of protesters 
occupied Puerta del Sol in central Madrid. Refusing to leave, they 
were soon joined by thousands of others summoned through the 
social media. 
The protesters gathered in central Madrid, and soon in tens of 
cities across Spain, came to be known as the ‘indignados’, or the 
indignants, from the booklet Indignez vous! (2010) authored by 
the nonagenarian French politician Stephane Hessel, who by calling 
on young people to rise up against economic injustice had inspired 
some of the initiators of the movement. Rejecting any Left/Right 
identification, they announced that they did not feel represented by 
existing parties and trade unions and were opting instead for a form 
of participatory democracy, or ‘democracy 2.0’, using Facebook 
and Twitter. ‘Nobody expects the #spanishrevolution’ proclaimed 
one sign held by a protester, wearing a Guy Fawkes mask from the 
film V for Vendetta, introducing a slogan that was to be re-tweeted 
and reposted hundreds of times. But why was nobody expecting 
76
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it? Where was the ‘indignation’ hiding before it came into public 
view in the cities of Spain? And what was the role of social media 
in bringing this indignation into view? 
In this chapter I discuss the role of social media in the mobilisation 
of the Spanish indignados. I will show how social media contributed 
to fashioning a choreography of assembly, resembling a ‘harvesting 
of indignation’, the physical and symbolic concentration of a 
constituency, united by a common sense of victimhood and 
indignation around public squares like Puerta del Sol, acting as 
a symbol of the ‘people’. Social media like Facebook and Twitter 
contributed to transforming individual sentiments of anger into a 
collective identity animated by a desire to take back the streets after 
years of demobilisation. The emotional tension that underscored 
this choreography was expressed in slogans like ‘take to the streets’ 
and ‘we are not on Facebook, we are on the streets’, reflecting 
a widespread desire to break out of a situation of isolation and 
passivity characterising Spanish society in the midst of the crisis. 
The indignados or 15-M movement has often been described 
by its own participants using the imaginary of networks. For 
example, in her book Nosotros los Indignados (2011), Klaudia 
Álvarez, the communication coordinator of Democracia Real Ya, 
portrays it as a ‘cerebro en red’ (networked brain) made up of 
‘inteligencias conectadas’ (connected intelligences) (Álvarez, 2011: 
12). Castells himself, in a speech delivered at the protest camp in 
Plaza de Catalunya in Barcelona, described the movement as a form 
of resistance against the ‘manipulation of brains’,2 and presented the 
emergence of the indignados as made possible by the greater scope 
for grassroots organisation available in the contemporary system 
of ‘mass self-communication’ (Castells, 2009). 
As stated in Chapter 1, I am suspicious of this cognitivist 
understanding of social movements as networks of brains, and 
my aim here is to recuperate a sense of the role of the body and 
emotions in the process of contemporary mobilisation. In the 
specific case of the indignados movement, it is precisely the emotion 
of ‘indignation’ that deserves to become the focus of analysis. 
Interestingly, the movement is also described by its own participants 
as ‘un estado de animo’ (an emotional state), as seen in the collective 
experience of enthusiasm throughout the ‘acampadas’ (the protest 
camps). But how was this emotion harnessed and triggered by the 
movement’s organisers?
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Of alcOhOlIc gaTherIngS and Illegal dOwnlOadS
To understand the rise of the indignados movement and the reasons 
for the high level of participation it attracted we need to take into 
account the exceptional gravity of the economic situation in Spain 
at the time. Alongside Portugal, Italy, Ireland and Greece, Spain was 
one of the ‘PIIGS’,3 to use the infamous label applied by financial 
analysts to those European countries whose sovereign debt ratings 
plunged in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007–8. Of the national 
economic indicators, the most staggering one in the case of Spain is 
youth unemployment: at 41 per cent in 2010 and topping over 47 
per cent in the third quarter of 2011 (Eurostat, 2011), the highest 
in Europe. Yet, as always happens with social movements, these 
grievances alone cannot explain the appearance of the indignados 
(Buechler, 2000). Why, otherwise, did the Spanish people not 
mobilise before the 15th of May 2011, given that such grievances 
were to a great extent there already?
Asking the activists who participated in the 15-M movement the 
reasons for the earlier lack of mobilisation, one often gets in response 
an array of adjectives like ‘pasmaos’ (stoned), ‘anestetisados’ 
(anaesthetised), ‘atontados’ (stupified), ‘apalancados’ (paralysed) – 
all terms conveying the sense of a society, and its youth in particular, 
incapable of voicing its discontent at the effects of the economic 
crisis. My interviewees almost invariably described Spain as a 
country in which people were trying to forget their troubles by 
indulging in the pleasures of Spanish nightlife and its bar de tapas.4 
This widespread resignation must also be attributed largely to the 
incapacity of the existing institutions and organisations to become a 
focal point in the mobilisation of emerging popular demands. The 
Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) of José Luiz Zapatero embraced 
the neoliberal response to the crisis, cutting public spending, and 
reducing labour rights. The trade unions, for their part, were accused 
of offering only a timid response to the government’s austerity plans, 
given their traditional closeness to the Socialists. While in Greece 
in 2010, ten general strikes took place, in Spain there was just one, 
and even that had limited impact. Apart from the ‘institutional 
Left’ of parties and trade unions, the radical grassroots groups 
stemming from the anti-globalisation movement also seemed to 
be going through a phase of latency. Despite such lows, legally 
and illegally occupied social centres like the Tabacalera, the Patio 
Maravillas, and Casablanca in Madrid, maintained their role as 
outposts of alternative culture and sociability and would come to 
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constitute an important resource in sustaining the occupation of 
Puerta del Sol.
Spain is well known the world over for its thriving street life. Yet 
in the period before the blossoming of the indignados movement, 
the country had been subjected to an intense sanitisation of public 
space, inspired by a ‘fear of crowds’, which affected both political 
and social gatherings in public space. Sofia de Roa, a 32-year-old 
journalist active in the 15-M movement and a member of the 
organisation Estado del Malestar (Badfare State), recounts how 
the government and the mass media had begun to stigmatise any 
outbreak of protest in public space:
Before the protests of the 15-M, there was a strike by workers on 
the Metro (the underground railway system) here in Madrid. And 
newspapers and TV presented them like criminals, just because 
they were using their right to protest. And the same happened 
with air-traffic control workers. Independently of what you think 
of a certain struggle ... the government responded by issuing a 
decree on protests sending a message to society to be careful 
about protesting. The general sense was that if you protested 
you must be a bit crazy. And many progressive people were also 
disillusioned, because in the past there were a lot of protests which 
didn’t achieve anything.
This stigmatisation of public gatherings also affected subcultural 
practices of youth sociability, as exemplified by the government’s 
campaign against the ‘botellon’. The botellon – literally ‘great bottle’ 
– is an outdoor gathering in which large groups of young people 
spend the night in public squares, drinking, chatting and listening 
to music (Baigorri and Fernández, 2004). The practice emerged in 
the 1980s among students and young people wanting to avoid the 
high costs of ‘legitimate’ establishments. Its increasing popularity in 
the 2000s led to the creation of national and regional laws against 
the botellon. In response, in 2006 young people coordinated on the 
web to organise a number of ‘macro-botellones’ which attracted 
thousands of participants. The organisers made it clear that they 
saw the banning of botellones not simply as a measure against 
‘vandalism’, as the government had it, but as a veiled attack on 
people’s freedom of assembly and use of public space.
In the face of this stigmatisation of public gatherings, in the 
months before the 15-M, a glimmer of hope for radicals came 
from a series of online campaigns protesting against restrictions 
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on so-called ‘internet freedom’. The Zapatero’s government ‘Ley 
Sinde’ – a law aimed at curtailing file-sharing in a country which 
had been dubbed a piracy paradise by media-industry lobbyists5 
– angered many digital activists, who organised online to oppose 
the approval of the law. The campaign received a boost after US 
diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks revealed that the Spanish 
government was submitting to pressure from American majors. 
Seeing this as a betrayal of the people’s mandate, Spanish activists 
initiated Twitter feeds with the hashtags #leysinde and #redresiste 
(the Net resists) and #nolesvotes (don’t vote for them), to contest the 
approval of the law. Various blogs and popular download websites 
like Cinetube6 and Series Yonkis7 blackened their pages in protest. 
Profile pictures on Twitter and Facebook were changed to an image 
designed by the cartoonist Eneko, representing the internet as an 
endangered dove.
After being defeated in the Senate in December 2010, the law was 
finally approved in February 2011. In response, a group of activists 
including Ricardo Galli, professor at the Balearic Islands University, 
and Carlos Sanchez Almeida, known in Spain as the ‘hackers’ 
lawyer’, set up the website nolesvotes.com. On the 16th of February 
they launched a manifesto asking people not to vote for those parties 
who had approved the Ley Sinde in the upcoming local elections 
scheduled for the 22nd of May. In a note posted on the blog of the 
lawyer Javier de la Cueva, one of the initiators of the campaign, 
the group proposed to ‘develop ... citizens’ initiatives based on 
the self-organisation of independent and reproducible territorial 
cells’. The note concluded on a techno-utopian note, claiming 
that ‘the existence of the internet makes traditional representation 
unnecessary: a citizen can already represent himself without utilizing 
an alien voice’.8 Hundreds of local groups coordinated through 
Google groups were created to spread the campaign locally, targeting 
specific candidates from the ‘traitor parties’, and the ‘No les votes’ 
campaign soon went beyond the single issue of ‘internet freedom’. 
A Google map appeared on its website, documenting several cases 
of corruption, and the group circulated pictures accusing the two 
main Spanish parties of being united in resisting transparency and 
in maintaining their privileges.
The ‘No les votes’ campaign remained at the level of a diffuse 
online contestation and never managed to materialise into street 
demonstrations (Sampedro and Haro, 2011: 165). Nevertheless, 
around the time of its unfolding, a number of other campaigns were 
emerging emphasising the importance of re-appropriating public 
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space, and which also came to influence the rise of the indignados: 
Juventud Sin Futuro (Youth without Future), Estado de Malestar 
(Badfare State), Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca (Platform 
for Mortgage Victims) and Democracia Real Ya (Real Democracy 
Now).
Juventud Sin Futuro (JSF) was a radical student and youth 
movement coalition incorporating leftist activists of different 
ideologies. On its website it described itself as an organisation of 
‘young people, affected by unemployment and precarious jobs’ and 
rallied behind the slogan ‘sin curro, sin casa, sin miedo’ (without a 
job, without a home, without fear).9 Its novelty stemmed from its 
innovative use of social media like Twitter and Facebook as vehicles 
for mobilisation. At the same time the group also maintained a 
strong local footing. As Segundo Gonzales, a member of the group, 
explains: ‘we always used social media, but we also always had a 
plan of physical action, because we are an organisation with some 
tradition and are rooted in different universities across the country’. 
JSF organised a demonstration on the 7th of April which, while 
attended by only a few thousand, would be seen in retrospect as 
an important ‘dry run’ for the 15th of May protests.
Not as ideologically explicit as JSF, but still recognisably 
‘progressive’ in its discourse and imagery, was Estado de Malestar,10 
a group of activists campaigning against unemployment and cuts 
in public services. Since early 2011, Estado de Malestar had been 
staging protest performances every Friday in Plaza Callao and 
Figure 3.1 The ‘thumb down’ logo of estado de malestar.
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Puerta del Sol in central Madrid, and in 30 other Spanish cities. 
However, as Sofia de Roa admits, ‘our Friday protests had only 
had a limited degree of success. People would pass by and briefly 
look with curiosity or disdain and just move on.’ This group also 
focused on the use of social media in its communications – its very 
logo took the form of a Facebook ‘thumb up’ reversed into a ‘thumb 
down’ and accompanied by the words ‘no me gusta’ (I don’t like it), 
and all its performances would be uploaded regularly on YouTube.
Less innovative in terms of its communications was the Plataforma 
de Afectados por la Hipoteca11 (PAH), a group founded in February 
2009 to defend people’s right to housing and to protest against 
the eviction of ‘mortgage victims’. PAH constituted an important 
link with the tradition of the 13-M housing rights movement, 
which in 2006 (from May 13th and through to June) had staged 
a series of sit-ins in public squares organised through SMS and 
emails (Sampedro and Haro, 2011: 159). While all these campaigns 
and organisations played an important role in the preparation of 
the 15-M protests, the group which gained most prominence was 
‘Democracia Real Ya’12 (DRY), originally established online to 
campaign against austerity and corruption. Democracia Real Ya, 
the last actor to appear on the activist scene, would also be the one 
which came to act as focal point in the process of mobilising the 
indignados movement.
‘we are nOrmal, cOmmOn peOple’
We are like you: people who get up every morning to study, 
work or find a job, people who have family and friends. People 
who work hard every day to provide a better future for those 
around us. Some of us consider ourselves progressive, others 
conservative. Some of us are believers, some not. Some of us 
have clearly defined ideologies, others are apolitical, but we are 
all concerned and angry about the political, economic, and social 
outlook which we see around us: corruption among politicians, 
businessmen, bankers, leaving us helpless, without a voice. This 
situation has become normal, a daily suffering, without hope. 
But if we join forces, we can change it. It’s time to change things, 
time to build a better society together.13
This excerpt from the manifesto of Democracia Real Ya, published 
on the group’s Facebook page, illustrates well the collective identity 
which came to define its online campaigning. Claiming to transcend 
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the Left-Right spectrum, DRY’s stated intention was to represent all 
those people who regardless of their political beliefs and lifestyles 
were affected by the ravages of the economic crisis and the politics 
of austerity imposed by Zapatero’s government. Through the 
inclusivity, or some might say vagueness, of its identity, DRY would 
in the months before 15-M become an attractor for thousands of 
largely unpoliticised young people, creating a platform of emotional 
condensation to transform individual experiences of frustration and 
indignation into a collective political passion. 
The initial nucleus of Democracia Real Ya was the result of an 
online encounter between two young people: 26-year-old Fabio 
Gandara and 23-year-old Pablo Gallego. Both Gandara and Gallego 
fell into Paul Mason’s category of ‘graduates without a future’ 
(Mason 2012). Gandara had specialised in public law but after 
working for a time at a famous legal firm in Barcelona had been 
laid off. He had some minor activist experience having attended 
the European Social Forum in Paris in 2003 and then joined in 
the spontaneous protests against the ruling Partido Popular of 
José María Aznar after the Madrid bombing of March 2004. 
Pablo Gallego, a fresh graduate from the business school of Cadiz 
University, was without prior activist experience. He was motivated 
to engage in organising by his first-hand experience of the dire state 
of the Spanish job market. ‘I realised that things were very bad, and 
there was no solution to anything’, he explains.
The story of the emergence of Democracia Real Ya is the story of 
two individual manifestos, both published online months before the 
indignados movement would materialise in the streets. In October 
2010, Fabio Gandara published his own manifesto in a Facebook 
group called ‘Yo soy un/a joven español/a que quiere luchar por 
su futuro’14 (I am a young Spaniard who wants to fight for his 
future), which later took the name of Juventud en Accion15 (Youth 
in Action). ‘This is not a movement of the Left or of the Right. 
We do not adhere to any theoretical groupuscule, be it Marxist, 
neo-Leninist, or anarchist. We are simply young people’, proclaimed 
Gandara in the manifesto.16 Although it managed to attract only a 
handful of signatories at the time, the manifesto already pre-figured 
in its tone and ingenuity the post-ideological refusal of Left and 
Right identifications which was to be a key feature of Democracia 
Real Ya. Unaware of Gandara’s manifesto, in early 2011, Pablo 
Gallego published his own on his personal blog. ‘A May ’68 in 
Spain is possible’ was the opening line of his ‘Manifiesto Juventud’ 
(Youth manifesto).17 In simple almost amateurish language, the 
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manifesto called on young Spaniards to break out of their state of 
passivity, to fight against corruption, a stalled two-party system, 
and trade unions by and large subservient to the ruling Socialist 
Party. Gandara came across Gallego’s manifesto and began chatting 
with him online. Together they decided to set up a new Facebook 
group called ‘Plataforma de coordinación de grupos pro-movili-
zación ciudadana’18 (platform for the coordination of groups for a 
civic mobilisation). 
‘Initially we were few people, me, Pablo and another person’, 
recounts Gandara. ‘Then bit by bit, people involved in different 
movements, from the internet movement to the student movement, 
started joining our forum.’ In this phase the group organised 
exclusively online using the Facebook chat service as its means of 
coordination. As Gandara explains, the strategy agreed within the 
group was to ‘use the power of the internet and the structure of 
the web to organise ourselves at the state level and develop a civic 
mobilisation for mass protest in the whole of Spain’. ‘I initially 
had a leading role (voz cantante) in the group’, explains Gandara, 
scrupulously adding that ‘there was no administrator who had an 
exhaustive role. There was a debate every time a decision had to 
be taken.’ 
Once the group managed to attract more people, they began 
‘doing brainstorms, noting specific ideas, or slogans, and we would 
discuss what was the specific social and political change that we 
were asking for’. During chat sessions on Facebook the slogan 
‘Democracia Real Ya: no somos mercancia en manos de politicos 
y banqueros’ (Real Democracy Now: we are not commodities in 
the hands of politicians and bankers) was coined and later came to 
be adopted as the group’s name. Then, a ‘bombarding work’ began, 
as Gandara goes on to recount: 
We would enter internet forums of social and political discussion 
to see what they were saying in that group and to comment on 
what they were saying and inviting people to participate and 
adding comments to Facebook groups, and posting on profiles 
of any kind and sending emails to associations and NGOs and 
political groups and telling them a bit about this idea.
As testified by its emphasis on openness to new members, the 
identity of the group centred on its techno-libertarian emphasis 
on the possibilities of participatory democracy offered by the web, 
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of the kind that had previously been invoked by the ‘No les votes’ 
campaign. But the group also strived to avoid being pigeon-holed 
as ‘political’, constantly emphasising its ‘civic’ character. For this 
reason, as Gallego explains, in all the group’s communications words 
which might sound ‘too political’ or ‘too ideological’ would be 
studiously avoided, and substituted by a more colloquial language, 
such as those typical of Facebook status messages. For Gallego the 
‘secret of DRY’s success was the use of euphemisms’:
A euphemism [for example] is to say that those at the bottom are 
against those at the top, instead of talking about class struggle. 
You are saying the same ... but you are not scaring people. The 
use of a new language has been fundamental to the movement’s 
success ... At a moment when the citizenry is highly individualized 
and vulnerable in the face of the system it is a way to create an 
aggregate of people united not because of an ideological affinity, 
but by a protest affinity.
The same kind of anti-ideological spirit also animated the design 
of the group’s website and publicity material. The main colour 
used as a background both in the website and in its publicity was 
a politically neutral yellow. This tint, similar to the one used in the 
public communications of the Spanish state, was the same as that 
adopted by Estado de Malestar and Juventud Sin Futuro, in an 
attempt to escape tight ideological identifications. A similar style 
characterised the group’s logo, which carried only the organisation’s 
name under ‘DRY’ in big letters. Written in a stencil font, the logo 
softly echoed the subversive language of graffiti and street art, thus 
giving the group’s identity a youthful while studiously unobtrusive 
creative edge.
The online branding of the group, with its almost obsessive 
focus on inclusivity, registered its desire to move away from the 
antagonistic subcultural identity of the anti-globalisation movement 
and of the radical Left more generally. Aitor Tinoco, a key DRY 
organiser in Barcelona, speaks proudly of the fact that ‘we were 
able to abandon flags and ideologies and talk about concrete 
problems to mobilise the citizenry’. While in some quarters this 
post-ideological approach earned DRY accusations of ‘political 
childishness’, it was also arguably precisely what allowed the group 
and its Facebook page to become ‘a place to go beyond’, as Sofia 
de Roa puts it. 
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While eschewing a clear ideological orientation, DRY owed the 
coherence of its identity to a direct appeal to the people against 
the system – a move which deeply resonates with Ernesto Laclau’s 
description of populism as the construction of a popular unity 
against distant and corrupt institutions (Laclau, 2005). The clearest 
illustration of this orientation is offered by a YouTube video used to 
launch the demonstration on the 15th of May. At its centre stands a 
chessboard on which a standard set of black pieces is overwhelmed 
by a mass of white pawns. This was accompanied by a series of 
flashing captions which, after listing a series of grievances about 
corruption and unemployment, affirmed in Spanish: ‘because we 
are more humane, because we are more decent, because we are 
respectable’, ending with ‘because we are more’.19 This majoritarian 
orientation, clearly visible in this video as in all the communication 
of DRY, constantly highlighted the separation between ‘politicians 
and bankers’ and the ‘common people’, as illustrated by a scathing 
message posted on the Facebook page on the 3rd of April: ‘thieving 
politicians and bankers remember that you are nothing and will 
never be anything without the people!’ 
Seeing in the campaign an opportunity to overcome division 
and inertia, different groups eventually decided to put their weight 
behind the 15-M call launched by DRY. The call was eventually 
supported by thousands of individual internet users and also by 200 
civil society organisations, including well-established groups like 
the anti-globalisation group ATTAC and the environmental NGO 
Ecologistas en Accion (but not trade unions).
Figure 3.2 The youthful logo of Democracia Real Ya. 
Gerbaudo T02575 01 text   86 30/08/2012   11:04
The harveSTIng Of IndIgnaTIOn 87
‘revOluTIOn BegInS On The 15Th Of may’
Besides being employed in the construction of a common identity, 
at the inception of the 15-M movement social media were also used 
as a means of generating an emotional impetus towards the protest, 
by firing up people’s enthusiasm and constructing a contagious sense 
of anticipation for the upcoming event. ‘The most important thing 
about these new tools was to give people an ilusion’, Fabio Gandara 
explains, ‘an ilusion that we could change things’. Interestingly, the 
word ‘ilusion’ in Spanish has a double meaning, the most immediate 
one being ‘hope’, the second one ‘illusion’. This ambiguity captures 
well the way in which the DRY activists motivated prospective 
participants by putting forward a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy 
about the success of the demonstrations. Since the opening of 
the Facebook page in early March 2011, two months before the 
protests, organisers had worked hard to give the impression that 
the protests were going to be ‘huge’. Despite the scarce resources 
they had at their disposal, and shielded behind the anonymity of the 
collective name of their Facebook group, they eventually managed 
to trigger a mood of collective euphoria among the page’s users. 
The page became a site for the accumulation of an emotional 
energy (Jasper, 2011), capable of motivating people to make the 
‘jump to the streets’ (salto a la calle) and overcome their isolation 
and passivity. A cartoon published by the popular satirical magazine 
El Jueves in support of DRY a few days before the 15th of May 
illustrated the imaginary which underscored this operation. It depicts 
an overweight man, his eyes glued to a computer screen, in a sort 
of social media adaptation of the stereotype of the ‘couch potato’. 
Instead of TV it is the internet which feeds his addiction. ‘I am on 
Second Life’ – says the character in the balloon – ‘I go to many 
demonstrations’.20 Against this perception of a widespread apathy, 
it is significant that the campaign adopted the simple but evocative 
slogan ‘Toma la calle!’ (take to the streets). Similarly to what had 
happened with the shabab-al-Facebook in Egypt, young internet-
connected Spaniards were summoned to transform themselves from 
a secluded Facebook youth into a politically active street youth. 
Just a few days after the opening of the Facebook page, the admins 
were already launching boastful messages like ‘LA REVOLUCION 
EMPIEZA EL 15 DE MAYO’21 (revolution begins on the 15th of 
May) and ‘EL 15 DE MAYO ES NUESTRO DIA!’ (15th of May 
is our day!). Almost every day they would report on the increasing 
numbers of supporters. Here are some of the examples of the 
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motivational messages conveyed: ‘Menos de 48 horas despues ... 
Ya somos 500!!!’ (After less than 48 hours ... we are already 500!!!). 
‘En menos de 4 dias ya somos mas de 1,000!! Sigamos creciendo!’ 
(Less than 4 days in and we are already 1,000. Let’s keep growing!’) 
‘Vamos a por los 10.000!!’ (We are reaching 10,000 people). The 
increase in support – though nowhere near as momentous as it had 
been with the Kullena Khaled Said page discussed in Chapter 2 – 
was invariably celebrated by the page admins as a clear indication 
of a high turnout in the upcoming demonstrations. ‘Esto va a ser 
algo grande’ (This is gonna be big) wrote the admin on March 
27th. Status messages abounded in exclamation marks and ‘smilies’, 
displaying an exuberance which proved very effective in grabbing 
users’ attention and building up their motivation to act. 
The admins skilfully exploited the interactive features of 
Facebook, striving to ‘give people the impression that thanks to 
these instruments people could participate directly’ in public affairs, 
in the same direct way in which they could post a message or a 
picture, as Fabio Gandara explains. They presented their group 
as being completely spontaneous and leaderless, and continuously 
restated that ‘it was open to the participation of all and all those 
who want to get involved’. Status messages posted on the page 
constantly invited participants to help with the mobilising efforts 
by sharing the page and inviting their friends to ‘like’ it. ‘Invita a 
todos tus amigos a la pagina. El 15 de mayo la calle tiene que ser 
nuestra’ (invite all your friends to join the page. On the 15th of 
May the streets have to be ours) pleaded the second status message 
posted. ‘Nos esta cuestando llegar a los 11.000 ... no puede ser hay 
que difundir!’ (It is costing us to get to 11,000 ... it’s not possible ... 
we need to reach out!) was one exclamation during the second week 
of the page’s existence, when the growth in membership seemed to 
be slowing down. 
Tens or hundreds of comments would follow each of these 
status updates, sometimes complimenting the admins, more rarely 
criticising them, almost always contributing to the collective sense 
of exaltation. As Wael Ghonim had done with the Khaled Said page, 
the DRY admins spent a lot of time acknowledging and replying 
to the comments, so as to sustain the impression that users were 
taking part in an interactive conversation rather than simply ‘liking’ 
the content fed to them. Moreover, they repeatedly asked users to 
contribute content to the page in the form of texts, pictures and 
videos. For example, on the 29th of April users were asked to record 
a video explaining their reasons for taking to the streets on the 15th. 
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Dozens responded to the invitation, recounting their own personal 
experiences of frustration with the economic and political system, 
thereby giving a series of faces and names to a phantom movement 
which was yet to make a physical appearance. 
Besides the DRY page, in the months before the protest a 
number of other channels, including Facebook pages, blogs and 
websites, contributed to circulating the call to participate far and 
wide. Compared to Egypt, where it had a minor role as a means of 
mobilisation, in Spain Twitter played a significant part in attracting 
attention to the movement and creating conversations among 
activists, journalists, bloggers, academics and sympathisers. In the 
weeks preceding the 15th, the hashtag #15M became a trending 
topic several times on the Spanish Twitter, which itself sparked 
further waves of enthusiasm, triggering an avalanche of related 
tweets and Facebook messages. This and other hashtags like 
#indignados, #tomalacalle (take to the streets), #spanishrevolu-
tion became a venue not only for sharing pent-up anger against 
‘the system’ but also for a collective cultivation of hope about 
people’s ability to react. ‘On the #15m we can be 10,000, 100,000 
or 1,000,000, but we will always be one less without you’ read a 
message posted on the DRY Twitter account a few days before the 
protests and re-tweeted 58 times. The tweet ‘Real Democracy now: 
because we are fucking fed up’ (estamos hasta los cojones) appeared 
on the 13th of May on El Jueves magazine’s official Twitter account, 
using a brazen language quite typical in the warm-up for the 15th.
The launch campaign was to a great extent a web-based operation. 
But as had been the case in Egypt, as the day of the protest drew 
closer organisers progressively shifted their efforts towards street 
communication. The activists of DRY and other groups like 
Estado de Malestar and Juventud Sin Futuro were convinced that 
the movement had to become visible in the streets, in order to 
draw in those Spaniards cut off by the digital divide. Mobilising 
operations progressively came to encompass what Fabio Gandara 
calls ‘a trabajo a pie de calle’ (street work). As Sofia de Roa explains:
Bit by bit people worked on outreach on the internet, and then 
in the last months the outreach for the event leapt onto the 
streets in the form of posters, debates, conferences and word of 
mouth and everything at that level, because it was necessary to 
do communication on the streets as well. There were posters in 
all the cities, and word of mouth worked very well.
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Local groups printed out the posters made available on DRY’s 
website or self-produced and put them up in main streets and public 
squares all across Spain. The intention of local organisers like Asun, 
an activist based in Salamanca, was to ‘begin to make visible the 
movement on the streets, where people would pass by and see a 
poster we had put up, even those who were not on the internet, or 
did not have a Facebook account’. 
The street communication campaign was particularly important 
because the demonstrations of the 15th were being organised not 
only in Madrid and Barcelona but in a total of 58 cities across 
the country. In order to ensure a decent turnout organisers 
were compelled to reach out locally to people beyond the core 
constituency of the movement. To help this street-level campaign, 
‘different local groups were created and there were face-to-face 
meetings in different cities, and this way we made the transition 
from the network to physical reality, and those two levels were made 
complementary’ explains Fabio Gandara. These meetings saw the 
participation of experienced activists, but also hosted many people 
for whom this was their first experience in politics. Aitor Tinoco 
recalls how this ‘was the first time that I was not seeing the same 
faces around the table’.
Throughout the work of preparation for the first day of protest, 
the main weakness appeared to be the scarcity of coverage in the 
mass media. National TV and press almost completely snubbed the 
event. In truth, activists were not counting heavily on the use of mass 
media as a mobilising channel. They were convinced that by using 
the internet and working locally ‘they could jump over Publico, El 
Pais, and any other TV and newspaper’ as de Roa puts it. However, 
given the wide support the protest was gathering, they thought 
it fit to try to use this channel as well, in order to broaden their 
outreach. In the weeks before the demonstration Pablo Gallego, 
Fabio Gandara and other spokespersons for the movement appeared 
on several radio programmes. But when a few days before protest 
they held an official press conference, they were astounded that only 
two news media showed up: the Left Publico and centre-Left El 
Pais. ‘We asked ourselves what we had done wrong’, says Gandara. 
The disinterest of the mass media provoked angry reactions among 
many activist tweeps. But paradoxically it also appeared to confirm 
the organisers’ sense of worth: it seemed the upcoming protest was 
so significant that they needed to be censored, a view reflected in 
a number of tweets circulating at the time: ‘Today’s front pages 
are ignoring the protests. They demonstrate that the big media are 
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part of the problem’, wrote one tweep on the morning of the 15th. 
A few hours before the beginning of protest, user @grcanosa, an 
industrial engineer, condensed the collective indignation against the 
national news media: ‘when in a country there are 60 simultaneous 
demonstrations and it does not go out on any media, something is 
happening isn’t it?’
a magneTIc Sun
When I arrived to Calle de Alcalá and I saw all the people there 
I was very happy. And to see that there were so many people of 
different age, and to see that it was growing, and to see that we 
were a lot ... and now that I am telling you this I get goosebumps.. 
really I was so happy. When we arrived to Puerta del Sol, people 
started sticking big posters on the buildings. The people who were 
there were so unbelievably happy ... I remember that at the end 
of the demo I met some friends of mine. We sat on the square, 
and there were many people who also began sitting. And it was 
strange. Because normally after the end of a demonstration you 
go home.
Sofia de Roa’s account of her experience during the 15th of May 
demonstration reflects the sense of exhilaration in witnessing a 
movement, nurtured online, eventually materialising in the streets 
of central Madrid. On the day, around 50,000 people marched in 
the streets in the Spanish capital alone, while thousands of others 
took to the streets in 57 other cities. The big turnout immediately 
sent emotional ripples across social networks. Pictures of the 
demonstrations were circulated to counter those who would say 
that ‘we were 5 or 6’ (from a tweet by user @kurioso), and angry 
accusations were launched at the big TV channels for not covering 
the protests. But it was what happened later in the night that would 
turn the 15-M protest from an isolated event into the beginning 
of a momentous protest wave. Instead of returning home at the 
end of the demonstration, some participants decided to camp out 
in Puerta del Sol. The square in central Madrid was turned into 
an ‘acampada’, a protest camp, which, also thanks to the intense 
social media messaging radiating from it, came to act as an almost 
irresistible magnetic gathering or trending place for the thousands 
of Spaniards who would flock there in the following days. 
‘Mas de 100 personas durmiendo en Sol en Madrid. Difundelo y 
unete!!’ (More than 100 people sleeping in Sol in Madrid. Share and 
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join!!!), was how @Anon_VV, a Spanish Twitter account connected 
with the international hacking group Anonymous, broke the news. 
After skirmishes with police at the end of the demonstration, a total 
of 50 people decided to spend the night in the square. Despite its 
reluctance to get involved in potentially illegal actions – wanting 
to retain its reputation as the moderate front in the indignados 
movement – Democracia Real Ya gave its stamp of approval to the 
occupation on its Facebook page. However, people like Gallego and 
Gandara decided to stay on the sidelines so as not to ‘interfere in the 
spontaneous process’ of the popular assemblies which developed in 
the camp. In fact, given their lack of experience in ground activism, 
these digital activists had little say on how the camp developed. 
The leading role in setting up the camp and its system of general 
assemblies and working groups was taken by people from the 
so-called ‘okupa’ or squatters scene in Madrid.
The taking of the square was celebrated as ‘spontaneous’, which 
indeed it was in the sense that nobody had planned it thoroughly 
in advance. But as Carmen Haro Barba, a press officer for the 
radical social centre la Tabacalera, one of the hotspots of the activist 
scene in Madrid, points out: ‘while for some this was their first 
experience of politics, most of the people who slept there on that 
night were experienced activists, part of the active fabric of this city. 
Many of them were militants of the social centres, people for whom 
politics is a full-time endeavour.’ Social centres like Tabacalera, Patio 
Maravillas and Casablanca, all located within walking distance from 
Puerta del Sol, contributed to the logistics and provided materials to 
set up the protest camp and keep it going. For all the importance of 
internet communication in reaching out to prospective participants 
and setting the scene for the protests, the actual construction and 
maintenance of the camp required a know-how which the digital 
activists who had launched the campaign did not possess. As had 
already happened in Egypt, once the movement ‘camped out’, the 
focus of communication and organisation progressively shifted from 
the internet to the streets. 
The tipping point for turning the sit-in into a fully-fledged protest 
camp came on the 17th of May when in the early morning the 
police arrived to clear the square. ‘I live in a country in which you 
can camp out to see Justin Bieber but not to defend your rights’, 
commented @TheDirtyMachine sarcastically. If an episode of police 
repression had given the movement its first impetus, a second gave 
the occupation of Puerta del Sol an aura of legitimacy which over 
the following days attracted an inflow of thousands of supporters 
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to the camp. Twitter hashtags like #nonosvamos (we don’t go) and 
#yeswecamp (a pun on Obama’s slogan ‘Yes we can’) became a 
channel for expressing support for the occupiers and for circulating 
information about how to help the occupation. 
The number of tweets posted per day on the hashtag #15M 
shot up to 58,000 on the 17th, reaching more than 200,000 on 
the eve of the local elections of the 22nd. A video presentation 
prepared by a group of researchers at the University of Zaragoza 
represents the flow of tweets as a glow of blue light flowing out of 
Madrid, reaching a climax on the day preceding the elections.22 This 
visualisation captures the way in which the enthusiasm experienced 
by those occupying the square was radiated out to those keenly 
following the events from afar. In the ensuing days many of these 
internet followers would turn into actual participants by joining the 
occupation either full time or part time. As Sofia de Roa recounts:
On Monday, when there was the eviction in the night, there was 
a call [se convoco] on the social networks saying to everybody 
to go the streets at 8pm in Puerta del Sol. And at 8pm there were 
more people than there had been on the 15th of May. Which 
means that it was really impressive [especially given that it was 
a Monday night, rather than the weekend]. On that Tuesday the 
Figure 3.3 map of the protest camp in puerta del Sol. (courtesy: lara pelaez madrid)
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support on social networks was growing exponentially with many 
people saying ‘I go!’, ‘I go!’, ‘I go!’ And people were really coming.
In the late afternoon of the 17th the first General Assembly after the 
re-occupation decided to erect an ‘acampada’. In a matter of hours 
Puerta del Sol was turned into a Spanish adaptation of Tahrir square 
with a circle of tents in the centre – a powerful image which would 
later not only be popularised through social media but finally also 
reported by the newspapers and TV.
Since the first days of the encampment, social media, and Twitter in 
particular, constructed and sustained an emotional attraction to the 
occupation, facilitating the ongoing mobilisation of supporters and 
sympathisers. ‘URGENTE! Hay que ir YA a #acampadasol, están 
cerrando los accesos’ (Urgent there’s a need to go to #acampadasol, 
they are closing access points) wrote @SpainRevolt on the 18th, 
when the occupiers had just set up the basic infrastructure of the 
camp and feared a new eviction. Later that day another user incited 
people to join: ‘Estamos en #acampadasol y necesitamos mas gente. 
Tenemos q movernos y no dejar q los politicos hagan lo q quieran, 
por favor ...’ (We are in acampadasol and we need more people. 
We need to move and not leave the politicians to do what they 
want, please...). Similar messages were sent in the following days 
informing people about the needs of the camp (which accepted 
only material donations and refused monetary ones), keeping them 
updated about the events taking place, as well as maintaining an 
ongoing conversation between those who were in the square and 
those who for whatever reason could not join the occupation, or 
could not join it just yet.
Exemplary of the way in which these and similar messages 
contributed not only in generating widespread sympathy but also in 
increasing the numbers involved is the story of Asun, a 40-year-old 
activist who joined the protests in Sol after having learned about 
them on Facebook. ‘I knew through Facebook that people had 
decided to stay’, recalls Asun, who had participated in the 15-M 
protests in Salamanca and went to Madrid as soon as she knew 
that activists had set up a protest camp there. ‘It was a very quick 
decision, because I did not know that this would happen. I told 
myself “si hay una chispa hay que follarla”’ (literally ‘if there is a 
spark you need to fuck it’: a figurative expression referring to an 
opportunity not to be missed). For many Spaniards the occupations 
in Sol and in tens of other squares appeared not only as an event 
not to be missed but also one that had to be experienced in person 
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rather than simply followed through social media. Messaging on 
hashtags like #sol and #15M contributed to turning the squares 
into contagious or magnetic gathering places, creating a mediated 
spectacle from which emanated an irresistible sense of exhilaration 
capable of transforming ‘spectators’ into ‘actors’. 
When I visited the Puerta del Sol camp on the evening of the 
20th of May, at the very peak of the occupation, what impressed 
me the most was the sheer bodily density in the square. Streams of 
people were trying to make their way into the square from the seven 
roads leading into it. Inside the square itself the crowd was almost 
suffocating, and indeed there were rumours that many people had 
fainted because of the crush. ‘Please try to move to side streets and 
squares’ pleaded a voice from the camp megaphone, ‘we need to 
extend beyond Sol in order to avoid the crush’. I was also astounded 
by the sense of fellowship exuding from the General Assembly 
held every evening in the centre of the square. The interventions 
– delivered by people of different ages and class backgrounds and 
lasting no more than a couple of minutes to abide by the assembly 
rules – usually involved a testimony to the experience of personal 
hardship in the midst of the economic crisis, and almost invariably 
concluded with the ritual formula ‘yo tambien soy un indignado’ 
(I also am an indignant). It was as though the indignation which 
had previously been geographically dispersed and held together 
only symbolically on the web was now being physically ‘harvested’, 
stored in one place and given not only a collective name but also a 
physical centre, an anchoring point in public space. 
The neT waS nOT The Square
Spanish academics José Manuel Sánchez Duarte and Victor Sampedro 
Blanco have interpreted the actions of the indignados movement 
as a sort of transfer to the streets of practices of cooperation first 
developed on the web. Their argument is summed up in the claim 
that before the 15th of May ‘The Net was the square’:
The internet logic has been transferred to public life; from there 
those who do not understand the first, cannot understand what 
is happening. We don’t either, but we do notice that the practices 
of the net (self-summoning, forum deliberation, consumption 
of counter-information, the weaving of affective and effective 
networks, to produce and to operate in peripheral and digital 
spheres) have become tangible. The traits of digital communication 
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– co-operation, instantaneity, self-nurturing, horizontality, de-
centralisation, flexibility, dynamism and inter-connection – have 
become present in assemblies and camps.23
The protest camps in Puerta del Sol and several other squares 
across the country cannot, however, be understood as a simple 
transposition onto public space of practices first established on the 
web. Rather, as documented in the course of this chapter, the use of 
social media involved an emotional choreography, which effected a 
deep transformation of the experience of solidarity and cooperation 
constructed among an online public, and the symbolic and physical 
harvesting of individual indignation. By contrast, the practices 
developed in the square were characterised by an immersion and 
corporeality which had little in common with the kind of ‘virtual 
proximity’ constructed on the web in anticipation of the protests. 
The process of mobilisation reached its climax in a re-appropriation 
of public space and a reinvention of the tradition of street politics, 
which to some extent developed in competition with the culture of 
digital activism which had been crucial in the initial phase. 
The oft-heard cry ‘no estamos en Facebook, estamos en la 
calle!’ (We are not on Facebook, we are on the streets) came to 
express the joy generated by the rediscovery of a sense of physical 
communion that reversed the spatial and communicative dispersion 
epitomised by social media interactions. Rather than posting status 
messages, people stuck hundreds of post-it notes at the entrance 
of Sol undeground station, where groups of people would stop 
to read them. Instead of discussions held over internet forums, 
participants immersed themselves in commissions, working groups 
and assemblies (practices invented long before the appearance 
of the Net). Rather than browsing through hundreds of profile 
pictures they became acquainted with other people’s faces. Instead 
of Facebook ‘pokings’ they resorted to collective hugs like those 
frequently seen during the first days of the camp. There was no 
doubt among most of the people I interviewed that the face-to-face 
interactions conducted in the square were by far superior to the 
kind maintained on the web, seen by many as running the risk of 
exacerbating people’s isolation and loneliness. As José Ordóñez, a 
protestor in his late thirties puts it: ‘it is only when you go to an 
assembly that your solitude disappears. The web runs the risk of 
isolating you.’ Thus while social media were undoubtedly important 
in getting people ‘there’, once they were gathered physically in public 
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space, it was as though they were almost embarrassed about the 
way they had got there in the first place.
The protest camps became centres in the network, physical points 
anchoring a diffused movement. As Aitor of DRY notes, ‘that’s 
why the camps have been so important, in order to overcome the 
fragmentation of the net, to move from that social atomisation 
which is well reflected in the very structure of the net’. He describes 
the occupied squares as a site of ‘incarnation’, and as stages for a 
process of ‘social recomposition’ in which a new social body would 
be formed. This process of recomposition came to revolve around a 
symbolic and material concentration, of which the suffocating bodily 
density experienced in Puerta del Sol at the peak of the protest was 
the manifestation. The importance of physical centres as focal points 
for the action of contemporary popular movements goes against the 
grain of the claims to de-centralisation and irreducible multiplicity 
made by many activists inspired by the likes of Deleuze, Negri and 
Castells, with their allergy to centres of any kind. Nevertheless, 
it is an element which is crucial to understanding the indignados 
movement and their ‘popular’ or ‘populist’ character. Puerta del 
Sol, alongside other major occupations like the one in Plaza de 
Catalunya in Barcelona, became a ‘nodal point’ through which to 
transform the people from a phantom public into a tangible crowd.
Figure 3.4 an assembly in puerta del Sol. The signpost reads ‘they call it democracy and 
it is not’. (courtesy: lara pelaez madrid)
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We must not forget that for Spain, Puerta del Sol constitutes the 
geographical and legal centre of the nation. It is the ‘Kilómetro cero’, 
the point from which all distances are measured and the point of 
departure for the radial network of roads. But it is also the ‘national 
square’, what the Place de la Bastille is for France, or Parliament 
square for Britain, and Tahrir square for Egypt – that is, the place 
in which, several times throughout history, people have petitioned 
or revolted against their national government. Bearing in mind this 
deep symbolic connotation, we can understand why the mere name 
‘Sol’ seemed to say so much about the unity of the movement, its 
holding together despite its internal diversity, and its refusal of forms 
of delegation and representation. This toponym became a popular 
hashtag for activist Twitter feeds (#sol, #acampadasol), material 
for domain naming (acampadasol.org, sol.tv), a short-hand for the 
movement as a whole, and an imaginary point of reference for all 
those who were not physically present ‘in Sol’ but were nevertheless 
orientated towards it, following events closely through social and 
mass media alike. 
Like a sun, its rays radiating through space, during the heyday 
of the occupation the ‘plaza tomada’ (the taken square) seemed 
somehow capable, thanks to the bodily density it attracted, of 
redeeming an economically down-trodden and politically humiliated 
nation. For Helena, an activist involved in acampada Sol, ‘Puerta 
del Sol with its seven esoteric rays was the point of departure for the 
awakening of Spain and humanity.’ This quasi-religious dimension 
should not be overlooked, given that the acampada in Sol, among 
its many (for some too many) commissions and working groups, 
also featured one devoted to ‘love and spirituality’. 
Naturally, the powerful ritual space constructed in Sol through 
the occupation could not last forever, and after almost a month, 
on the 19th of June, the indignados decided to lift the camp, given 
the strain on those maintaining it, and the growing complaints 
from local hotels and shop-keepers. But in an expression of the 
movement’s emotional attachment to the square, they left behind 
‘InfoSol’ – an info-point made of recycled material – so as to 
outlast the bodily gathering of the movement; though this popular 
‘monument’ of sorts was soon to be trashed by the Spanish police. 
After lifting the main occupations the movement focused on 
‘extending’ itself, spreading the ‘indignation’ it had accumulated 
in symbolic spaces like Puerta del Sol and Plaza de Catalunya. 
Activists set up assemblies in different neighbourhoods throughout 
the big cities, while indignant marchers traversed Spain to encourage 
Gerbaudo T02575 01 text   98 30/08/2012   11:04
The harveSTIng Of IndIgnaTIOn 99
the creation of assemblies in remote Spanish towns. This was a 
remarkable attempt to give the movement a capillary presence 
throughout Spanish society by constructing local organisational 
structures. Nonetheless, arguably this emphasis on de-centralisation, 
which to a great extent reproduced practices and discourses 
dominant during the anti-globalisation period, also ran the risk 
of depriving the movement of its concentration, of the physical 
and symbolic density it had worked hard to harness. While in 
Madrid activists decided to continue holding a weekly assembly 
in Puerta del Sol, in Barcelona they decided to move completely 
to the neighbourhoods, without maintaining a central assembly. 
That decision proved ‘a complete hara-kiri’, as Aitor Tinoco puts 
it. ‘We de-centralised our struggle to the neighbourhoods and thus 
lost a central focus.’
Bearing in mind the vital role of occupied squares as ritual centres 
and organisational foci of the movement, rather than simply as 
nodes in a network, we can appreciate the role played by social 
media during the phase of sustainment of the occupation, besides the 
phase of initiation discussed in the previous sections. Social media 
helped to sustain a sense of emotional attraction to the mass sit-ins. 
Facebook pages, tweets and posts were involved in the continuous 
weaving together of an emotional texture around the occupied 
public spaces, connecting these places with dispersed publics. 
Live-stream broadcasts by the website Sol.tv received almost 10 
million visits during the first week of the protests,24 just as the city 
council of Madrid switched off its webcam in Puerta del Sol in an 
attempt to black-out the protests. Hundreds of videos posted on 
YouTube conveyed the experience of collective enthusiasm in the 
square, while several dedicated websites, including tomalaplaza.net 
(take the streets) and tomalosbarrios.net (take the neighbourhoods), 
sprang up to give supporters and sympathisers timely reports on 
what was happening.
These and other websites also allowed the movement to connect 
with those who for whatever reason could or would not attend 
the protests. As Luis, an activist involved in the communication 
commission of the ‘acampada’ in Barcelona, explains: ‘in the 
physical square are 2,000 people. But our Facebook page has 
received 2,000,000 visits in 15 days, with people from every part of 
the country, who are connecting, sharing and thanking.’ The diffuse 
and distant forms of involvement which the ‘acampadas’ managed 
to attract through the use of social media allowed ‘those who could 
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not physically attend to feel part of the movement’, as Teresa, a 
freelance web-designer involved in the movement, observes.
cOncluSIOn
The 15-M movement in Spain was characterised by an intense and 
enthusiastic resort to social media as a means of mobilisation. In 
using social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter activists 
constructed resonant emotional conversations across the internet 
and managed to harness a widespread collective indignation 
transforming it into a political passion driving collective action in 
public space. Movement organisers wove together a ‘choreography 
of assembly’ which facilitated the gathering of a diverse and dispersed 
constituency around Puerta del Sol and the other main occupied 
squares of the movement, transformed into symbolic points of 
convergence for the movement. In the process, Facebook pages and 
Twitter feeds constructed loose collective identities characterised by 
an appeal to ‘normality’ (as in DRY’s self-definition as ‘normal and 
common people’) aiming to intercept prospective users regardless 
of their political and cultural affiliations. 
Naturally the process of mobilisation in the indignados movement 
was not all about Twitter and Facebook, however much these media 
allowed organisers to reach out to diverse sectors of the Spanish 
society and exploit the participatory imaginary of the web 2.0. 
Similarly to what happened in Egypt, activists soon resorted to 
street-level agitation to go beyond the movement’s core constituency 
and break the barrier of the digital divide. 
Furthermore, television stations like La Sexta and centrist and 
progressive newspapers like El Pais and El Publico contributed 
to shaping the image of the indignados, to mobilising people, 
and to building a consensus for the indignados far and wide. In 
an opinion poll published by El Pais on the 5th of June 2011, 
66 per cent of Spaniards expressed their sympathy towards the 
indignados, and even 81 per cent agreed that they were right to be 
‘indignant’.25 Such figures demonstrate that the indignados have 
to a large extent fulfilled their majoritarian ambitions, and drawn 
a diverse following of supporters and sympathisers. Furthermore, 
thanks to its numerous local occupations beyond the main squares, 
the movement has also managed to create local infrastructures 
accessible to people outside of the metropolitan areas. Compared 
to the anti-globalisation movement, whose mobilisation potential 
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was for the most part restricted to an urban middle-class youth, 
this constitutes a major achievement.
Despite its initial success, however, the 15-M movement slowly 
began to wane during the last months of 2011. Local neighbourhood 
assemblies saw their numbers progressively drop, and within the 
movement itself the differences became more acute between the 
so-called moderates identified with Democracia Real Ya and the 
more ‘radical’ members represented by the so-called ‘okupas’ 
activists rooted in the squatters movement. At the time of writing, 
the movement was celebrating its first annual anniversary with 
protests beginning on the 12th of May, but was internally torn 
between the initiators of the movement led by Fabio Gandara, who 
had decided to turn Democracia Real Ya into a legal organisation, 
and others who wanted the movement to remain a ‘network’ 
without any formal structure. 
The irksome question of leadership is thus finally coming to the 
fore and being openly discussed. This is a testament to the fact that 
the indignados, like other such movements, were not and are not 
‘leaderless’. As we have seen in the course of this chapter, a handful 
of young digital activists like Fabio Gandara and Pablo Gallego 
had a decisive role in steering the actions of the movement, by 
‘setting the scene’ for or ‘choreographing’ public protests. While 
these activists’ doings were hardly visible in the public spaces they 
contributed to creating, the way in which they used social media 
to construct collective identities and to fuel an emotional tension 
towards participation deeply shaped the way in which the movement 
emerged and developed. 
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‘The hashtag which did (not) start a 
revolution’: The laborious adding up 
to the 99%
Im thinking about getting my lazy ass out of bed to go #occupywallstreet in the city.
My bed is just way too comfortable though :(
Tweet sent on the 22nd of September 2011
‘It all started innocuously enough with a July 13 blog post urging 
people to #OccupyWallStreet, as though such a thing (Twitter 
hashtag and all) were possible. It turns out, with enough momentum 
and a keen sense of how to use social media, it actually is.’1 The 
quote from a Reuters report encapsulates much of the myth created 
around the rise of Occupy Wall Street in mainstream news media. 
The story goes that one day someone put out a Twitter hashtag 
and then by some kind of social media magic a social movement 
was born. In fact, as we will see in this chapter, the emergence of 
Occupy Wall Street was a much ‘messier’ process than this kind of 
representation suggests. If Adbusters – the Canadian countercultural 
magazine which first published a call to protest on the 17th of 
September – had hoped that the #OccupyWallStreet hashtag, 
together with ‘tactical briefings’ published on its website, would 
ignite a ‘revolution’, this did not turn out to be the case. On the 
pre-announced day of protest, of the 20,000 ‘redeemers, rebels, and 
radicals’ it had summoned only 300 turned up. The movement got 
up and running, and grabbed the attention of the US public and 
of the world, only after a messy and slow process of ground-level 
organising and a redefinition of its identity as a popular (rather 
than countercultural) movement representing the ‘99%’: i.e., all 
those who were suffering the consequences of the economic crisis.
The emergence of Occupy Wall Street was characterised by a 
tortuous development in which social media were only partly used 
as a means for a choreography of assembly, setting the scene for 
public protest, and often became more a kind of channel for the 
reverberation of events taking place on the ground. Paradoxically, in 
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the country where social media firms like Twitter and Facebook have 
their headquarters, campaigners initially failed to use them effectively 
as a means to ‘choreograph’ the movement before its materialisation 
in public space. Social media only acquired importance during the 
phase of sustainment of the movement, being used to create a sense 
of attraction to the occupations, and to invoke a sense of solidarity 
between ‘physical occupiers’ and ‘internet occupiers’, activists on 
the ground and people following events from a distance.
Occupy Wall Street (or ‘Occupy’ in the shorter form and ‘OWS’ in 
its acronym) followed in the wake of the Egyptian uprising and the 
Spanish indignados, from which Adbusters drew their inspiration 
for putting out the initial call. On the 17th of September protesters 
assembled in Zuccotti Park, a few tens of metres away from the 
New York Stock Exchange, and the occupation soon inspired tens 
of other camps across the US. Progressively the movement came to 
encompass a diverse constituency, including blue-collar workers, 
unemployed, retired, poor, homeless, all representatives of that 99% 
the movement purported to be fighting for. Before being evicted 
from Zuccotti Park and from most of its other camps between 
November and December 2011, the movement had managed to 
secure quite an impressive degree of public support. According to 
a poll published by the New York Times in mid October 2011, 46 
per cent of American citizens agreed with the reasons given by the 
‘occupiers’ for their action.2
Even if social media alone cannot explain the emergence and 
relative success of Occupy Wall Street, it is evident that they 
have played an important role in mobilising and coordinating 
participants. Unsurprisingly, this aspect of the movement sparked 
a huge news media hype. Technology journalists and social media 
gurus eagerly debated which social media gadget best represented 
the movement. Having gotten bored with Twitter, some of these 
pundits applauded the activists’ adoption of Twitter’s ‘anarchist’ 
alternative Vibe3 and the location-based service FourSquare.4 
Social media start-ups immediately jumped on the techno-utopian 
bandwagon, hoping to find in Occupy a much needed PR boost for 
their newly introduced services.5
As in the preceding chapters, I am not much interested in the 
technical affordances of these tools, but in the cultural practices 
the activists developed in their use. I will highlight how, similarly 
to in Egypt and Spain, social media were crucially used for 
constructing a choreography of assembly facilitating the gathering 
of participants in public space, and generating an emotional tension 
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towards participation. I begin by describing the crisis of public space 
which characterised American society at the inception of Occupy, 
and the incapacity of established organisations to act as the base 
for building a popular campaign against the politics of austerity. 
Looking at the interaction between Adbusters and the organisers 
on the ground, I argue that the launch campaign failed in creating 
that initial emotional impetus which characterised the protests in 
Egypt and Spain. The fixing of the date – 17th of September – was 
initially not accompanied by the construction of a resonant popular 
identity or by the accumulation of a sense of anticipation motivating 
a dispersed constituency to take to the streets. During the phase 
of initiation, all the organisers’ attention was on Twitter, while 
Facebook, which had constituted the springboard for the other two 
movements, was initially snubbed. Only later, once the movement 
had pitched its tents in Zuccotti Park, did the ‘We are the 99%’ 
Tumblr page come to act as an emotional rallying point for the 
construction of an inclusive popular identity and the generation of 
an impetus towards participation. 
In the second part of the chapter, I move to analysing the role 
played by social media in sustaining the protests once the occupation 
of Zuccotti Park began. Here Twitter was effectively used to weave 
together an emotional conversation and to sustain a sense of 
solidarity between the physical occupiers and their distant supporters 
or ‘internet occupiers’. However, social media interactions did not 
manage to turn sympathisers into actual participants to any great 
extent. In the final section of the chapter I discuss the use of Twitter 
as a tactical device during protest events and emergency situations 
such as the eviction of occupiers from the park on the night of 
the 15th of November. I suggest that the use of Twitter on this 
occasion pointed to the presence of a group of core organisers, 
or ‘choreographers’, which contradicts the movement’s claims to 
leaderlessness and absolute spontaneity.
reclaImIng The fIrST amendmenT
The First Amendment gives every New Yorker the right to speak 
out. But it doesn’t give anyone the right to sleep in a park or 
otherwise take it over, to the exclusion of others. Protesters have 
had two months to occupy the park with tents and sleeping 
bags. Now they will have to occupy the space with the power of 
their arguments.6
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When, on the morning of the 15th of November 2011, the Mayor 
of New York Mike Bloomberg went to a press conference to justify 
the eviction of the protest camp at Zuccotti Park in Downtown 
Manhattan, executed a few hours earlier by the New York Police 
Department, he saw fit to appeal to those higher values of public 
health and safety. Nevertheless, it was clear to anyone with any 
knowledge of recent American history that his action was not 
simply ‘administrative’ but deeply political and ideological. The 
eviction was but the latest instance in a history of attacks on the 
right of assembly, animated by that ‘fear of crowds’ Mike Davis has 
eloquently written about (see for example 1992a). Young activists 
just needed to think back to the police repression of the protests 
against the Republican National convention in 2008. Older ones 
might be reminded of by-now legendary events such as the violent 
eviction of the People’s Park in Berkeley in May 1969 by then 
governor of California Ronald Reagan, who deployed the National 
Guard to stop a group of residents and students from occupying an 
abandoned patch of land near the Berkeley campus.
 The eviction at People’s Park was the inauguration of a long 
political cycle which has marked ‘the end of public space’ in 
American society (Mitchell, 1995). Different scholars and pundits 
have denounced how, in the subsequent decades, the dominance 
of neoliberal doctrine has involved an ongoing attack on spaces 
of political encounter and alternative sociability (Putnam, 2000; 
Brenner and Theodore, 2002). The consequences of neoliberal 
ideology for public space have been well described by Mike Davis, 
who highlights the ‘destruction of any truly democratic urban space’ 
brought about by neoliberalism. For Davis, ‘the public spaces of 
the new megastructures and supermalls have supplanted traditional 
streets and supplanted their spontaneity. Inside malls, office centers, 
and cultural complexes, public activities are sorted out into strictly 
functional compartments under the gaze of private police forces’ 
(Davis 1992a: 155). The call to ‘occupy’ chosen by activists was 
premised precisely on this sense of a crisis of public space, and on 
the conviction that in order to create a public space anew there was 
no other way than by physically ‘occupying’ it.
The absence of an established public space in which to voice public 
grievances has become particularly apparent since the inception of 
the global economic crisis. Similarly to the case of the Spanish 
indignados, the key reason for the surprising level of support earned 
by Occupy Wall Street was the dire economic conditions in the US, 
undergoing its worst crisis since 1929. As the Occupy activists were 
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themselves to popularise, 30 years of neoliberalism had seen the rich 
getting richer and the poor poorer. According to the Congressional 
budget office, between 1979 and 2007 the richest 1 per cent of 
Americans saw its earnings rise by a whopping 275 per cent, while 
the rest saw only a 60 per cent rise along with a rising cost of living.7 
With the explosion of the economic crisis in 2008, the situation 
of economic inequality became yet bitterer for the majority of 
Americans, affected by unemployment, home repossessions, and 
falling earnings. Unemployment touched a record 10 per cent rate 
in 2009,8 the highest since the Great Depression, dropping to 8.6 
per cent in December 2011 but still well above pre-crisis levels.9 
The hopes raised by Barack Obama during his 2008 presidential 
campaign soon turned sour. Obama demonstrated he was not a 
new Roosevelt, with the determination to rein in a capitalism out 
of control, but a cautious centrist politician, ready to compromise 
on the economy with the Republicans, and careful not to antagonise 
corporate America from which the first African-American president 
of the US drew much campaign funding.
Confronted with this dire economic situation, the organisations 
of American civil society, including trade unions and established 
activist groups, have by and large proven incapable of coming 
up with a convincing and broad-based response. In the 30 years 
since Reagan took power and neoliberalism became the dominant 
political philosophy in Washington, American trade unions have 
been defeated in battle after battle, similar to what has happened 
in the UK since the era of Margaret Thatcher. They now represent 
just 11 per cent of the workforce in the private sector, and 25 per 
cent of the government workforce. It is true that events like the 
2011 Wisconsin protests can be read as a sign of renewed vitality 
within the US labour movement. Yet trade unions in general have 
remained far too weak and corporatist to be capable of leading 
a powerful national campaign against the politics of austerity. 
Besides the unions, other social movements which might have 
otherwise constituted a focal point to gather around were not up 
to the challenge. The anti-war movement had fallen apart following 
internecine struggles and the progressive fading away of the ‘war on 
terror’ in the news agenda. The galaxy of direct action groups like 
DAN and Ya Basta, described by David Graeber in his book Direct 
Action (2009), was instead too small and subcultural to constitute 
a platform for the convergence of popular dissent.
Paradoxically, in recent years it has been the American Right 
rather than the Left that has taken the lead in reinventing a politics 
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of the street, as well illustrated by the Tea Party movement. Since 
January 2009, hundreds of protests have been organised in different 
parts of the US to protest against the effects of the economic crisis 
and what participants considered an excessive level of government 
intervention in the economy. The protest movement peaked in a 
taxpayer march on the 12th September 2009 in Washington DC, 
in which the equation between ‘Obama’ and ‘socialism’ was all 
the rage. Some envious leftist activists have defined the Tea Party 
phenomenon as an ‘astroturf’ movement, that is, one orchestrated 
and bankrolled by powerful organisations. But it is undeniable that 
the Tea Party has skilfully managed to tap into a vein of discontent 
caused by the economic crisis, which to a great extent Occupy Wall 
Street would also do.
As in Spain and Egypt, in the US some glimmers of hope for 
radicals in recent years also came from online activism. Since the 
late 1990s, the ‘free culture’ (Kelty, 2008) developed by hackers, 
advocates of open source software, and internet rights campaigners, 
has come to constitute a major inspiration for the development 
of new forms of activism. The foremost representative of this 
emerging techno-utopian political culture is the hacker group 
Anonymous. ‘Anonymous’, a ‘mass noun’ used by several hackers 
around the world to sign their actions, originated in 2003 from 
an online encounter between hackers sharing funny pictures on 
the ‘imageboard’ website 4chan.10 The group began its activity 
by engaging in light-hearted online mockeries, like defacing the 
homepage of the American epilepsy association with a flashy video. 
Only later did the group come to acquire a political profile through 
its attacks on the websites of government agencies and corporations 
(almost invariably accompanied by its ‘suit without head’ logo and 
the signature motto ‘We are Anonymous. We are legion. We do not 
forgive. We do not forget. Expect us’) as well as for its support for 
Wikileaks and Julian Assange.
Wearing Guy Fawkes masks inspired by the activist cult movie 
V for Vendetta, people identifying themselves with Anonymous 
have in recent years also made the leap onto the streets, in a 
demonstration that even hackers do not always content themselves 
with ‘inhabiting’ cyberspace. Since the Project Chanology protests 
of 2009, against the Church of Scientology and its censorship of a 
YouTube video featuring a clueless Tom Cruise, Anonymous has 
repeatedly invited its supporters to take to the streets to protest 
against corporations and organisations which it sees as countering 
its ideals of transparency and freedom of information. Occupy 
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Wall Street has been to date the most important public campaign 
Anonymous has put its weight behind. In anticipation of the protests 
the hacker group posted a YouTube video inviting its supporters to 
flood the streets of Downtown Manhattan on the 17th of September. 
Similarly to what happened in Egypt and Spain, the digital activist 
practices developed by groups like Anonymous, with its ideals 
of anonymity and leaderless organising, had a deep influence on 
the emergence of Occupy Wall Street, which I reconstruct in the 
following section looking at the interaction between organisers 
online and on the ground. 
ADbuSTeRS and The peOple On The grOund
On September 17, we want to see 20,000 people flood into lower 
Manhattan, set up tents, kitchens, peaceful barricades and occupy 
Wall Street for a few months. Once there, we shall incessantly 
repeat one simple demand in a plurality of voices.11
It all began as a shot in the dark. The trumpet of war this time 
was first sounded not by a newly formed group of unemployed 
graduates who had met through social networking sites, as was the 
case with Democracia Real Ya, nor by an anonymous Facebook 
admin as in the Egyptian revolution. Instead, on this occasion the 
initiative was taken by an established alternative news media, the 
Canadian anti-consumerist magazine Adbusters. On July 13th the 
magazine’s website addressed its network of supporters – ‘90,000 
redeemers, rebels, and radicals’ – asking 20,000 of them to morph 
into a revolutionary army by assembling in Wall Street, the financial 
centre of America and the world. The call suggested that
If we hang in there, 20,000-strong, week after week against every 
police and National Guard effort to expel us from Wall Street, it 
would be impossible for Obama to ignore us. Our government 
would be forced to choose publicly between the will of the people 
and the lucre of the corporations.
Against the claims to spontaneity and leaderlessness which 
have since been associated with the movement, at its inception 
Occupy was a carefully orchestrated campaign, whose logo, copy 
and imagery had been professionally packed up by the creative 
graphic team of Adbusters. The idea behind Adbusters’ call was to 
exploit what they saw as ‘a shift in revolutionary tactics’ introduced 
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by the Egyptian uprising and the Spanish indignados: ‘a fusion 
of Tahrir with the acampadas of Spain’. As we have seen in the 
previous two chapters, the Egyptian and Spanish movements were 
‘revolutions’ with a set date, pre-announced on Facebook well in 
advance. Adbusters’ call surpassed both in its ambition to ‘design’ 
a revolution, with almost no prior consultation with the political 
groups already established on the ground.
Behind the launch of the campaign lay the work of two key people 
inside Adbusters. The first was Kalle Lasn, the magazine’s founder 
and main editor, a histrionic 69-year-old filmmaker and writer. The 
second was Micah White, a 29-year-old Berkeley-based activist and 
the senior editor on the magazine. Interestingly, Micah owed much 
of his fame as a writer to his harsh critique of ‘clicktivism’, a form 
of internet-only activism practised by organisations like MoveOn 
and Avaaz (White, 2010). He had also criticised Facebook which 
he blames for the ‘commercialization of friendship’. Following the 
revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, however, he had seen reasons for 
hope in the possibilities opened up by the use of social media, and 
had suggested that ‘technology can birth the barricades of the 21st 
century’ (White, 2011). 
The call to occupy Wall Street was certainly not Adbusters’ first 
attempt to take on the power of corporations. Since its foundation 
in 1989 the magazine had been an outlet of debate and visual 
experimentation for a crew of ‘culture jammers’, media activists 
dedicated to the mockery of mainstream culture through advertising 
spoofs, also known as ‘subvertising’, celebrated in the pages of 
Naomi Klein’s No Logo (2000). Around the turn of the millennium 
it became one of the intellectual and creative powerhouses of the 
anti-globalisation movement. However the idea of ‘jump-starting’ 
a popular movement following the lead of the Arab uprisings and 
the Spanish indignados was in its ambition well beyond anything 
it had tried before. ‘For 20 years we have been calling for a global 
uprising’ – explains Kalle Lasn – ‘and when that turmoil in Greece 
and in other parts of Europe happened and then in Egypt and 
Tunisia we saw an opportunity’. Unlike what had happened in 
Spain and Egypt, the date of the 17th of September was chosen 
on purely practical grounds: ‘That was time enough to get the 
Twitter feed to go crazy and that was enough for the Facebook 
page to come together and we tried to do it as quickly as possible’, 
Lasn explains.
In launching Occupy Wall Street, Adbusters’ efforts were all focused 
on communication, rather than the actual organising of the event, 
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as though hoping that advertising alone would suffice to create the 
momentum required for a popular movement to materialise. The very 
name of the campaign was turned into a hashtag – #OccupyWallStreet 
– so as to facilitate its ‘viral’ diffusion. Adbusters worked carefully on 
the campaign iconography, including the image of a ballerina dancing 
over the famous Wall Street bull sculpture. Moreover, Lasn and 
White decided that the movement should have only ‘one demand’, 
so as to imitate what they saw as the reason for the success of the 
Egyptian revolution. Where the Egyptians had tenaciously demanded 
the resignation of Hosni Mubarak, the American revolutionaries 
would have contented themselves with pleading for a presidential 
commission on the crimes of the financial system. In response to the 
criticisms raised by readers on its online forum, however, Adbusters 
decided to leave it to the people taking to the streets in New York 
what their one demand should be. Those gathered in Zuccotti Park 
eventually decided that they did not want to make any demands at 
all, fearing that to do so might legitimise those in power, who had 
nothing to offer them anyway, so they thought.
Adbusters’ impromptu launch of the campaign did not go 
down well with the local activist community in New York. It was 
seen by many as a naïve operation given that it did not take into 
account the material resources that would be required to get the 
campaign up and running. Yet the local activists also recognised 
the ‘political opportunity’ (Tarrow, 1994: 17–18) the call opened 
up, and felt a sort of duty to set up the protests for those who were 
likely to make their way to Lower Manhattan on the day fixed by 
Adbusters. The sentiment then prevalent among ground organisers 
is well represented by David Graeber, an anarchist activist and 
anthropologist who had much influence in the nurturing phase of 
the movement throughout August and early September, and who has 
declared himself the ‘inventor’ of the ‘we are the 99%’ slogan: ‘The 
Adbusters people said we have 90,000 subscribers; we’re hoping 
to get 20,000’ – recounted Graeber in an interview for Vanity Fair. 
‘We were like, Yeah, right. Those guys don’t understand that these 
things just don’t happen on the Internet. To make it real you have 
to do real on-the-ground organising.’12
It did not take long after the initial call was launched before 
the ‘real on-the-ground organising’ was initiated. Thus David 
Kroll, an activist and associate editor of the counter-information 
website TomDispatch,13 recounts the early organising attempts in 
New York:
Gerbaudo T02575 01 text   110 30/08/2012   11:04
The laBOrIOuS addIng up TO The 99% 111
Figure 4.1 The ‘launch’ poster for #Occupywallstreet by Adbusters.
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Months before the first occupiers descended on Zuccotti Park in 
lower Manhattan, before the news trucks arrived and the unions 
endorsed, before Michael Bloomberg and Michael Moore and 
Kanye West made appearances, a group of artists, activists, 
writers, students, and organisers gathered on the fourth floor of 
16 Beaver Street, an artists’ space near Wall Street, to talk about 
changing the world. There were New Yorkers in the room, but 
also Egyptians, Spaniards, Japanese, and Greeks. Some had played 
a part in the Arab Spring uprising; others had been involved in 
the protests catching fire across Europe. But no one at 16 Beaver 
knew they were about to light the fuse on a protest movement 
that would sweep the United States and fuel similar uprisings 
around the world. (in Van Gelder, 2011: 16)
For Kroll, ‘without that worldly group that met at 16 Beaver and 
later created the New York City General Assembly, there might 
not have been an Occupy Wall Street as we know it today’. In turn 
it is fair to say that without Adbusters’ call the small and highly 
subcultural activist scene in New York would have hardly found a 
way to bridge their sectarian divides and launch an ambitious and 
inclusive campaign like ‘Occupy’. It is undeniable that Adbusters’ 
call at least acted as a provocation shaking up the passivity and 
divisions within the American activist community.
Besides the anarchist scene gathering around countercultural 
spaces like 16 Beaver, ABC No Rio, and the C-Squat (the last two 
of which were actually closed for renovation at the time), other 
groups with a leftist orientation informed the development of 
the nascent movement. The idea of the protest camp had already 
been tried out by a small group of socialist activists called New 
Yorkers Against Budget Cuts. From June 14th to July 5th 2011 
they had set up an encampment in front of City Hall to protest 
against a programme of budget cuts planned by Mayor Bloomberg. 
They called the sit-in (where they were not allowed by police to 
pitch tents) ‘Bloombergville’,14 drawing their inspiration from the 
Hoovervilles, the shanty-towns which had mushroomed during 
the Great Depression of the 1930s and were named after President 
Herbert Hoover, held responsible for the economic disgrace. Besides 
this group, several others contributed in preparing the terrain for the 
nascent movement, including the newly formed activist group US 
Day of Rage, which took its name from the days of rage of the Arab 
Spring and called for an overturn of the system of party funding.
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When on the 2nd of August these different groups met at the 
first General Assembly called at Bowling Green near to the bull 
sculpture sparks flied. Socialists organised the assembly as a rally 
with set speakers. David Graeber and other anarchists, seeing how 
things were panning out, invited people to defect from the meeting. 
‘I started tapping people on the shoulder who looked like they 
were as annoyed as I was and said, if we actually did a real general 
assembly, would you come?’ Graeber recounted to Vanity Fair. ‘We 
ended up forming a circle, and at that point everyone defected from 
the rally. There were maybe 60 or 70 people.’15 The group which 
coalesced on that day started meeting regularly at Battery Park and 
then at Tompkins Square. Thus the first nucleus of the New York 
General Assembly, which would act as the main decision body of 
the movement, was formed, and started working on the organisation 
of the protests. 
hOw nOT TO run a SOcIal medIa launch campaIgn
‘We put out the hashtag ... and it was quite a blast’, claims 
Kalle Lasn, the ‘brain-father’ of Occupy Wall Street, describing 
the launch of the movement in summer 2011. In truth though, 
there was not really much of a ‘blast’ on social networking sites 
in the two-and-a-half month period between Adbusters’ first call 
and the occupation of Zuccotti Park. Compared to the activists 
in Egypt and Spain, the original nucleus of Occupy organisers by 
and large failed to construct a sense of anticipation around the 
‘landing’ of the movement in public space. The level of attention 
on both Facebook and Twitter was almost flat until the movement 
made its physical appearance. As the social media company Social 
Flow noted in a report on the communication flowing through 
the #OccupyWallStreet hashtag: ‘we are so used to seeing rapid 
information spreads on Twitter, yet what we see in this case is an 
extremely slow build-up’.16 Moreover, according to the same report, 
many of the users who were initially using the hashtag were in fact 
Spanish tweeps connected to the indignados movement eager to see 
it making ripples across the Atlantic, rather than people based in 
the US. It was only in late September and early October, after two 
episodes of police repression and a threat of eviction, that Occupy 
started attracting attention on social media and eventually also on 
mainstream media.
There are a number of reasons for the relative failure of the 
Occupy launch campaign. Naturally the almost non-existent mass 
Gerbaudo T02575 01 text   113 30/08/2012   11:04
114 TweeTS and The STreeTS
media coverage prior to the protests constituted a major obstacle to 
raising the awareness of the majority of the population. Arguably, 
however, the lack of public support was the consequence of a certain 
elitist attitude in the movement communications, reflected in its 
over-reliance on Twitter and its snobbery towards Facebook, a 
website with a much larger number of users. Starting with Adbusters, 
the Occupy organisers seemed to misunderstand the lesson of the 
use of social media in Egypt and Spain, where Facebook rather than 
Twitter had been the key website for launching the movement before 
its appearance in public space. In fact, from the very start Occupy 
was conceived as a ‘Twitter movement’, as evidenced by its very 
naming as a hashtag: #OccupyWallStreet. As a report published 
in October 2011 by social media company Attention highlighted, 
‘the data clearly shows that Twitter is the social network where all 
of the Occupy conversations are happening’. Twitter was getting 
82.5 per cent of the mentions related to Occupy Wall Street, while 
Facebook was getting a very meagre 2.8 per cent, according to the 
report.17 Many of the key Facebook pages were only established 
once the movement had already occupied Zuccotti Park. Among 
them the page of Occupy Together, which served as a platform for 
connecting all the occupations mushrooming around the US, and 
was opened only on the 24th of September. 
The Facebook presence of the movement before the protests of 
the 17th was limited to the Occupy Wall Street page operated by 
organisers in New York, and an event page for the 17th opened 
by Adbusters. Both pages’ performance in the preparation stage of 
the protest was very disappointing.18 The page for OWS in New 
York19 had been set up as far back as the 9th of August, at the 
time of the first General Assemblies. Yet by the 17th of September 
it had managed to attract only 891 ‘likes’. Compare this with the 
Kullena Khaled Said page in Egypt, which attracted 36,000 users 
on the first day of its existence! The OWS Facebook page began 
getting significant traffic only after activists had physically occupied 
Zuccotti Park on the 17th, with a rapid, though not explosive 
progression in the following days.
Looking at the kind of messages posted by the admin during 
the initial phase it is not difficult to understand why internet users 
did not ‘like’ the Occupy Wall Street Facebook page. Their status 
messages completely lacked that emotional component which, as we 
have seen, was the hallmark of both the Kullena Khaled Said page in 
Egypt, and the Democracia Real Ya page in Spain. The OWS admin 
wrote infrequently, and his status messages were telegraphic and 
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unappealing, often accompanied by annoying supplications of the 
kind ‘share, share, share’. Below are some examples of early posts:
11 days until we visit Wall Street on September 17th. Like this 
video and then share it – September 6th [only 1 person liked the 
video and nobody shared it]
Share, share, share [with a link to an article about the ‘super-rich’ 
in the US] – September 7th
[only 5 people liked and nobody shared or replied]
Share, share, share. September 17th is real. – September 8th [only 
4 people liked and nobody shared or replied]21
As the reader can appreciate, the messages were not exactly designed 
to create an emotional connection with the public. They had a 
cold informative tone unlikely to elicit the enthusiasm of internet 
users. Many times these messages would just consist of links to 
articles or videos without any introduction framing them. All in all 
these Facebook communications amounted to an uninspired and 
uninspiring monologue, which failed to avail itself of the interactive 
features of social networking sites and thereby did not generate that 
collective conversation and contagious sense of enthusiasm which 
had played such a crucial role in both Egypt and Spain.
The same dullness characterised the Facebook event page opened 
by Adbusters. The page managed to secure around 20,000 positive 
RSVPs and 150,000 invitations before the first day of protest, but 
only a tiny fraction of these respondents would actually attend.22 
Also in this case the admin status messages were rather lifeless, 
and there was little conversation among users before the 17th. The 
Table 4.1 number of ‘likes’ on the Occupy wall Street main facebook page20
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disappointing performance in the use of Facebook as a campaign tool 
might well reflect some activists’ personal lack of organisational craft 
and charisma. But more generally it betrays the fact that the Occupy 
organisers did not initially regard Facebook as an important channel 
in their communications. As a consequence they did not interact with 
a very large audience base, where many possible ‘recruits’ might have 
been found, and which, compared to Twitter, better approximated 
demographically to that 99% the movement purported to fight for. 
But even on Twitter itself, where activists invested much more 
energy, the results were also initially disappointing. They did not 
manage to create that sense of enthusiasm prior to the protests that 
would have secured a high turnout on the first day of action. In fact, 
the #OccupyWallStreet Twitter hashtag never got close to becoming 
a trending topic, as the #15M hashtag had in Spain. Some tweeps 
raised the suspicion that the hashtag was not trending because of 
censorship by Twitter, which in those days was receiving investment 
from top banking firm JPMorgan. Twitter along with a number 
of independent analysts rebutted the accusation, pointing to the 
complexity of the algorithm defining which topics become trending 
ones.23 Regardless of whether or not Twitter censored the Occupy 
hashtag, did this really matter so much for turning the attention of 
the public towards the movement? 
What is evident is that it began to gain considerable attention 
on Twitter only when occupiers eventually pitched their tents in 
Zuccotti Park, and the police began their repression, as suggested 
in another passage of the report by social media firm Attention 
quoted earlier:
In the first week, average mentions per day were an unimpressive 
18.8 mentions per day. Not many people were talking about 
Occupy Wall Street. After the start of occupation on 9/17 and 
up until 9/23, average mentions per day increased by a whopping 
2,004%. The following week had a 97% increase over the week 
prior, and the week after the Brooklyn Bridge arrests saw a 216% 
increase in average mentions per day.24
Thus what finally made the movement ‘go viral’ on social media 
was not what was happening ‘independently’ in the so-called 
‘twitter-sphere’, but rather events taking place on the ground, 
which then reverberated in Twitter conversations. Specifically, 
as we have already seen in the case of the indignados and the 
Egyptian revolution, police violence against protesters was crucial 
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in generating attention on the internet, gaining the movement new 
supporters and sympathisers.
Two events came to constitute the tipping point for Occupy’s 
increasing visibility on social and mainstream media alike: the 
pepper-spray attack by NYPD officer Anthony Bologna, and the 
mass arrest on Brooklyn bridge on the 1st of October. On the 26th 
of September, Bologna was caught on camera pepper-spraying three 
female activists for no apparent reason during a small demonstration 
near Wall Street. The video quickly garnered thousand of hits on 
YouTube25 and sparked many commentaries on TV shows like Jon 
Stewart’s Daily Show and liberal broadcasters like MSNBC and 
CNN. The second episode was the arrest of over 700 protesters 
during a march on Brooklyn Bridge on the 1st of October. Ironically, 
the march itself had been organised by Occupy in protest at Anthony 
Bologna’s actions the week before. In a demonstration of poor PR 
skills, the New York Police Department sparked a further wave of 
indignation by opting for a mass arrest of the kind the city had not 
seen for several years. These episodes highlight how the role of social 
media in the case of Occupy was more as a means to facilitate the 
reverberation of episodes taking place on the ground, rather than 
as a means of preparing the terrain symbolically for the protests. 
Paradoxically, in the home country of Twitter, Facebook, and several 
other social media firms, activists showed little ability for exploiting 
the emotional power of social media. 
In order to understand the weakness of the initial social media 
campaign, however, we also need to take into account the confusion 
which early on lay at the core of the identity of Occupy Wall 
Street. This identity was torn between the radical countercultural 
imaginary proposed by the Adbusters’ publicity, and the populist 
identity underlying the slogan ‘We are the 99%’ coined by David 
Graeber during the initial ground organising session in August. 
Only once the physical occupation had begun did the movement’s 
identity eventually crystallise around a majoritarian orientation, 
aiming to represent the people as a whole rather than a bunch of 
‘redeemers, rebels, and radicals’. A crucial role in this process was 
played by the ‘We are the 99%’ Tumblr blog, whose contribution to 
the process of mobilisation is documented in the following section.
a TumBlr waIlIng wall fOr The 99%
‘I am a two times felon with no job and I owe over $10,000 in 
medical bills. I am the 99%’ – 15th of September.
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‘My parents put themselves into debt so that I could get a fancy 
degree. It cost over 100 grand $ and I have no job prospects. I 
am the 99%’ – 25th of September
‘I am 20 years old and I can’t find a job because I have no 
experience. I have no experience because I can’t find a job. I am 
the 99%’ – 27th of September
‘I am a single mum of four, college student, shelf stocker, I go 
hungry every day. I am the 99% per cent’ – 28th September26
These sentences are a selection from the hundreds of ‘photo 
messages’ posted on ‘We are the 99%’ Tumblr blog.27 The idea 
behind the project was simple: collecting the stories of all those 
who felt part of the 99%, all those who perceived themselves to 
be victims of the economic crisis irrespective of their political or 
cultural affiliations.
Most of the entries posted on the blog were generated by those 
‘graduates without a future’ Paul Mason portrays as a sort of 
revolutionary subject of contemporary popular movements (2012). 
But among the hundreds of posts there were also stories of people 
coming from very different walks of life: working mothers incapable 
of providing for their children, older workers nearing the end of 
their career without the prospect of a pension, people needing 
surgery and unable to pay for it, Americans of different ethnic 
backgrounds, classes and ages confessing they were regularly going 
hungry or were ‘one paycheck away from homelessness’ as stated 
in one of the messages. For this diverse constituency of people – 
who shared in common not only their economic plight but also an 
anger towards the super-rich 1 per cent held responsible for the 
economic crisis – the website came to constitute a point of emotional 
condensation: a wailing wall on which the identity of a new-born 
movement might coalesce.
The Tumblr blog was created by a 28-year-old New York activist 
who made himself known only as ‘Chris’, and his friend Priscilla 
Grim, a 36-year-old activist and social media expert. They opened 
the website in early August, but began publishing posts only on 
the 15th of September, just two days before the occupation of 
Zuccotti Park. The website therefore had little influence during 
the initiation phase of the campaign, and in fact only began gaining 
momentum towards the end of September, around the same time as 
the movement finally began to make headlines in the mainstream 
media. In the text published on the homepage of the blog they 
proposed a simple but compelling description of the 99%:
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We are the 99 percent. We are getting kicked out of our homes. 
We are forced to choose between groceries and rent. We are 
denied quality medical care. We are suffering from environmental 
pollution. We are working long hours for little pay and no rights, 
if we’re working at all. We are getting nothing while the other 
1 percent is getting everything. We are the 99 percent.28
Internet users who identified with this description were asked 
to photograph themselves holding a small sign with a message no 
longer than one sentence. In fact, almost all of the messages entered 
by users ended up being several lines long, as though reflecting an 
overflow of personal sentiment, their feelings incapable of being 
contained in a concise statement.
Make a sign. Write your circumstance at the top, no longer than 
a single sentence ... Then, take a picture of yourself holding the 
sign and submit it to us. The 99 percent have been set against 
each other, fighting over the crumbs the 1 percent leaves behind. 
But we’re all struggling. We’re all fighting. It’s time we recognize 
our common struggles, our common cause. Be part of the 99 
percent and let the 1 percent know you’re out there.
By taking a picture of oneself with a sign and sending it to the 
website users could symbolically subscribe to the identity of 99%, 
adding their own individual story to a collective assembling of 
anger and indignation. At the same time, they were asked to set 
aside their divisions in terms of political or cultural orientations, 
in a way which resonates with Laclau’s discussion of the capacity 
of ‘empty signifiers’ (like the slogan ‘We are the 99%’) to create 
a ‘chain of equivalence’ connecting manifold issues throughout a 
movement’s constituency.
The identity constructed through the Tumblr page was very 
different from the one reflected in Adbusters’ initial call and the 
publicity it produced. The picture of the ballerina dancing over 
the bull evoked the format of the raving ‘protest parties’ of the 
anti-globalisation movement and its DIY culture (see for example 
McKay, 1998). Another picture used to accompany Adbusters’ 
tactical briefings portrayed an activist hipster of some kind with a 
scarf and ski mask, running towards a target, implicitly Wall Street 
itself. This iconography was visually stunning, and the language 
used in the call and tactical briefings was infused with that taste 
for provocation and self-irony which has characterised Adbusters’ 
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departure from the rusty culture of the Old Left. But for all its beauty 
and inventiveness, this publicity did not capture the widely felt pain 
of many people in the US. Adbusters was basically re-hashing the 
imaginary of a ‘politics of pleasure’ (McKay, 1998) which was now 
past its expiry date and out of tune with the everyday experience 
of Americans at the time of the worst economic crisis since 1929. 
The content of the 99% Tumblr blog completely departed 
from this avowedly minoritarian and voluntarist imaginary. The 
website contributed in spreading the ‘meme’ of the 99% and in 
giving this elusive and (almost) all-encompassing identification 
a concrete imagery: a series of faces and stories people could 
relate to, feel compassion for, and identify with. The 99% slogan 
fundamentally revolves around the creation of a popular identity, 
whose coherence lies in its opposition to those excluded from the 
1 per cent of super-rich. The ‘populist’ cultural operation at play 
here is clearly similar to the claim of being ‘normal, common people’ 
made by Democracia Real Ya activists in Spain before the 15th of 
May protests. Some people have criticised the fact that the slogan 
reduces political identifications to a numerical factor.29 Others 
have highlighted the risk of eliding differences among various 
categories of people inside the movement, and in particular ethnic 
and sexual minorities.30 Moreover, it is clear that this collective 
name is connected with a sense of national identity, given that the 
99% figure refers to the distribution of income in the American 
rather than the global economy. What it is disturbing for some is 
precisely the intention to represent the majority of Americans rather 
than simply an oppressed or idealist minority. This majoritarian 
ambition, however, constitutes precisely the difference between 
Occupy and the anti-globalisation movement, and arguably what 
has allowed the former to mobilise a diverse constituency, beyond 
young middle class people.
By collecting in one place the stories of Americans of different 
classes, the 99% Tumblr blog became a symbolic rallying point for 
a dispersed community of users called upon to recognise that its 
problems were not simply individual ones, but a consequence of 
the structural injustice of the economic system to which there was 
no ‘biographical solution’ (Beck, 1992), only a collective one. As 
Shawn Carrie, an Occupy activist points out:
They always tell you that if you don’t have a job it’s because you 
are not good or trained enough. It teaches you that it’s all about 
you but I think what people now realise is that it’s a systemic 
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issue. It is one thing for one person not to have a job. But another 
thing when thousands and millions of people don’t have a job. 
It is not just because people are not doing that. It is because it is 
the system that is broken.
This process of popular identification was paralleled in many of the 
discussions taking place in the protest camp in Zuccotti Park, where 
in the course of meetings small and large, and in the everyday life of 
the camp, people would continuously share their stories and their 
fears. For Bill Wasik, the main editor of Wired! magazine:
Those photos of struggling Americans essentially virtualized the 
occupation; the street protesters were merely the visible symbol 
of the giant, subterranean mob of Americans struggling to get 
by. What’s really revolutionary about all these gatherings – what 
remains both dangerous and magnificent about them – is the 
way they represent a disconnected group getting connected, a 
mega-underground casting off its invisibility to embody itself, 
formidably, in physical space.31
In both its physical and web manifestations, the movement would 
come to amount to a ‘documentation of disgrace’ – in the words of 
Shane Gill, a member of Occupy PR team – a visible demonstration 
of how bad things were in America. 
The hearTBeaT Of Occupy
A small park in Central Manhattan few people had ever heard of 
before the protest was to become the ‘pulsing heart’ of OWS, the 
focal point of a diffused space of participation. For the movement 
this small plaza made of granite tiles and decorative trees, deprived 
of sunlight because of the presence of tall buildings all around, 
came to constitute several things at the same time. On the one 
hand, it became a community space for those directly involved and 
a physical point of access for those who wanted to get involved or 
were simply interested in seeing the movement with their own eyes. 
On the other hand, it was also crucially a mediated place people 
engaged with from a distance following its activity through Twitter, 
Facebook and live streams on the web, besides the coverage offered 
by mainstream media. One message written on a piece of cardboard 
stuck to a tree in the middle of the park expressed this second role 
of the park by stating: ‘this is the people’s stage’.
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Entering Zuccotti Park for the first time on the 5th of November, 
coming from Fulton Street subway station, I was initially a bit 
disappointed. ‘Is that all?’ I thought to myself. Having heard and 
seen so much about the park on TV and on the web before arriving 
there it was a bit of a shock to realise how small the camp was in 
comparison to those I had seen in Spain and Egypt. Yet the camp 
itself and the small community of a few hundred people occupying 
or spending much of their time there was only one piece in a much 
larger social interaction. The park became a symbolic place and 
a source of identification for a dispersed public of sympathisers 
following its doings through the media and on the internet. For 
David, an Italian IT researcher working in the US,
Zuccotti was more like a symbol of thousands of people 
distributed around the globe. And the massive presence of Big 
Media operators was confirming the impression that something 
globally relevant was going on. I noticed a massive presence of 
smartphones, digital cameras – besides broadcast operators all 
around. You could almost hear the flow of tweets and Facebook 
posts spreading from there.
What made Zuccotti Park capable of becoming a sort of ‘media 
spectacle’ (Kellner, 2012), or more precisely a ‘social media 
spectacle’, was paradoxically precisely the richness of the face-to-face 
experience people could enjoy within it, and its exceptionality in 
the context of American society. For Stephanie, a young filmmaker 
who has been involved part-time in the movement, it was ‘a sort of 
beautiful, exciting thing, which does not happen in public space in 
New York. Public space here is not really utilised in the way that 
it is utilised in the rest of the world’. She recounts one of the first 
evenings spent in Zuccotti Park:
there were people who maybe they were there supporting a union, 
or there were people who were there with signs saying they were 
professors ... we just stayed there and talked, it was a beautiful 
fall night ... and we stayed there on a ledge of the park ... and 
sort of just listened to other people’s conversations, and there 
were a lot of debates, and some people were just walking around 
saying – ‘this is bullshit, I live in this neighbourhood get out of 
here’. And somebody would just approach him and say – ‘tell 
me, let’s just talk, we don’t want to, we are not trying to bother 
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you, we are trying to help you’. It was like a spirit, something 
that had life in it, and it was really reaffirming.
Many of the interviewees I spoke with in New York after the eviction 
told me how much they missed the face-to-face conversations they 
had in the park: interactions for which there was no substitute on 
social media or web forums. As Shawn Carrie describes it: ‘You 
[could] be talking with someone with whom you would have never 
talked to in your life, someone you would have never stumbled 
upon and talk to them. Because you have this space: this public 
space which has been activated for public discussions.’ The camp 
was for the participants what, according to Richard Sennett, a city 
is supposed to be: ‘a milieu in which strangers are likely to meet’ 
(Sennett 1977: 48).
Around the immersive face-to-face environment experienced by 
the occupiers stood a diffuse emotional space: a space traversed 
by tweets, Facebook messages, and live streams. After the activists 
began establishing the camp on the 17th, Twitter streams on hashtags 
like #OccupyWallStreet, #OccupyWallSt, #OWS and #Occupy-
wallstreetNYC became a channel for connecting those outside and 
those inside the camp. The minutes of General Assemblies were 
tweeted live by top movement tweeps like @DiceyTroop, while 
others would keep people posted on the different events taking place 
in the park. These Twitter feeds somehow read like the heartbeat 
of the movement, going up and down according to the evolution 
of the situation. The content of tweets and the overall mood they 
conveyed might signal euphoria or difficulty depending on events 
on the ground. As Michael Premo, an activist involved in Occupy 
in New York, recounts:
The only thing about those tools is that they provided a better 
platform to radiate out the love and emotion that was happening 
there ... I think it changed the texture of the tweets ... It had a 
different sort of relevance in terms of radiating that out to many 
people... and the sheer number of people also who were tweeting.
One example of the kind of emotional conversations going on 
between those in the camp and those outside is offered by a selection 
of tweets sent on the 24th, one of the toughest day during the first 
weeks. Heavy rain was making life more difficult for those sleeping in 
the park: ‘Umbrellas needed! #OccupyWallStreet Large umbrellas!! 
Pls RT’, implored one activist. ‘#OccupyWallStreet How many people 
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there today? Growing? Same?’, asked a concerned sympathiser. 
Reassurances promptly came. ‘Not one person left. The 99% 
will prevail! #OccupyWallStreet #ourwallstreet #takewallstreet’, 
wrote one of the occupiers. ‘Head count still over 200 despite the 
weather. #OccupyWallStreet #ourwallstreet #takebackwallstreet 
#takewallstreet’, added another. Towards the end of the day, when 
it finally stopped raining, someone saw fit to thank the hackers’ 
group Anonymous for the relief: ‘Whoa rain has stopped at #occu-
pyWallStreet! Thanks anon for hacking the weather ;)’. Another 
tweep thanked ‘hippie magic’ rather than computer skills. Later in 
the evening the occupiers used Twitter to ask sympathisers to order 
pizzas for them at nearby Liberato’s Pizza, whose name resonated 
positively with the former (and apt) name of Zuccotti Park: ‘Liberty 
Plaza’. After being flooded with pizzas that night, someone cheekily 
tweeted ‘#occupywallstreet – we do eat more than pizza’.
The Twitter streams helped in maintaining a sense of solidarity 
between ‘physical occupiers’ and ‘internet occupiers’ (as Julian, 
a 24-year-old activist calls those supporters who did not spend 
much time at Zuccotti Park, or had never been there). Supporters 
would frequently send messages of encouragement like ‘Today Is A 
Good Day For Revolution! For Everybody In #OccupyWallStreet! 
Keep It Up!’ or #OccupyWallStreet about time ... YES!’ Other users 
Figure 4.2 activist snapping a picture of an event at Zuccotti park on his iphone. 
(courtesy: lara pelaez madrid)
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would incite people to join the occupation or to partake in one of 
the many events and actions held within and around the camp. ‘I 
hear #occupywallstreet has #cookies better hurry and go get some’ 
read a message sent on the 27th. Finally, others tweeted to ‘sign 
in’, to use the metaphor utilised by the social media location-based 
service FourSquare, as exemplified by messages like ‘Just arrived at 
#OccupyWallStreet representing brooklyn!’ or ‘I was going to go 
to this: [link] But might just go #occupywallstreet instead’. All in 
all these messages contributed to creating an emotional attraction 
around the occupation, facilitating the continuous in-flow of 
supporters, sympathisers, tourists and the curious, in a sort of 
ongoing pilgrimage which lasted until the camp was evicted. 
Apart from its mediated symbolism, the park also constituted 
a physical point of access, a sort of recruitment booth, for those 
interested in joining the movement. Crucial at this level was the 
location of the park right in the middle of Lower Manhattan, a place 
traversed not only by bankers, but also by construction workers 
such as those employed in the building site of the adjacent Freedom 
Tower, janitors and waiting staff working in nearby offices and bars, 
as well as American and international tourists on a visit to the Big 
Apple. For OWS activist Shane Gill:
Initially people were coming to the park, based on this first day 
of action that had been called, and then in the days after there 
was this escalating enthusiasm that probably attracted the more 
typical activist circle, but then consolidated also among those who 
outside of it wanted to physically participate in things. And then 
they carried it through for a couple of the first days and weeks ... 
partly the location being so central in Lower Manhattan ... it’s 
really a high traffic, and foot traffic, and I think that gathered a 
lot of crowd.
Likewise the impression of another Occupy activist, Shawn Carrie: 
‘for people outside, for people who are not in the movement, if 
they want to find out they know where to go. If for example they 
have found out about it by reading on a newspaper, but are not 
involved yet, they know where to go to know more about it and 
get involved.’ As these comments suggest, the presence of Zuccotti 
Park and then of hundreds of camps, large and small, across the 
US was crucial in allowing outsiders to see the movement with 
their own eyes, and for organisers to have a point of outreach to 
the population at large.
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The face-to-face interaction between occupiers and outsiders was, 
however, made more difficult by the tight policing in the area. The 
barricades erected by the NYPD, and the white observation tower, 
nicknamed the ‘Star Wars tower’ (Writers for the 99%, 2011: 128), 
demarcated the site as some sort of criminal area to enter at your 
own peril. During my visit to Zuccotti Park in early November 
2011, I noticed how visitors for the most part remained outside 
of the barricaded perimeter of the camp, for the most contenting 
themselves with snapping photos of people holding cardboard 
signs (often used pizza boxes), or of the picturesque mass of tents, 
as though visiting some weird activist zoo. Very few of these 
visitors engaged with the camp beyond this superficial interaction. 
For their part, many occupiers put much effort in getting these 
people involved. One day I noticed a group of young male activists 
repeatedly shouting to the passing crowd: ‘Don’t be that guy! Don’t 
be that guy!’ The sense of their message was apparent: do not just 
stand outside and watch what we do, get involved, join us. Yet 
the invitation did not seem to find many receptive ears. As Caiti 
Lattimer, a 23-year-old participant, remarked to me: ‘it takes a 
great amount of bravery for someone who isn’t involved to even 
go down there because it is intimidating. Everything is intimidating 
when there is a large group of people involved.’
Figure 4.3 activist holding a sign inviting people to join actively the occupation. 
(courtesy: lara pelaez madrid)
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In the case of Occupy Wall Street, the widespread sympathy 
for the movement, mustered among other ways through social 
networking sites, failed to a great extent to translate into mass 
physical participation. Compared to both Egypt and Spain, the 
turnout for the different US protests, and for the day-by-day 
participation in the camp, was around one tenth or less. For 
example, while the indignados and the Egyptian revolutionary 
movement saw protests with over a million participants, the Occupy 
protests never went above the tens of thousands. Many sympathisers 
contented themselves with following events from the safe haven of 
their computer screens. Julian, a 25-year-old activist and a teacher 
in a New York primary school, for example, tells of a colleague of 
his who had never gone to Zuccotti Park or any of the occupations 
but became an obsessive follower of the movement online.
She has watched the live feed for hours and hours and hours, 
and knows everything that is going on now ... and it’s funny. I go 
in and she says ... oh my God, do you know what happened in 
Oakland? No! Then I go on my email and I say oh shit! And then 
she sent me an email saying that Zuccotti might be shut down any 
day now ... And I ask myself how do you know about this shit?
As Caiti Lattimer notes: ‘the internet has allowed people that kind 
of voyeurism ... The internet has allowed people to watch the 
movement from afar and even to keep track of it daily without 
having to be there in person ... Therefore I assume that there are 
a lot people who are closet supporters of Occupy Wall Street.’ 
The difficulty in transforming sympathisers into actual supporters, 
already noted by Klandermans (1984), is a reminder of the fact 
that the new forms of connection facilitated by the use of social 
media and the increasing availability of information they offer does 
not automatically translate into additional participation, unless 
organisers are capable of creating a powerful emotional connection 
with these constituencies.
InSIde The TwITTer hq
We have seen how Twitter and other social media were very 
important for sustaining an emotional space around the OWS 
movement, connecting occupiers and sympathisers. Yet there is 
clearly another aspect of Twitter use which needs to be discussed: 
its tactical role as a platform for real-time coordination during 
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action and in emergency situations. While in Egypt this had only 
a minor relevance, given the limited penetration of Twitter among 
the protestors, the case was different with Occupy. Almost all the 
people I interviewed in New York owned a smartphone and were 
Twitter users. 
Occupy organisers created a number of Twitter accounts to be 
used for circulating tactical information. During different actions 
around Wall Street and in other parts of the city, these accounts 
provided a minute-by-minute coverage of events. Sometimes they 
went further, giving people specific directions or suggestions on 
what to do, or on how to divert police crowd-control attempts, in 
a kind of activist equivalent of military Command, Control and 
Communication. Thus, for example, experienced activists would be 
fielded on the ground to work on ‘reconnaissance’, walking some 
metres ahead of a march to tweet or text back details about the 
manoeuvring of police forces. Shawn Carrie, manager of the aptly 
named account @OWS_tactical, recounts the way he employed 
Twitter during the action held on the 17th of December 2011 against 
the NDAA (National Defense Authorization Act), a law releasing 
funding for defence. The target of the action was Grand Central 
Station, upon which people were invited to converge in scattered 
groups:
Police didn’t know where it is coming from ... because everybody 
is just moving, and everybody is just doing it at the same time, and 
they cannot point to the centre of it ... and so, from my tactical 
account I put out something like ‘tactics’. And then I gave people 
tips about what to do, like just act inconspicuous ... or wait in line 
and pretend to be a tourist ... just hide out, and act nonchalant 
and don’t look suspicious.
This use of Twitter as a tactical device appears at first sight to 
confirm the network or swarm-like view of movement coordination, 
as described among others by Arquilla and Ronfeldt in their seminal 
essay on ‘net-wars’ (2001). The basic idea being that mobile media 
devices allow for the de-centralised coordination of participants, 
as suggested by Carrie’s own claim in the comment above that the 
police could not ‘point to any centre’. However, in this kind of 
coordinating operation there often tends to be a neuralgic centre of 
communication, much like what happens with an army. From the 
interviews I conducted with a number of highly involved Occupy 
activists it emerged that the key Twitter tactical accounts were 
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managed by a core group of movement organisers, composed of 
around 20 people. These people also tended to be highly involved 
in ground operations, in the General Assembly, and in the different 
commissions. During the occupation in Zuccotti Park this core 
group used an office space made available by the New York Teachers 
Union. A lot of controversy erupted among occupiers about the 
existence of this space, which the mainstream media were quick 
to call the ‘Occupy HQ’ or ‘Occupy Media HQ’,32 given that its 
presence went against the grain of claims to leaderlessness. 
The clearest illustration of the use of this ‘Twitter war room’ for 
the centralised coordination of ‘combat operations’ is offered by the 
events of the night of the 15th November, when the NYPD violently 
evicted protestors from the square. Andrew ‘Foo’ Conner, one of 
the core organisers, managed to leave before the police encircled 
the camp. After meeting up with others at the office space, Conner 
helped direct the dispersing crowd to a common re-gathering area. 
It is worth giving his account of that night at length:
We were basically put in charge of taking the dispersed campers 
and getting them back to I guess coherence ... Because you have to 
remember we have lost a thousand or so people sleeping there at 
night and the police were doing their damn best to run people off 
this way, and run people off the other way and across the bridge 
and they dispersed us ... and there is no way they could disperse us 
because we live at Zuccotti Park! We can’t go home ... and there 
was that very weird mentality. So, people were calling us because 
they knew that we were safe in one sense or another and we used 
Twitter to do everything we could. What ends up happening is 
that we send out three bike couriers and they were able to find 
people in each of the groups that were protesting and to get their 
phone numbers. And we were able to go to Twitter, and then with 
the three bike couriers and then getting their numbers, and then 
with emails, we were able to get everyone back to Broadway and 
Pine. So at this point we have a map on the wall trying to figure 
out where everyone is, because there were about five different 
groups split off. And then through Twitter we just said go to 
Broadway and Pine. We were able to take a bad situation for us 
and turn it into a moderately OK situation.
Conner’s testimony is interesting for at least two reasons. First, 
this scene clearly shows that the practice of coordination does not 
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correspond to the idea of a completely leaderless movement – on the 
night, the process of re-gathering the occupiers was led by a handful 
of core activists. Secondly, this centralised mediated coordination 
was made particularly urgent by the fact that the movement had lost 
its fixed base in space, that it had been deprived of that minimum of 
coordination offered by the camp, acting as a sort of beacon for the 
movement. It is as though having been deprived of a ‘nodal point’ 
in space, the movement had to resort to a mediated one in order to 
be able to act in concert.
The core organisers I interviewed were for the most part honest 
in admitting the contradictions of this situation. In fact, they had 
themselves tried to develop protocols to make the management of 
key Twitter accounts more ‘horizontal’. Nevertheless, the practical 
constraints of this type of work appeared to make upholding 
such a lofty ideal virtually impossible. This tension is reflected in 
Shawn Carrie’s description of the management of the main Twitter 
account @OccupyWallStNYC, which at the time of the interview 
in December 2011 counted 300,000 followers:
 
There’s maybe 20 people who have access, and maybe 8 of those 
people who can approve ... What it is, is a system of privileges 
and permissions. Everybody has access to the account but it has 
a little bit of a structure where anybody can write tweets, but 
then they get put into a list which needs to be approved and the 
whole group looks at it ... and it is happening all the time 24/7 ... 
it is a running list ... we use a program to streamline it. Somebody 
submits something he/she wants to be tweeted and all the group 
has the possibility to look at it ... and they can edit it. Basically 
we have an open process to edit our tweets.
Carrie added that the group tried to make access to this account 
more open but that it proved practically impossible to make it 
completely open:
we are always bringing in more people ... We definitely didn’t 
want it to be too few people ... because one person cannot do all 
the work, for all the Twitter accounts ... But obviously we cannot 
make it completely democratic because otherwise it would be a 
mess. But it is a very fair and horizontal way to actually exercise 
a consensus process. And we wanted it very specifically to be 
that way.
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The discrepancy between the movement’s claim to leaderlessness 
and its own organisational practices did not seem to be just limited 
to the use of Twitter, but had a more general bearing throughout the 
movement. Formally, the life of Occupy in New York as elsewhere 
was regulated through a General Assembly held three times a week 
(Writers for the 99%, 2011: 25–32). However, in the day by day life 
of the occupation, there was a small group of highly experienced 
and highly involved activists who people turned to ‘get things sorted 
out’. As Stephanie recounts:
Leaders have emerged who are people who have the ability to be 
present and participate in that typical way, at every meeting all 
day long, or who have access to valuable internet space, or who 
have access to Occupywallstreet.org. They may not have what 
they are doing consented upon by any larger group. But because 
they have that valuable internet space that people turn to and 
look at, they become leaders in their own way.
While in its publicity OWS made frequent claims to being a ‘leaderless 
movement’, its organisational practices saw a handful of leaders 
emerge in its day by day evolution. Those who had access to the key 
communication channels of the movement became automatically 
not just ‘opinion leaders’ but also organisational leaders. In the 
following comparative chapter I will discuss how this continuing 
presence of leaders is in fact a more general feature of contemporary 
popular movements.
cOncluSIOn
The vicissitudes of Occupy Wall Street demonstrate that the ‘social 
media magic’ does not work unless it is accompanied by a resonant 
narration, capable of motivating people to take to the streets. While 
from the beginning organisers, starting with Kalle Lasn and his 
team at Adbusters, placed much hope in the mobilising power of 
social networking sites and Twitter in particular, they failed to use 
these media as means for a ‘choreography of assembly’ setting 
the scene for public protests. Only once the movement became 
visible in public space did it begin receiving attention on social and 
mainstream media alike. Blogs like the ‘We are the 99%’ Tumblr 
page contributed to forging a popular identity very different to 
the minoritarian and voluntarist one advanced by Adbusters. 
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Twitter was instead adopted for constructing a sense of solidarity 
between physical occupiers and internet occupiers as well as for 
coordinating the actions of participants during actions and in 
emergency situations. 
Occupy has been associated with anarchist claims to absolute 
leaderlessness. However, as was seen when looking at the ‘Twitter 
HQ’, the practices of communication and organisation of the 
movement contradict the claims to leaderlessness and absolute 
spontaneity often made by activists, especially in relation to their 
use of social media. While social media allowed for participatory 
conversations within and around the movement, as happened in 
other movements these conversations were led and moderated 
by a handful of core organisers managing influential movement 
Facebook and Twitter accounts. Such activists came to acquire a role 
as invisible choreographers who by using social media to publicise 
the movement’s plans and events have had much influence in shaping 
its manifestations. If the activist spaces created by Occupy and other 
groups are indeed characterised internally by a strongly participatory 
character, their initiation and maintenance nevertheless requires the 
work of a few committed activists. 
There are a number of aspects which have not been possible to 
cover in this chapter for reasons of space. Specifically, as has been 
the case in previous chapters, here it has not been possible to cover 
the role of mainstream media as a channel for mobilisation, even 
though this was, as Shane Gill puts it, ‘the way in which most 
Americans got to know about Occupy’. Moreover, the discussion 
in this chapter has been limited in geographic scope given that I 
have focused all my attention on Occupy Wall Street in New York. 
Like the Spanish indignados, the Occupy movement demonstrated 
a remarkable capacity to extend itself across the national territory, 
creating a diffuse network of local protest camps, allowing also 
those living outside of New York City and other metropolitan 
centres to participate physically in the protests. 
But a more general question arises concerning the future of Occupy. 
At the time of writing, in Spring 2012, all the main occupations had 
been evicted. Activists were preparing for new actions scheduled 
in May. But all in all the movement, now deprived of its novelty 
factor, seemed to be experiencing a phase of latency. This once 
again highlights the difficulty of sustaining a contemporary popular 
movement, especially when accompanied by a categorical refusal to 
explore new forms of formal organisation to give more continuity 
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to a campaign. The future of Occupy and of similar movements 
will largely depend on the degree to which they manage to reinvent 
their activities beyond the tactic of the long-term encampment and 
to rethink the use of social media in the context of facilitating new 
forms of gathering in public space.
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‘follow me, but don’t ask me to 
lead you!’ liquid Organising and 
choreographic leadership
‘I will just tell you one thing which is very important. We don’t 
have leaders. OK?’ So wrote a user on one of the Democracia Real 
Ya Facebook pages, in reply to a request from me for an interview 
with him. He declined, but his response was possibly richer than 
any interview I might have otherwise conducted. The comment 
encapsulates in few words the fundamental idea dominating 
contemporary activist discourse. From the pro-democracy movement 
which toppled Mubarak to the indignados of Puerta del Sol and 
the Occupiers of Zuccotti Park, activists constantly stress that they 
have no leadership, and appeal to the spontaneity of participation 
as a fundamental source of their legitimacy. Occupy Wall Street, for 
example, boldly states in its publicity that it is a ‘leaderless resistance 
movement’.1 But is this really the case? Is it true that social media 
allow contemporary social movements to become leaderless and 
horizontal spaces?
This chapter endeavours to develop a comparative analysis of 
the use of social media across the different social movements and 
national contexts discussed in this book, focusing on the crucial 
and controversial question of leadership in social media practices. 
The target of my critique is the discourse of leaderlessness and 
the ideology of horizontalism which dominates contemporary 
activism. ‘Horizontalists’ believe that thanks to the availability 
of modern technologies of communication social movements do 
not need the kind of linear command structure characteristic of 
bureaucratic organisations. Instead, they can rely on a form of 
‘swarm intelligence’ (Hardt and Negri, 2005) within which, in the 
words of Shawn Carrie, ‘no one is a leader because everybody is 
a leader’.
The analysis developed in the previous chapters has already 
largely contradicted this vision of contemporary movements as 
leaderless, by identifying individuals and groups who had a pivotal 
134
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role in the various processes of mobilisation. From Facebook admins 
like Wael Ghonim in Egypt and Fabio Gandara and Pablo Gallego 
in Spain, to prominent activist tweeps with thousands of followers, 
like the Egyptian Mahmoud Salem (a.k.a. Sandmonkey), social 
media activists have deeply shaped the actions of social movements 
throughout the phases of both initiation and sustainment. However 
much these and other social media activists refuse the label of 
leaders, the communicative and organisational work they conduct 
through Facebook and Twitter amounts to a form of leadership, 
as a relatively centralised influence on the unfolding of collective 
action (Barker et al., 2001).
To grasp the workings of this form of ‘soft’ leadership, I begin 
by asserting that within contemporary movements the use of 
social media does not augur the end of organisation as such but 
the emergence of ‘liquid’ forms of organising. Within this model, 
stemming from a critique traditional or ‘solid’ organisations, 
communication and organisation become almost indistinguishable, 
and the ‘communicators’ of a movement become also automatically 
its organisers and leaders. In spite of the egalitarian ideology of 
contemporary popular movements, the forms of communication 
characterising social media are characterised by a ‘power law 
distribution’ in which a handful of people control most of the 
communication flow. This imbalance reveals the de facto presence 
of a form of leadership, which makes use of the participatory and 
interactive environment of social media for the channelling and 
triggering of participants’ emotionality.
The nature of this ‘choreographic’ leadership will be further 
illuminated by looking at activists’ use of Facebook and Twitter. 
Facebook, as we have seen, has been employed as something akin 
to a recruitment and training ground, to facilitate the emotional 
condensation and common identification of a largely un-politicised 
middle-class youth. Twitter, in contrast, has been mainly used as 
a vehicle for ‘live’ internal coordination within the activist elite, 
besides its many largely ‘external’ uses, including as a means for 
citizen journalists to document police brutality. Because of its lesser 
reach compared to Facebook, this medium – the most popular of 
social media within the core activist community – runs the risk of 
isolating movement leaders from the less internet-savvy sections of 
their constituency. Activists’ use of social media thus reveals the 
inherent tendency of mediated communication to isolate even while 
connecting (Ling, 2004), with possibly nefarious consequences for 
the development of collective action. 
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In the final section of this chapter I reflect on the relation between 
social media, public space and locality. I argue that social media 
can be seen as involved in ‘focal practices’ (Borgmann, 1984) 
which direct people’s attention towards specific places and events, 
symbolically gathering many dispersed individuals around the 
same actions. Symbolic places like those occupied by the mass 
sit-ins of the popular movements of 2011 come to constitute the 
nodal points in the texture of participation of contemporary social 
movements. They appear in the guise of impersonal leaders, fixed 
spatial referents making up for the absence of a visible leadership 
and the evanescence of its liquid organisational practices.
lIquId OrganISIng
The only new thing about these tools is that you are not a member 
in an organisation anymore, you are a member in a cause or a 
movement. And you don’t need to have a physical membership. 
You don’t need to go to the meeting. You are not organising things 
underground anymore. You do everything over the internet. So 
you get the instructions … and if the instructions are convincing 
you, you yourself start to play a little bit of a part. You start to 
tell your friends, your family. You know what the goal is, which 
is to spread the information, and you start to give it to people. 
You start to create from the tools you have. You start to spread 
the information by word-of-mouth as much as you can. You send 
text messages to all your contacts. You send your people emails. 
You communicate with colleagues at work.
These comments by Ahmed Samih, a human rights activist involved 
in the revolutionary movement in Cairo, sum up well the way in 
which activists in Egypt, Spain and the US see the use of social media 
as bringing about new forms of organising. What Samih describes 
here is a situation in which stable membership in an organisation 
is substituted for a continuous communicative engagement with 
the ‘movement’ at large. In this situation of ‘disintermediation’, 
individual activists (note Samih’s repeated reference to ‘you’ in 
the singular) rather than groups are seen as the basic units of the 
movement, responsible for relaying messages to their personal 
networks of friends and acquaintances.
The imaginary evoked by Samih resonates with Clay Shirky’s 
description of social media as allowing for ‘organising without 
organisations’ (Shirky, 2008). It is remarkable how the mere 
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mention of the word ‘organisation’ is capable of raising suspicion 
among activists, as I witnessed in some of the interviews. The idea 
that ‘organisations have become an obstacle to organising ourselves’ 
(Invisible Committee, 2009: 7) has a strong resonance with many 
of the activists I interviewed in Spain, Egypt and the US. Activists 
constantly present their politics as a reversal of the doings of 
large-scale institutions like banks, corporations and state agencies, 
with their top-down forms of communication. Moreover, they are 
also largely critical of the institutions of mass popular organisations, 
such as political parties, trade unions and other established forms 
of association.2 Finally, they for the most part refuse the option of 
building new formal organisations to pursue long-term campaigns 
on the issues raised by social movements. This became particularly 
evident in the wave of disapproval sparked by the decision of some 
core members of Democracia Real Ya, including Fabio Gandara, 
to register the group as a legal organisation in the early months 
of 2012. One could say that while prizing freedom of expression 
(on the internet), and freedom of assembly (in public squares), 
contemporary movements are much less interested in exploiting 
freedom of association.
One way to identify the specificity of the organising forms 
facilitated by the use of social media is through the use made by 
Egyptian activists of the term ‘organic’ to mark their difference 
from established organisations, and in particular from the Muslim 
Brotherhood. ‘They are very mechanic, we are very organic’ says 
Egyptian activist Noor Ayman Noor, referring to Tom Burns and 
G.M. Stalker’s analysis in the Management of Innovation (1961). 
It works like the ‘traffic in Cairo’, explains Mahmoud al-Banna, ‘it 
is outrageous when you look at it, but there is an order to it, there 
is a pattern’. Similar views can be heard across the Atlantic, among 
the activists of Occupy Wall Street. Thus Will, a 25-year-old activist 
from San Diego involved in OWS New York, expresses his distrusts 
towards ‘hierarchical organisations’:
We have traditionally been used to hierarchical organisations 
like governments which are very top-down or business-like. 
These organisations put their ideas out through the media who 
can then use them to have a discussion. You can have a debate 
about ‘this is wrong’ and ‘this is right’, but only within these two 
fixed boundaries. And everyone is basically just repeating their 
opinions, no matter if they watch CNN, Fox News, or other 
mainstream media. There is not much independent thought. The 
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hierarchical system supposes that we as individuals are not able 
to organise ourselves, that we need help.
As these comments illustrate, the rejection of solid organisations is 
accompanied by a striving for disintermediation and an investment 
in forms of bottom-up organising or ‘open organising’ (Jordan, 
2002: 69) among ‘individuals’ rather than groups. These ‘liquid’ 
forms of organising stress the importance of direct involvement 
and authentic engagement – values which are part of the heritage 
of anarchism (see for example Vaneigem, 1983).
The notion of ‘liquidity’ (Bauman, 2000) as applied to these 
forms of organising has a strong resonance with the evanescent 
character of social media themselves. Social media messaging is 
often described as ‘streaming’ (an Al-Jazeera English TV programme 
on social media and activism was aptly titled The Stream). When 
following tweets posted on popular hashtags, or Facebook status 
messages, the impression is of an ever-changing communicative 
flow which can sometimes make people dizzy with information 
overload. As I will argue in the conclusion, this liquid character 
of the information flow in contemporary social movements raises 
important questions about their long-term sustainability.
In the framework of the liquid organising practised by 
contemporary movements, social media intervene in expanding and 
brokering connections between friendship networks. The flexible 
relationships they allow for are characterised by an informality or 
‘personalism’ which Paul Lichterman describes as ‘a way of speaking 
and acting which highlights a unique, personal self’. For Lichterman, 
‘personalism supposes that one’s own individuality has inherent 
value, apart from one’s material or social achievements’ (Lichterman, 
1996: 6). Social media are means through which a highly personal 
engagement with social movements can be constructed, while at 
the same time rejecting a well-defined and stable collective identity, 
an element which Lichterman sees in opposition to personalism.
Within contemporary social movements, with their stress on 
informality and the adoption of ‘friendship’ as the frame for 
interpersonal interaction, communication and organisation become 
by and large impossible to separate from one another – so deeply 
embedded, so tightly woven together that they become indistinguish-
able. In a way, communication is always also a form of organisation, 
as argued by, among others, François Cooren in The Organising 
Property of Communication (2000). Again one can think back 
to Lenin’s affirmation of the newspaper as a ‘collective organiser’ 
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(1902/1969: 156). Interestingly, when Lenin was accused of thinking 
that he could make a party out of a newspaper, he replied that this 
was not his intention. The newspaper was only a tool in the hands 
of the Party, the visible manifestation of an entity which could not 
be reduced to this medium. For some contemporary activists, by 
contrast, it seems as though a movement’s organisational structures 
can really be completely subsumed by Facebook pages, tweets, and 
other evanescent forms of communication.
What we are witnessing here is thus not only an equivalence 
between organisation and communication but arguably also a 
reversal of their mutual relationship. ‘We organise ourselves in a 
certain way and we communicate accordingly’, said Dario Azzelini, 
one of the leading figures of the German socialist group Fels, during 
my previous research on the culture of the anti-globalisation 
movement (Gerbaudo, 2010: 86). Contemporary activists could 
well reverse the statement: we communicate in a certain way and we 
organise ourselves accordingly. It is communication that organises, 
rather than organisation that communicates. As a corollary, 
‘communicators’ also automatically become ‘organisers’, given 
the influence they can have through their communications on the 
unfolding of collective action. When an influential Facebook admin 
posts a status message he or she is not simply expressing an opinion 
but also inviting a certain kind of emotional response from page 
users. Similarly, when an activist ‘tweep’ sends a message about an 
incident involving the police, he or she is not only ‘informing’ but 
also eliciting a physical reaction from those receiving the message. 
These digital activists are not ‘giving orders’ to anybody. Yet their 
messaging influences the way in which people act together, by setting 
the scene in which their collective action is manifested, or, to use 
the terms employed in this book, by constructing a choreography 
of assembly.
relucTanT leaderS
If among contemporary activists the word ‘organisation’ raises 
suspicion, the word ‘leader’ is capable of provoking an immediate 
rejection. Activists from the Arab World to Europe and the US 
frequently assert that the movements they participate in are 
‘leaderless’ or ‘horizontal’, treating this as a crucial element in their 
identity and sense of worth. Moreover, crucially, many believe that 
the use of social media is what helps social movements achieve the 
goal of leaderlessness. An example coming from my background 
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interviews conducted in other countries illustrates this belief well. 
Tim, an organiser in the British anti-austerity group UK Uncut, 
states that ‘Facebook and Twitter allow us to be truly horizontal.’
But despite assertions like these, the adoption of social media 
within contemporary social movements does not allow them to 
become leaderless or horizontal automatically. They do not magically 
introduce a level playing field. Very much to the contrary, it is 
precisely through the use of social media that new forms of leadership 
are constructed. It is true that social media allow for participatory 
communication, but this feature does not mean that everybody has 
the same degree of influence on collective action and that hierarchy 
is eliminated. Rather, top Facebook admins and activist tweeps come 
to acquire a disproportionate degree of influence on movement 
communication, and thus also on the choreographing of its actions. 
The leadership constructed at this level is no doubt diffuse rather 
than concentrated in one person, and characterised by a charismatic 
(Weber, 1978: 1948) and ‘organic’ character in which ‘authority 
is settled by consensus’ (Burns and Stalker, 1961). Nevertheless, 
it remains a form of leadership as a relatively centralised (albeit 
distributed) influence on the unfolding of collective action. 
Arguably the type of confusion which underlies the ideology of 
‘horizontalism’ can be traced back to an erroneous equation between 
informal or ‘liquid’ organising and leaderlessness. The assumption 
is that if you do not have an elected chair, with legal status, that 
automatically means there are no leaders or leading groups. This 
idea had already been disputed by Burns and Stalker (1961) in their 
classic study of ‘organic’ organisations (as opposed to ‘mechanic’ 
ones), in which they asserted that forms of stratification continued 
to exist. This same phenomenon was also noted by feminist theorist 
Jo Freeman in her classic essay the ‘Tyranny of Structurelessness’ 
(1972), already cited in Chapter 1. Many of the remarks made by 
Freeman, commenting on the feminist movement in the US in the 
1970s, could perfectly apply to contemporary social movements. 
Despite claims to leaderlessness, leaders or core organisers continue 
to exist, and possibly they will always exist in one form or another 
given that the dynamic character of the process of mobilisation 
always implies the presence of imbalances and asymmetries.
To assert that these movements have leaders is not to deny 
that they are highly participatory, and that they create genuine 
spaces for self-expression. This feature is well represented by the 
General Assemblies (GAs) which became a hallmark of both the 
Spanish indignados and Occupy Wall Street. General Assemblies, 
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as an alternative to rallies with a prescribed list of speakers, have 
offered ordinary people a stage on which to voice their concerns, 
have their stories heard, and contribute to collective decision-
making. Institutions like GAs are used to a great extent precisely 
to enforce horizontalism and leaderlessness. Yet it would be naïve 
to think that the mere presence of GAs magically transforms social 
movements into horizontal spaces of participation. This is so for 
at least two reasons.
Firstly, General Assemblies themselves, alongside similar 
organisational platforms, are affected by the dilemma of the 
‘hierarchy of engagement’ described by Haunss and Leach in 
relation to the autonomous direct action scene in Germany (2009). 
This means that while these decision-making bodies are in theory 
open to everybody, de facto they tend to be mostly attended by 
people highly involved in the movement. Those who have work or 
family commitments, and for these or other reasons cannot attend 
regularly, can feel sidelined. Conversely, a disproportionate influence 
comes to be acquired by those who have what we could call the 
‘privilege of presence’, that is, the time and energy to participate 
fully in the movement’s actions.
Secondly, in the day-to-day life of social movements, the practical 
organisation of collective action relies heavily on the intervention 
of highly involved and experienced participants, or core organisers, 
who are responsible for ‘getting things done’ as Stephanie, an 
Occupy activist, puts it. There is in other words a gulf between 
the decision-making and the execution of the different activities 
of the movement. This phenomenon becomes particularly evident 
at the level of communications, as we saw in the case of OWS’s 
management of their tactical Twitter accounts – the activists 
originally adopted ‘horizontal’ procedures, but soon had to restrict 
access to the accounts because they would have become ‘a mess’ if 
left completely open.
The presence of a leadership in contemporary popular movements 
is the most evident in the phase of their initiation, in the months 
and weeks before they become publicly visible, which in some but 
not all cases is also the phase at which the impact of social media 
is the highest. At the very beginning of the process of formation of 
contemporary popular movements we recurrently encounter a tiny 
group of people, initially often just one or two people who have been 
responsible for triggering the process of mobilisation: Wael Ghonim, 
the admin of the Kullena Khaled Said Facebook page, Pablo Gallego 
and Fabio Gandara, the first initiators of Democracia Real Ya, and 
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Kalle Lasn and Micah White editors of Adbusters. Naturally these 
initiators did not create the movement all by themselves. If it had 
been for them alone, there would have been no movement at all. 
However these people in collaboration with other activists and 
in interaction with sympathetic internet users launched an idea 
which progressively came to act as the initial nucleus of a symbolic 
gathering which would later precipitate into a material gathering, 
into a protest in public space.
The level of influence of these activists varied a lot according to 
the specific circumstances of the social movements they contributed 
in initiating. For example, Lasn and White had very little say once 
ground organising began in New York, also given that they were 
acting from the distance of Vancouver and Berkeley. In the case 
of the Egyptian uprising and the indignados instead, these leaders 
had an evident role in guiding the launch campaign from beginning 
to end. Working as admins of their Facebook pages, Ghonim as 
well as Gandara and Gallego, shaped the identity of a nascent 
movement, and had much power in defining its action in its initial 
stages of development. Yet, as soon as the movement landed onto 
public space, they lost a great deal of this influence. Given that 
their leadership was channelled exclusively through a Facebook 
page, once people did not need Facebook anymore to be gathered 
together, having found a site to gather around in a physical place like 
Tahrir square or Puerta del Sol, these Facebook leaders lost grip on 
their following. Similarly, influential ‘activist tweeps’, especially in 
countries with high Twitter penetration rates like Spain and the US, 
definitely had an influence in sustaining the action of participants 
on the ground, not just in the form of tactical coordination, but 
more crucially through the construction of an emotional tension 
towards protest participation. 
The new forms of leadership emerging in the field of digital 
activism are paralleled by the continuing importance of street-level 
leadership. Once a movement is out on the streets, there is more 
room for ordinary participants to shape its action, as the influential 
individuals and groups are physically submerged ‘in a much bigger 
crowd’. At this level also, however, we regularly find the presence of 
leading groups involved in giving collective action a sense of unity 
and of direction. In the case of Egypt, for example, a leading role 
was played by a number of organised political groups, such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the 6th of April movement. Moreover, 
the football ultras of el-Ahly and Zamalek, with their highly 
pyramidal structures, were crucial in coordinating and waging street 
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fights with the police. In the case of Spain, direct action activists 
from the ‘okupas’ scene contributed significantly to informing 
the organisation of the acampadas, drawing on their previous 
experience in the anti-globalisation movement and direct action 
protests. Finally, activists involved in the tiny but vocal anarchist 
community in New York definitely had a leading role in managing 
the set up of General Assemblies.
As we saw in Chapter 5, without the people who had met at the 
16 Beaver arts space in New York in August 2011, ‘there would 
not have been an Occupy movement as we know it today’ (Kroll in 
Van Gelder, 2011: 16). But what were those people if not leaders 
of some kind? Or does the fact that most of them were anarchists 
automatically preclude that possibility? Personally I am convinced 
that historical anarchists like Errico Malatesta, Mikhail Bakunin and 
Nestor Makhno were also precisely that: leaders. They were people 
who ‘led’ by initiating social movements, inspiring actions and acting 
as focal points or symbolic centres for anarchists scattered across 
geographic space to look towards. The role played by contemporary 
activists, and digital activists in particular, is very similar. 
It is ironic that social media commonly held to facilitate the 
leaderlessness contemporary movements strive for become precisely 
the means through which new forms of leadership emerge. This 
phenomenon reflects the fact that, contrary to what theorists such 
as Castells think, the internet is anything but a non-hierarchical 
communication environment. As different analysts including 
Yochai Benkler (2006) and Clay Shirky (2010) have observed, 
communication on the web is characterised by a ‘power law 
distribution’ whereby a tiny minority of internet users produces 
the content the great majority consumes (Wikipedia – to which only 
2 per cent of users ever contribute material – being a case in point 
[Shirky, 2010: 125]). The same hierarchical tendency underscores 
Twitter communication. This is exemplified by the distribution of 
messages sent on the #jan25 hashtag used by Egyptian activists 
during the uprising against Mubarak. Alexandra Dunn and 
Christopher Wilson found that out of over 106,563 unique users 
who employed the hashtag, the great majority of messages were 
sent by 200 ‘power accounts’ (Wilson and Dunn, 2011: 1265). 
Similarly, a study of tweets related to the Spanish indignados 
conducted by the university of Zaragoza in Spain found that the 
working of Twitter streams connected to the 15-M contradicted 
the ideology of equality propounded by the movement. Researchers 
retrieved a ‘tendency toward hierarchical structure’ in which a 
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small group of ‘opinion leaders’ gathered most of the attention 
(Borge-Holtoefer et al., 2011: 8).
Twitter interactions epitomise the new forms of hierarchy created 
in the use of social media. This is also because in this medium, 
unlike on Facebook, relationships are asymmetrical. By following 
someone you are not automatically followed, hence the huge 
disparity between average users and popular ones in terms of 
number of followers. The very naming of the relationship as an 
act of ‘following’ alerts us to the fact that this medium involves or 
encourages some form of leadership. Or are we to believe that there 
can be ‘followers’ without leaders? The type of interaction available 
on Twitter reveals a structural imbalance in online communication, 
an imbalance which in organisational terms means the presence of 
a leadership, however diffuse, distributed or networked it might be.
To sum up, social media have become a means through which 
leadership is exercised while at the same time concealed, so as to 
maintain an impression of absolute spontaneity and fulfil the criteria 
of horizontalism. This phenomenon is perfectly illustrated by the 
controversy surrounding the existence of the ‘HQ’ of Occupy Wall 
Street, an office space near Zuccotti Park, where a dozen activists 
worked on communications as described in Chapter 5. Some militant 
anarchists got very angry about the existence of this space, which 
they saw as a command centre trying to control the movement. It 
is clear that this space was very troublesome for them because it 
materially embodied the fact that for all the talk about leaderlessness 
which populated the publicity of Occupy Wall Street the movement 
fundamentally relied for its day-to-day survival and public relevance 
on the work of a committed bunch of media-savvy activists. At 
least in the case of Occupy Wall Street in New York, people were 
not trying to make this presence of a group of core organisers a 
completely hidden secret. What was scandalous in other words was 
not the presence of organisers, but the fact that organisers were 
‘housed’ in a specific space, instead of being invisible in the crowd 
or hidden behind a computer screen somewhere in town. 
Interestingly, many Facebook and Twitter accounts used by 
contemporary social movements go under anonymous names, or 
collective names, thus contributing to the impression of leaderlessness, 
while they often tend to be operated by a core group of organisers. 
Social media create the impression that nobody is leading because it is 
assumed that these media are inherently ‘participatory’, and that by 
using them people are ‘simply’ communicating, interacting, sharing, 
‘participating’. However, enshrined in ‘simple’ communication, 
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there are forms of ‘soft’ leadership, which make use precisely of the 
interactive and participatory character of the web 2.0 environment. 
Indicative of this phenomenon is the assertion of Egyptian activist 
Ahmed Sabry, a 48-year-old architect, that ‘Facebook was our 
training ground and Twitter was our HQ.’ Interesting here is the 
opposition between physical structures for organising (a training 
ground, and a headquarters as a building), and ‘immaterial’ and 
evanescent channels of communication like Twitter and Facebook, 
which itself reads like a celebration of liquid organising. To put it 
in a more extended form Facebook was used by movement leaders, 
or to use a more neutral term ‘organisers’ or ‘activists’ to mobilise 
people from the outside of the space of participation, while Twitter 
was important for purposes of internal organisation. 
faceBOOk waS Our TraInIng grOund...
When Mark Zuckerberg developed the first version of Facebook at 
Harvard, what he aimed to cater for was young students’ craving 
for flirting and friendship (Kirkpatrick, 2010). In fact, these are to 
a great extent still the kind of desires which animate most Facebook 
users. For many contemporary social movements, however, this 
most popular of all social networking sites has come to constitute 
a platform for political organising and mass mobilisation – the 
equivalent of what the counter-information website Indymedia 
was for the anti-globalisation movement, as a point of contact 
between activists, supporters and sympathisers and an arena for 
public discussions. The contrast between Indymedia and Facebook 
immediately highlights one key difference between these movements. 
While activists using Indymedia were addressing an already 
politicised public, contemporary activists using Facebook attempt 
to ‘recruit’ and train (prepare for political action on the streets) a 
following among a largely un-politicised youth, epitomised by the 
Egyptian shabab-al-Facebook discussed in Chapter 2. 
As we have seen, in advance of the movement appearance in 
public space Facebook pages and groups like Kullena Khaled 
Said and Democracia Real Ya have acted as an emotional rallying 
point around which to condense a common identity capable of 
assembling symbolically a diverse constituency of dispersed and 
individualised participants. Moreover, they have been a springboard 
for constructing an impetus facilitating the ‘jump to the streets’ as 
uttered by Spanish activists. The use of Facebook varies greatly 
across the social movements studied in this book. While the website 
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played a crucial role in the Egyptian uprising, and an important 
one in the case of the Spanish indignados, it had almost no role in 
the preparation phase of Occupy Wall Street, given its snubbing 
by American activists. The reason why activists turn to Facebook 
to ‘recruit’ participants is fairly easy to understand from a purely 
strategic perspective. Facebook is the most popular of all social 
networking sites, approaching one billion global users in 2011. 
Few media give access to a larger audience, and certainly not in 
the interactive way this medium allows for. Across the countries 
considered in this study Facebook penetration rates vary greatly. In 
the US, 42 per cent of adults were on Facebook in 2011, while in 
Spain the penetration rate was 33.5 per cent.3 Compared to these 
countries, Egypt has a very small percentage of Facebook users: 
only 4% of the adult population, though steadily growing (Dubai 
School of Government, 2011c). Regardless of these differences, 
at the time of the study, Facebook was in all three countries the 
social networking site with the largest number of users (in the case 
of Egypt, for example, a microscopic 0.15% were Twitter users). 
Thus, in using Facebook as a ground for their mobilising efforts, 
activists were focusing on the one site where they could potentially 
reach the largest number of users.
The popularity gained by the website as a platform for 
recruitment is, however, not reducible merely to the size of its user 
base. Arguably, what makes this medium so effective for drawing 
people in, including those with no previous experience of political 
participation, is the fact that it allows activists to tap into people’s 
‘real’ local social networks. In general, Facebook is used to mediate 
one’s relationship to and engagement with a local community of 
friends and acquaintances: ‘to articulate connections that have some 
basis offline’ (Ellison et al., 2011: 134) and to maintain and extend 
users’ ‘social capital’ (Bourdieu, 1984). In fact, many of those my 
interviewees interacted with on Facebook were indeed their real 
friends or close acquaintances, rather than ‘Facebook friends’ (in 
the sense of Facebook-only friends). In this sense, Malcom Gladwell 
is partly wrong in asserting that social media allow only for the 
construction of ‘weak ties’ (or at least he is wrong with regard to 
the type of interaction people engage in on Facebook).
At the same time, even such ‘weak ties’ can come to constitute 
a vehicle of mobilisation. As sociologist Mark Granovetter (1974) 
famously contended, it is in fact through weak ties that information 
is transmitted across groups, rather than simply within them. For 
Caiti Lattimer, an Occupy activist:
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Facebook allows you to share things with people that you only 
have an acquaintanceship with ... The interesting thing with 
Facebook is that it truly allows you to reveal your private opinions 
and self to people that often times you have met just once and 
don’t really know at all. So for example out of the 2,000 people 
I am friends with on Facebook I have close relationships with 
maybe 20 of them, maybe 30 if I am lucky.
It was remarkable that many of the people I interviewed in both 
Egypt and Tunisia, and to a lesser extent in Spain and the US, 
went to their first demonstration all by themselves. Fathma Righi, a 
24-year-old Tunisian activist, recounts how on the 14th of January 
– the day of the decisive protests in the capital – ‘I went by myself, 
because none of my close friends was sure to come.’ For Fathma, 
as for other interviewees, the mere declared intention to participate 
uttered by many on the revolutionary Facebook pages she had joined 
seemed enough to persuade her to turn out. In Fathma’s case, it was 
also because she felt that ‘all Tunisians were my brothers. I did not 
need to be with friends. I was not scared.’ Facebook had become 
for her a thermometer of the mood of the nation rather than simply 
a means to interact with her friends. 
The use of Facebook as a mobilisation tool reflects not only the 
technological affordances of the medium, but also the peculiar forms 
of appropriation activists have devised, turning it from a symbol 
of corporate entertainment into a tool of resistance. Needless to 
say that this process has not been frictionless. Activists have had 
to face repeated censorship from this corporate service, such as 
the closing of pages and accounts. Furthermore, they have had to 
invent new forms of communicative engagement tailored to the 
forms of interaction allowed on the website. This has been visible 
in the forms of imagery and language adopted by activists in using 
this medium and tapping into its audience.
First and foremost, Facebook is a medium which privileges visual 
material, pictures, videos and the like. As Segundo Gonzales, a 
member of Juventud Sin Futuro in Spain, notes: ‘on Facebook you 
do not read a text of 6 paragraphs, you do not share it. Nobody 
does. But if you write a sentence or a picture, people do share it. It 
is a culture of images, a culture of instantaneity.’ For Occupy activist 
Andrew Conner, the challenge in using the website as a channel for 
mobilisation is the fact that ‘Facebook is dumb audience’:
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If you put a stupid photo, or a silly post, it will always get more 
likes than a political post that says ‘this is really important come 
out to the park tonight’. And the problem is that it is unconscious. 
More people will like the image of a cat than they will like an 
OWS message saying that we are getting evicted. 
But despite the levity and sometimes vulgarity of its content, it 
is arguably precisely this non-political and ‘mass’ character of 
Facebook, together with the breadth of its user base, that makes 
it such a powerful venue for social organising. Here activists 
can make connections with others outside of the narrow activist 
community, people who will not automatically share its idealism 
and commitment. 
As Ethan Zuckerman has claimed in his own ‘cute cat theory of 
social media’, while the web 2.0 was designed ‘to share pictures of 
funny cats’, this does not mean that it is not suitable for activism. 
‘There’s a real challenge within the world of lolcats – making 
activism viral probably means making it funny as well as political 
and heart-wrenching’ (Zuckerman, 2008). In other words, activists 
need to be able to turn the type of communications prevalent on 
these platforms to their own ends. Since contemporary movements 
are supposed to be ‘popular’, given their claim to represent the 
people, campaigning on Facebook at least forces them to deal with 
an audience which uses social networking sites primarily for the 
purposes of entertainment rather than for political reasons. By the 
same token, the use of dedicated activist social networking sites – 
like the Spanish N-14 adopted by the indignados movement – only 
increases the danger of isolating activists from society at large, 
secluding them in an activist-only bubble.
Secondly, in their use of Facebook, activists have resorted to the 
informal and intimate language which characterises communications 
among its users. As we have seen in previous chapters, activists 
like Wael Ghonim and Fabio Gandara created emotionally charged 
interactions with their audiences to sustain a process of collective 
identification among people sharing a common sense of victimhood 
in the face of an unfair power system. The identities constructed 
on their Facebook pages were characterised by that deep elusivity 
which Ernesto Laclau considers a feature of populist movements 
(Laclau, 2005: 118). In the case of the Kullena Khaled Said page, 
it was the figure of Khaled Said himself that constituted the initial 
nodal point in the process of identification. Later, the page resorted 
to the imaginary of the nation and Egyptian-ness to construct a more 
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wide-ranging identification, while the police force, deeply hated by 
different sectors of Egyptian society, came to act as a negative focal 
point, strengthening participants’ sense of solidarity. Likewise in 
the case of Democracia Real Ya, the self-identification as ‘normal, 
common people’ was extremely loose. What gave it some coherence, 
apart from its appeal to the imaginary of cyberdemocracy and its 
promise of unrestrained participation, were vibrant verbal attacks 
levelled at bankers and politicians. The coherence of these identities 
was thus dependent not on some form of internal solidity, but rather 
on the opposition ‘us vs. them’: the people against the system.
In the case of Occupy Wall Street the process of popular identity-
building found its venue not on Facebook, but mainly on the Tumblr 
blog ‘We are the 99%’, which, posting the stories and pictures of 
struggling Americans, managed to capture the imagination of many 
supporters and sympathisers. Within Occupy Facebook was initially 
snubbed as a mobilising platform. And when it was used there was 
little sign of that compelling emotional narration which was so 
important in both Egypt and Spain. Yet, also in the case of Occupy 
Wall Street, from the first week of occupation organisers came to 
realise the importance of improving their Facebook presence and 
exploiting its potential for emotional condensation. Here too the 
identity of the 99% was characterised by a deep indeterminacy, 
despite its apparent mathematical precision. What gave it some 
cohesiveness was once again its opposition to an enemy: in this case 
the financiers of Wall Street.
Besides serving as an emotional rallying point for constructing 
a popular identity, Facebook has also been appropriated as a 
‘springboard’ for protest participation. Movement leaders in Spain, 
Egypt (this again does not apply to the US) used Facebook to fuel 
an impetus towards upcoming protest events capable of persuading 
people to take to the streets. The phenomenon has been observed 
analysing the doings of Wael Ghonim in Egypt, and Fabio Gandara 
and Pablo Gallego in Spain. These Facebook ‘activist admins’ 
constantly invoked an enthusiastic sense of anticipation, a sense 
of urgency about the need to take to the streets, and a sense of 
optimism about the turnout. The overall gist of these messages 
is summed up by one of the admin posts on Democracia Real 
Ya page back in March, two months before the protests, which 
proclaimed ‘this is going to be big!’ and bombastically anticipated 
‘revolution starts on the 15th of May’. As Andrew Conner puts 
it: ‘you need to fake enthusiasm, until you have real enthusiasm’. 
Similarly, we have seen the effort Wael Ghonim put in to counter 
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the defeatism of some page members, constantly reasserting his 
trust in users’ honesty about their intention to participate in the 
25th of January protest.
Indeed the question of trust is crucial in understanding the 
problems activists need to deal with in their use of social media. 
Social psychologist Bert Klandermans has observed that one of the 
key things that convinces individuals to participate in protests is ‘the 
impression that also other people will participate’ (Klandermans, 
1984: 586). But one of the main problems with online organising is 
that the lack of face-to-face contact can become an obstacle to the 
construction of trust (Tarrow, 1998), making it difficult for users to 
be reassured about other people’s intentions. In a way, one can see 
the popularity of the RSVP count function on Facebook event pages 
as being an attempt to cope with precisely this constitutive distrust 
of online interactions, by conveying the impression that ‘we will be 
many’. Naturally, as we have seen across the different case studies, 
such counts hardly reflect how many people will actually take part 
in demonstrations. In the protests in Egypt, Spain and the US actual 
attendance tended to be between 10 and 50 per cent of those who 
promised to participate on Facebook. Nevertheless, the RSVP count 
with all its capacity for over-estimation creates the impression, or at 
least the necessary illusion, that there is an enthusiasm behind the 
event, and that one will not end up with only a few others facing 
overwhelming police forces. 
...TwITTer waS Our hq
‘Nowadays most activists seem to use Twitter’, says Egyptian activist 
Nour Ayman Nour. This sums up well the evidence that has emerged 
from our different case studies, at least if by ‘activists’ we mean those 
heavily involved social movement participants or core organisers 
(Oberschall, 1973: 383). If Facebook constitutes the equivalent 
of what Indymedia was for the anti-globalisation movement, one 
could say that Twitter is now analogous to what mailing lists were 
for the earlier activists: a platform for internal organisation and 
coordination. Here again, the differences between the two media are 
immediately evident, not only because of the mobile and real-time 
character of Twitter, but also because the micro-blogging site has 
a generalist rather than activist-specific character, and does not 
require a special subscription as do activist mailing services like 
riseup5 or aktivix.6
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As we have seen, with its rapidity and conciseness, Twitter has 
proved attractive to activists as a means to convey minute by 
minute updates about events taking place on the ground, as a sort 
of movement equivalent to the military C3 (Control, Command, 
and Communications): a movement HQ, to use Egyptian activist 
Ahmed Sabry’s own definition, or channel for internal tactical 
communications about the movements of security forces, about 
attacks and other incidents, and about the needs of protest camps, 
such as medical supplies and technical equipment. Sally Zohney 
recounts how ‘Twitter for me was the minute-to-minute update 
of the 25th of January, 26th and 27th. And I said OK ... we are 
gathering in Nasr City in that area and we should avoid that area 
because there is police etcetera.’ Similarly, in Spain, the protesters at 
Puerta del Sol used Twitter to give updates about police attacks and 
to inform supporters about the material needs of the camp. Within 
Occupy Wall Street Twitter has been adopted as an all-purpose 
tool, to coordinate people in the course of demonstrations, organise 
supplies, and publicise actions. For contemporary movements 
Twitter has thus come to constitute a centre or focal point in their 
real-time communications: a single platform where all information 
can be collected, and by being gathered in one place made available 
to a dispersed public of participants and sympathisers.
As with Facebook, the importance of Twitter naturally varied 
across the three different national contexts. While it had only a 
limited impact in Egypt, mainly reflecting the low Twitter penetration 
rate there, it was very important in Spain, and extremely important 
in the US, countries with a much higher penetration rate. (Twitter’s 
penetration rate was 7 per cent in the US in 2011; though I was 
not able to find reliable figures for Spain, it can be estimated as a 
bit lower than in the US). Beyond the penetration rate one would 
also need to consider the ‘uptake rate’: the percentage of protesters 
who used the service. In the absence of relevant and reliable data 
it is understandable that this uptake rate should be much higher 
than the overall penetration rate, given the prevalence of a young 
and middle-class demographic among protestors.
While the use of Twitter as a tactical device has been well 
documented (see for example Aday et al., 2010), no attention has 
been paid to its contribution to the emotional construction of a sense 
of togetherness within social movements. This phenomenon can be 
seen in many Twitter conversations going on between those who are 
‘on the ground’ and those who are following events from a distance. 
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Some activists have also attempted to use Twitter as a tool for 
activating and recruiting prospective participants, a task more usually 
covered by Facebook. However, this has mostly proven a failure, 
as we saw in the case of Occupy’s overly Twitter-focused launch 
campaign. This is to a great extent a consequence of the website’s 
communicative architecture, through which, as Ahmed Samih puts 
it, ‘you do direct group communication about very specific issues’, 
because ‘it is organised around issues with hashtags’. When there 
are incidents or notable events taking place on the ground Twitter 
streams like those used by the activists can see hundreds of messages 
exchanged every minute. However, these discussions generally 
attract the attention of a fraction of all participants.
The specificity of Twitter conversations can also prove an obstacle 
when it comes to reaching out to people outside of the activist 
community. The people following hashtags like #OWS, #Tahrir, 
or #indignados are not exactly average internet users, nor average 
Twitter users either. Unless these hashtags become trending topics, 
which they rarely do, users have to look for them proactively, which 
presupposes they have an interest in the topic already. While Twitter 
communication gathers people closely around issues of common 
concern, and allows for focused discussions, this specificity also runs 
the risk of enclosing activists in their own ‘virtual walled community’ 
(Ling, 2004: 190). This is something that Egyptian activists in 
particular have become aware of, motivating the development of 
new practices of activist communication, such as #tweetashara3 
(literally: tweet the streets) which combines new media practices 
with the classic repertoire of street level agitation.
The activist predilection for Twitter cannot just be reduced 
to technical issues, or to the site’s supposed superiority vis-à-vis 
Facebook, but needs to be understood as a reflection of activists’ 
striving for distinction (Bourdieu, 1984) from the vulgar mass of 
Facebook users. Through their engagement with Twitter, participants 
can gain a certain status, a ‘symbolic capital’ in Bourdieu’s terms, 
which to a great extent comes down to the fact that Twitter is more 
exclusive than Facebook, given among other factors its emphasis on 
textual information. Two testimonies from activists will illustrate 
the point. Elizabeth, a participant in Occupy Wall Street, explains:
I don’t do Facebook, I don’t believe in it. I think it is a great 
business tool but personally I don’t like the idea that people 
make money out of watching what you do. I have issues with it. 
Twitter maybe they do the same thing. But what you get there is 
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the news by the second. That’s the most valuable thing about it. 
So if you want news the best thing is to use Twitter, rather than 
to go to any of the websites, or even the newspapers.
Similarly Khaled, a 24-year-old Egyptian activist: 
I am not a big fan of Facebook. So I don’t follow it closely. I 
had an account and then I de-activated it because at that point 
Facebook was very personal and people would take pictures of 
themselves in bikinis and this and that and put it up. It was an 
important tool to connect with old friends. But at the same time 
I felt it was a waste of time. Everyone was just showing off. I 
didn’t feel there was much substance to it. So it just kind of pissed 
me off. I don’t want to do this. It is wasting my time. There are 
more important things I need to do.
It is easy to empathise with this sense of frustration faced with the 
idleness that characterises so many Facebook interactions. This 
‘dislike’ for Facebook, however, also highlights the risk inherent in 
what Bourdieu calls ‘elective affinities’, that is, the tendency that 
‘brings together people that go together’ (Bourdieu, 1984: 241), in 
this case activists with other activists.
This risk of isolation which, as seen in Chapter 1 is a negative 
side-effect of increasing possibilities of connection offered by social 
media, is well captured in the testimony by Egyptian activist Sally 
Zohney who thus explains the difference between the forms of 
interaction available on Twitter and Facebook:
On Twitter you follow and are followed by people who have 
very similar views ... On Twitter you surround yourself with a 
community of like-minded people. With Facebook it is different 
because it is your friends. So it is usually people you met before 
the revolution, people who are friends or friends of friends you 
met at school, or people you met at work. So it is people who 
don’t necessarily have the same mindset or the same ideologies. So 
they get into lot of flames and arguments, and stuff ... My sister 
for example unfriended a lot of people during the revolution, 
friends she had since high school.
As Sally goes on to explain, ‘because everyone you are following 
in your timeline, everyone is the same. So you think everybody in 
Egypt thinks the same way we all want the removal of the SCAF, 
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all want this... but then you realise this is only the people who 
think like me ... the rest of the country doesn’t think the same’. 
This risk of becoming trapped in an ‘activist bubble’ is particularly 
evident in activists’ Twitter interactions, but clearly, though to a 
lesser extent, the same also applies to Facebook. This is not to claim 
that Facebook is inherently better, or more efficient than Twitter 
because of its specific communicative architecture, or the services it 
offers. It is not really a matter of technology, efficiency or quality of 
service, but a question of the social and cultural practices conveyed 
through this new medium. As we saw earlier, social media and 
Twitter in particular reflect the tendency of mobile communications 
to ‘bring us together’ while ‘tearing us apart’ (Ling and Campbell, 
2011). This threat is a reminder of the continuing importance of 
street-level communication, which by and large continues to be the 
best way in which social movements can reach out to mainstream 
society, without the mediation of mainstream media. 
TrendIng placeS
To further understand the dynamics of contemporary social 
movements we need to dissect the complex interaction between 
social media, public space and locality which is hinted at by the 
metaphor of choreography. The case studies considered in this book 
highlight how the rise of social media does not entail a lessening of 
the importance of street politics or of face-to-face communication 
in physical spaces. Street-level communication – in the form of 
face-to-face agitation, fly-posting, leafleting and similar practices 
– continues to play a crucial role as a means of mobilisation. As 
seen in the context of the Egyptian revolution, fundamental for the 
success of the revolution was the face-to-face interaction between 
the shabab-al-Facebook and the shaabi, the lower classes on Cairo’s 
streets. Similarly, the Spanish indignados, after having initiated the 
launch campaign towards the 15-M soon invested in the creation of 
local groups responsible for reaching out to those people bereft of an 
internet connection or of a Facebook account. In the case of Occupy 
this work of street level mobilisation had a lesser role compared to 
Egypt and Spain, for how much activists also resorted to posters, 
flyers and face-to-face networking to mobilise people. All in all, 
while social media were important to coalesce a core constituency 
of young middle class people, street level communication is what 
has allowed these movements to expand and become truly ‘popular’, 
by breaking the barrier of the digital divide, and allowing members 
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of the so-called ‘internet generation’ to engage with ‘those who 
do not have a Facebook account’ to use the expression of Occupy 
activist Andrew Conner. 
Apart from exploiting existing forms of public space, activists also 
actively engaged in creating new contexts of proximity. Contrary to 
the view of network theorists like Castells, who have argued that 
the new media automatically entail a lessening of the importance 
of place, contemporary activists’ use of social media is involved to 
a great extent in reconstructing and facilitating forms of physical 
proximity. Social media contribute in the construction of a sense 
of political locality or a political ‘net locality’ (Gordon and de 
Souza Silva, 2011), giving the movement a grounding in public 
space. Occupied squares like Puerta del Sol, Tahrir square, Zuccotti 
Park – but also Syntagma square in Athens or the Kashba square 
and Bourghiba avenue in Tunis – have acquired an extraordinary 
symbolic importance in contemporary movements, as spaces for the 
gathering of a constituency that does not feel represented by existing 
organisations and institutions. The intense messaging about these 
sites through Facebook pages, Twitter streams and activist blogs 
has turned them into what we could call (playing with the Twitter 
notion of a ‘trending topic’) trending places: venues for magnetic 
gatherings, face-to-face assemblies whose alluring power depends 
to a great extent on the intense flow of messaging radiating out of 
them and in turn attracting people towards them.
Social media are often blamed for distracting us from what we are 
meant to be doing, or inundating us with messages and thus adding 
to the misery of information overload. In their activist use, however, 
they often serve as a means of ‘concentrating’ people’s attention and 
emotions, functioning as what technology theorist Albert Borgmann 
has called ‘focal practices’, practices which ‘re-center’ us, giving us 
a sense of our location in the world (Borgmann, 1984). Hence the 
popularity of Twitter hashtags carrying the name of a specific place 
associated with the movement, like #Tahrir, #Sol, #Zuccotti, which 
then becomes the target of an emotional investment, exemplified 
by messages like ‘I believe in #Tahrir’.7 We can here refer back to 
Paolo Virno, cited in Chapter 1, who playing with the Greek term 
‘topos’ which covers both place (as in topology) and language (as 
in topic), asserted that the multitude does not have a common place 
but it does have a common a common language (Virno, 2004). In 
a way it is as though with contemporary movements one needs to 
reverse such statement. In contemporary popular movements it is 
as though the topos of topic comes to be identical with the topos of 
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place. Matters of discussion as ‘matters of concern’ (Latour, 2005) 
can hardly be extricated from the specific places in which activists 
fight upon them.
As a consequence of this heavy symbolic investment in occupied 
squares, the space of participation of contemporary popular 
movements acquires a concentric and centripetal structure which 
resonates with the description of ‘texture’ developed by Henri 
Lefebvre in his Production of Space. According to Lefebvre, 
textures are ‘made up of a large space covered by networks or webs’ 
(Lefebvre, 1974/1991: 222). Though shaped by communicative 
processes which by nature are wide-ranging, they tend to centre on 
places or ‘monuments [which] constitute the strong points, nexus or 
anchors of such webs ... the properties of a spatial texture are fixed 
upon a single point: sanctuary, throne, seat, presidential chair or 
the like’ (Lefebvre, 1974/1991: 222, 225). Likewise, the occupied 
squares of contemporary protests come to resemble a kind of 
‘monument’ at the centre of the texture of participation. They are 
fixed points that transfix, points that capture and attract internet 
publics from a distance. Alongside the ‘empty signifiers’ which 
dominate the activists’ online communications and the identities 
they construct, these places offer ‘full signifiers’: signifiers filled with 
histories, political traditions, and the bodily density or ‘collective 
effervescence’ of popular reunions (Durkheim, 1912/1965: 162). 
In face of the flexibility and elusivity of contemporary movements’ 
organisational structures, but also in face of the indeterminacy 
of the identities these movements construct through social media 
interactions, the role of such places as focal points is what allows 
the movements to come together and hold together. 
The reader might well ask at this point: have not specific places 
always been important for revolutionary movements? What 
makes contemporary protest sites so exceptional? It is true that all 
revolutions have had their symbolic places which have acquired 
an almost sacred quality for the movements invested in them – the 
Bastille in 1789, the Winter Palace in October 1917, the Sorbonne 
in May 1968. Yet with the ‘take the square’ movements of 2011 
there appears to be something even more compelling. Occupied 
squares have become not simply stages for protest performances 
but also sources of identification for the social movements that 
have appropriated them, nodal points capable of holding together 
movements otherwise deprived of a solid organisational structure. 
In this way, places like Zuccotti Park, Puerta del Sol and Tahrir 
Square have themselves come to act as ‘impersonal leaders’, making 
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up for the lack of a visible leadership and the reluctance of de facto 
leaders to be seen as such. Not being able to cling to a flag, a political 
party, or a personality cult, and having to temper the liquidity of its 
social media communications, the contemporary social movement 
clings to a place, as the stage of its history, the cradle (and grave) 
of its development.
cOncluSIOn
The liquid organising practised by contemporary activists in their 
use of social media does not mean automatically the elimination 
of leadership. To the contrary, social media adoption among 
activists is accompanied by the rise of forms of soft and emotional 
leadership, which are by and large indirect as well as invisible but 
nonetheless effective in giving collective action a certain degree 
of coherence and a sense of direction. It is this kind of soft and 
dialogical leadership that the term ‘choreography’ endeavours to 
capture. Thus, the doings of contemporary movements are ridden 
with a deep contradiction between the discourse of leaderlessness 
and horizontality and organisational practices in which leadership 
continues to exist, though in a dialogical or interactive form. And 
possibly it will always continue to exist thanks to the asymmetrical 
character of the process of mobilisation and the need for focal points 
in the process of people’s assembling in public space. 
A further issue to be taken into account is the fact that the forms 
of soft leadership and liquid organising made possible through the 
use of social media, while effective in setting the scene for action and 
choreographing specific protest events in the short term, can prove 
ineffective in the long term in giving a direction to the collective 
action of social movements. This risk has been highlighted by the 
crises experienced by all three movements discussed in this book 
once their main occupations, from Tahrir square to Zuccotti Park, 
were lifted and they were deprived of that space to which, to a great 
extent, they owed their identity and sense of unity. The consequences 
and limits of this model of liquid organising and the ‘invisible’ 
choreographic leadership that underlies it will be discussed in the 
Conclusion, looking at its theoretical and political implications, 
and paying particular attention to the question of sustainability of 
contemporary social movements. 
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I believe in #Tahrir
@aujo808, 14th november 2011
‘The streets are dead capital’ proclaimed the artistic collective 
Critical Art Ensemble in 1995, explaining that ‘for an oppositional 
force to conquer key points in physical space in no way threatens an 
institution’ (Critical Art Ensemble, 1996: 11). Instead of physical 
strikes one will have to organise virtual strikes, instead of physical 
sit-ins, virtual sit-ins, instead of physical demonstrations, virtual 
demonstrations. This call was indicative of the spirit prevalent among 
many activist groups in the mid 1990s. Francis Fukuyama had just 
announced that we had reached the ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama, 
1992), and Thatcher’s war cry ‘There is No Alternative’ still rang 
true for the majority of the population in Western countries. The 
global financial meltdown of 2008 was still far away and the bubble 
of the ‘new economy’ had not yet burst. The only glimmers of 
hope for radicals were coming from the mountains of South-Eastern 
Mexico, where the Zapatistas had begun their uprising, to which 
the Critical Art Ensemble provided virtual support by hacking the 
Mexican government’s websites.
In face of the social and political latency and the emptying out of 
public space from protest politics which characterised those years, 
the rise of the internet came to be hailed as opening up a new space 
where a ‘free culture’ (Kelty, 2008) could develop. While John Perry 
Barlow of the Grateful Dead was seeing the web as a new ‘Electronic 
Frontier’, many activists came to welcome it as a new political 
playground. The rise of ‘hacktivism’ led many to see the internet as 
offering an escape from the emptied out public space (McCaughey 
and Ayers, 2003). Closeted in their rooms, their eyes glued to 
flickering screens, browsing through thousands of websites and 
databases, hacking governmental and corporate servers, activists 
would form virtual communities and waged their battles against 
the corporate state through the recesses of cyberspace, much like 
the characters in a William Gibson novel.
The social media practices of the 2011 popular movements urge 
us to depart from this escapist vision of the internet as a virtual 
158
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space wherein to refuge ourselves from the crisis of public space. 
What we are witnessing now is a use of social media in the service 
of re-appropriating physical public space (Lefebvre, 1974/1991), 
rather than its substitution with a virtual one. A use we have tried 
to capture with the notion of a ‘choreography of assembly’. At this 
level, the choice of the term ‘choreography’ stands to suggest that 
this process of reconstruction of public space is not completely 
spontaneous and improvised. In fact, despite their repeated claims to 
leaderlessness, contemporary social movements do have their own 
‘choreographers’ and these choreographers are not identical with 
the ‘dancers’ or participants. As it happens in the field of dance, in 
contemporary movements these choreographers or ‘soft leaders’ 
are for the most not visible on the stage or at least do not take 
centre-stage as it were. But by harnessing participants’ emotionality 
and directing it their actions nevertheless do have a deep influence 
on the display of collective action. In these final remarks I want 
to reflect on the theoretical and political implications of this use 
of social media within contemporary popular movements. To this 
end, I focus on three fundamental questions which have emerged 
from the foregoing study: the emotional character of social media 
use in social movements; the tension between spontaneity and 
organisation; and the threat of evanescence. 
The emOTIOnal cOaleScence Of The ‘peOple’
Reading through the thousands of Facebook status messages, 
comments, tweets and blog posts which first anticipated and then 
celebrated the ‘landing’ or ‘parachuting’ of the popular movements 
of 2011 into public space, one frequently comes across metaphorical 
spatial expressions like ‘jumping out’ or ‘jumping downward’ or 
‘breaking out of the bubble’ of internet activism. These messages 
reflect the construction of an emotional striving to depart from a 
sense of isolation, dispersion and passivity that activists see as the 
hallmark of social experience not only in authoritarian regimes like 
Mubarak’s Egypt, but also in societies fallen prey to neoliberalism’s 
attack on all forms of public space. In front of this situation of crisis 
of public space, social media have become emotional conduits for 
reconstructing a sense of togetherness among a spatially dispersed 
constituency, so as to facilitate its physical coming together in public 
space. This finding clearly goes against much scholarship on new 
media which has tended to locate them in a ‘virtual reality’ or in 
a ‘cyberspace’ (McCaughy and Ayers, 2003), or in a ‘network of 
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brains’ (Castells, 2009) detached from geographic reality. But it is 
corroborated by recent research identifying a revival of locality in 
new media practices (Gordon and de Souza Silva, 2011). 
There is no doubt that for almost all the activists I interviewed, 
the internet alone is not the solution to the crisis of public space. 
In fact, while the movements discussed in this book have seen their 
first nuclei emerging in the form of online discussions, they are 
marked by a sense of embarrassment at being simply internet-based 
publics in the first place: ‘We are not people of comment and like.’ 
Exploiting this embarrassment, even the Mubarak regime tried to 
debunk the credibility of the pro-democracy movement, precisely 
by ridiculing them as ‘Facebook people’, armchair revolutionaries 
who would have never make precisely that jump from the ‘screens to 
the streets’. ‘We are not on Facebook, we are on the streets’ chanted 
the Spanish indignados in response, expressing their conviction that 
physical rather than virtual space is the primary locus for grassroots 
politics. ‘This is not a cyber-utopia’ says Shane Gill in a similar 
vein, criticising those ‘techno-utopians’ who want to reduce the 
movement to its internet communications. 
 It is true that Democracia Real Ya and other groups have some 
of their meetings online, and the Occupy groups use video and voice 
conferencing services like Mumble to engage in forms of interaction 
which transcend the physical limits of location. But what is most 
exciting and ‘contagious’ about these movements, what has captured 
the public imagination, are not abstract discussion sessions on 
internet forums, but the protest camps, assemblies, demonstrations, 
sit-ins and popular marches on the ground: multiple variations of 
a politics of the streets performed ‘shoulder to shoulder’ rather 
than ‘peer to peer’. Internet communication and social media in 
particular are important only as the means towards facilitating such 
gatherings. These technologies cannot substitute public space for 
a ‘virtual public sphere’ (Papacharissi, 2002), but only re-weave a 
new sense of public space, refashioning the way in which people 
come together on the streets. When they are not connected to the 
construction of public gatherings social media can also run the risk 
of isolating activists from the broad constituency of the movement, 
as seen when talking about activist obsession with Twitter in the 
foregoing chapter. 
To understand the working of this mediated reconstruction 
of public space operated by activists in their social media use, 
it is crucial to appreciate the conspicuously emotional rather 
than ‘informational’ character of this operation. Digital activists 
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like Wael Ghonim in Egypt, and Fabio Gandara in Spain have 
skilfully exploited the personal character of social media, their 
capacity to become channels of intimate while at the same time 
public conversations. They have used social media to construct an 
emotional tension, connecting the highly dispersed and individualised 
interactions people maintain through Facebook, Twitter and other 
social media to the bodily immersion of collective gatherings. These 
forms of communication have contributed in creating a contagious 
sense of anticipation or impetus in advance of the protests, and an 
emotional attraction around mass sit-ins to sustain participation 
after the movement’s landing in public space. 
The emotional quality of the communications of contemporary 
movements needs to be understood in conjunction with the ‘popular’ 
character of these movements. In his discussion of ‘populism’ Laclau 
had already noted that the symbolic construction of the ‘people’ as a 
political subject has a profound ‘affective’ dimension (Laclau, 2005: 
227). As we have seen from our case studies, social media can be 
used to construct a sense of solidarity within a diverse constituency, 
sharing a common sense of indignation, anger, frustration and 
perception of shared victimhood in face of a corrupt system. Social 
media become the pole of ‘aggregation’, or better ‘concentration’, 
of these individual sentiments, turning them into political passions 
within a narrative of popular reunion. 
The implications of this emotional quality of the forms of 
mobilisation practiced by contemporary popular movements, revolve 
around the need to depart from techno-deterministic and cognitivist 
understandings of social media as informational channels advanced 
by theorists like Clay Shirky (2008, 2010) and Manuel Castells 
(2009). This line of analysis has popularised a vision of social media 
as some sort of C3 (Command, Control and Communications) 
devices of contemporary social movements, bestowing them 
with a technological edge over a sluggish state apparatus. This 
vision understands social movements as quasi-military insurgent 
groupings, swarms or smart mobs (see for example, Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt, 2001; Rheingold, 2003; Hardt and Negri, 2004) reducing 
their communications to pure questions of efficiency.
It is true, as it has been documented at different points in this 
book, that contemporary movements use social media also for 
tactical, that is, ‘practical’ purposes: to exchange information 
about the situation on the ground, and make up for the lack of a 
linear command structure. Nevertheless, tactical communication 
also has a deep emotional dimension, as seen for example in the 
Gerbaudo T02575 01 text   161 30/08/2012   11:04
162 TweeTS and The STreeTS
Occupy activists’ use of Twitter for coordination after the eviction 
at Zuccotti Park. All in all though, as has been demonstrated in 
the course of the book, the most important role of social media lies 
in the construction of an emotional sense of togetherness among 
dispersed participants, rather than in the coordination of ‘combat’ 
operations on the ground. 
This emotional quality of activist use of social media is a 
reminder of the fact that the understanding of social movement 
communications cannot be reduced to purely technical factors, 
and, more importantly, that there can be no ‘technological fix’ 
to the problem of collective action. No Android or iPhone App, 
no mapping software, no instant messaging or social networking 
service, no arrest alerting system, no online voting platform will ever 
solve technically the question of collective action, of how to mobilise 
and organise participants. This might well be a designer’s dream, but 
by the same token it should also always be an activist’s nightmare. 
The success of popular movements still lies to a great extent in the 
organisational skill of its activists and in their capacity to create a 
compelling sense of togetherness capable of initiating the coalescence 
of a disparate constituency. Arguably, contemporary movements 
could get by well enough without the tactical affordances offered 
by social media. But what they cannot do without (or what they do 
better with) is the capacity of such media to become the instruments 
of an emotional narration capable of motivating individuals to take 
to the streets. 
SpOnTaneITy By deSIgn
The move ‘from the web to the streets’ has not only been undertaken 
for instrumental reasons, in order to cross the digital divide and 
engage with those (many) people ‘who are not on Facebook’. It is 
also a reflection of contemporary popular movements’ anti-author-
itarian valuing of immediacy and face-to-face relationships. These 
movements fight against institutions which they criticise for being 
bureaucratic, alienating, pyramidal, over-structured and opaque. 
Rejecting the distance between people and power these institutions 
are seen to establish, contemporary movements are characterised by 
a striving for directness of anarchist inspiration: direct action, direct 
democracy, direct human contact. Directness as a desire for disin-
termediation, visible in the movements’ distrust towards traditional 
organisations’ mechanisms of delegation and representation and in 
their embracing of liquid forms of organising.
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The paradox, though, is that this disintermediation and 
personalised interaction, designed to allow for the construction of 
immediacy and ‘authentic’ human relationships, is itself premised 
on complex processes of technical and symbolic mediation, of 
which social media are just the most evident manifestations. It is 
in fact remarkable how, despite the claims to spontaneity made by 
these movements, they are characterised by attempts to manage or 
design the ‘revolution’ which are historically unprecedented – as 
exemplified by the use of Facebook for fixing protest dates. When 
did it happen in the past that people would announce ‘the revolution 
begins’ on this or that date, as was done by Wael Ghonim in Egypt 
and Fabio Gandara and Pablo Gallego in Spain? It is as though in 
the context of a ‘mediatised’ society, immediacy (by definition the 
absence of mediation) cannot be sustained without being thoroughly 
mediated. It is at this level of mediation that soft, indirect, and 
invisible or ‘choreographic’ forms of leadership develop.
Activists are perpetually having to dispel conspiracy theories 
claiming that there is someone or something ‘behind’ their protests – 
be it Israel, the CIA, Hamas, or Serbia (sic!) in the case of Egypt; the 
Democratic Party, George Soros’ money, or ‘the Canadians’ (sic!) in 
the case of Occupy; or the Socialist Party PSOE, or even the Jesuits 
(sic!!) in the case of the Spanish indignados. The suspicion that 
social movements have to counter again and again is the idea that 
their endeavours are just a ‘cooked-up’ venture, that they are merely 
the ingenuous puppets of someone pulling their strings from behind. 
Naturally, these conspiracy theories are almost invariably ludicrous, 
and inadvertently make for good movement counter-propaganda 
in showing the obtuseness of their political opponents. And yet 
they are right in raising the suspicion that these movements are 
not completely ‘spontaneous’, and that there is in a sense ‘someone 
pulling the strings’. But the ‘puppeteers’ here are the participants 
themselves, and in particular those highly committed members 
who dedicate much time to the movement, and thus become its 
communicators and organisers, or ‘leaders’.
Contemporary social movements put a lot of emphasis on 
individual participants’ active contribution; there is, however, no 
such thing as unrestrained participation and ‘pure’ spontaneity 
(Gramsci, 1971: 196). It is true that general assemblies, protest 
camps, working commissions, and the like are spaces which allow 
for self-expression and improvisation. But here we run into a 
paradox: in order for this spontaneity to unfold, there is the need 
for a hidden work of scene-setting conducted by a nucleus of core 
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organisers, around which further rings can progressively crystallise 
and without whose presence they seemingly would not crystallise. 
The spontaneity of contemporary movements is thus a highly 
organised one, precisely because it is a highly mediated one, in a 
context in which communication and organisation become almost 
indistinguishable from one another.
The ethical problem raised by this kind of ‘choreographic’ 
leadership is not the presence of leaders as such but rather the 
categorical denial of the existence of leaders of any kind. What 
worries me about this denial is its capacity for encouraging a lack of 
responsibility among movement leaders. Look for example at Wael 
Ghonim, who has always trenchantly rejected the label of leader. 
‘This is Revolution 2.0: No one was a hero because everyone was a 
hero’, he wrote on the 13th of February 2011 in a tweet re-tweeted 
more than a hundred times. No doubt there is some truth in this 
statement. The Egyptian revolution succeeded because of the heroic 
and creative participation of hundreds of thousands of people, 
hundreds of whom lost their lives during the glorious ‘18 days’ 
and thereafter. But who could deny that Ghonim, alongside many 
influential activists like 6th of April’s Ahmed Maher, had a major 
role in shaping the emergence of the movement? He indeed was a 
leader of some kind, a Facebook admin and a ‘Facebook leader’, 
who, alongside many leaders on the ground, was instrumental in 
opening up that highly participatory space which constituted the 
stage of the Egyptian revolution. 
On a negative note, however, Ghonim was also instrumental in 
shutting that space down. When Mubarak resigned on the 11th 
of February, Ghonim famously tweeted: ‘Mission accomplished. 
Thanks to all the brave young Egyptians. #Jan25’. Ironically, this 
mimicked the message which a few years earlier had been delivered 
from an aircraft carrier by George Bush, who would himself later 
repent of having thought the war in Iraq was over. Likewise Egyptians 
were soon to realise that they had not won, or not as fully as they 
had hoped. They learned from experience that the military council 
(SCAF) which succeeded Mubarak was not that different from its 
departed master. They would later regret having left the square 
without ensuring that the military top brass would not continue 
in the dictator’s steps. As Egyptian activist Nora Shalaby reports, 
many people in the movement resented Ghonim for his famous 
tweet, precisely because of the perception that his Facebook page 
had such an influence on people’s action that by sending the message 
he had convinced many that it was time to go home.
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Ghonim’s tweet was not just an opinion, however much it 
pretended to be merely that. His message had a concrete, though 
indirect and invisible, emotional effect. It contributed to the creation 
of a collective celebratory mood, which led many people to think 
that really the revolution had accomplished its aims and that they 
could go back to their own private lives. This is the problem with 
the ‘anti-leaders’,1 or reluctant leaders, of contemporary social 
movements – by refusing to admit to being leaders at all, they 
can then be let off the hook when they do something wrong. The 
problem, in other words, is unaccountability: the very problem Jo 
Freeman identified when looking at the feminist movement of the 
1960s and ’70s. It seems like again and again we are faced with 
the same problems, and communication technology has not lived 
up to its promise of fixing organisational problems by means of its 
wondrous affordances.
My remarks about the de facto leadership in the movements 
considered in this book should not be taken as moralistic. In fact, 
I have nothing but praise for the people who put so much effort 
in creating and sustaining the various movements, and for all their 
mostly invisible work of choreographing the collective actions. 
Moreover, I do not think that leaders, or ‘organisers’, or highly 
involved and influential participants – if you prefer the term – are 
not living up to or are betraying their movements’ ideals. On the 
contrary, I think that it is the ideals, and in particular the ideology 
of ‘horizontalism’, that is ‘betraying’ activists by being incapable 
of capturing empirically the gist of the actual practices taking place 
on the ground. In other words, this is not an ‘immanent’ critique 
of the Adornian kind (Adorno, 1976: 112–13), that of not living 
up to one’s ideals. It is, as it were, a transcendental one: a critique 
of not ‘thinking up’ to one’s practices.
In sum, I would argue that activists do not need to change 
their communicative and organisational practices so as to make 
them more ‘horizontal’; they need not labour under the optimistic 
compulsion to achieve a utopian equality of involvement which will 
never be realised however hard we try. Rather, we need to invent 
new concepts and practices better suited to capturing the fact that, 
for all its participatory ideals, the process of mobilisation always 
involves inequalities and asymmetries in which there are people who 
mobilise and people who are mobilised, people who lead and people 
who follow, and the two categories only ever partly overlap. This is 
not an invitation to return to the old reassuring dogmas of Leninism 
with its class essentialism, its theory of the vanguard party and the 
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like, but a call for the invention of new ways to make sense of the 
processes by which social movements are triggered and guided, 
processes which do not fit the imaginary of horizontal networks. 
The metaphor of choreography might just be one theoretical device 
that would aid in developing this alternative understanding.
BeTween evaneScence and cOnTInuITy
At the heart of the culture of contemporary social movements 
there lies a third fundamental tension: that between evanescence 
and fixity. On the one hand, contemporary popular movements 
are characterised by ‘liquid’ forms of organising; in which the 
use of social media by social networking sites is geared towards 
superseding the authoritarian tendencies of ‘solid’ organisations 
like parties and trade unions, in the effort of avoiding the ‘iron law 
of oligarchy’ (Michels, 1999). On the other hand, these movements 
require the invocation of a sense of locality or ‘net locality’, which 
involves bestowing them with some degree of fixity, a ‘nodal point’ 
in their texture of participation.
As we saw in Chapter 5, the activists’ choice of social media as their 
preferred means of communication is paralleled by their embrace 
of a culture of instantaneity, perfectly matched by social media 
like Twitter and Facebook with their focus on the ‘here-and-now’ 
– or, more negatively put, with their constitutive evanescence. 
These media can thus be seen as the contemporary equivalent of 
traditional movement ‘ephemeras’ like flyers and posters. In fact, 
they are even more ephemeral: ‘ephemeral ephemeras’ as it were. 
It is remarkable how in their activist use social media come to be 
tightly linked to specific actions or events, as exemplified by the 
functionality of Facebook events which has become so popular 
among activists. Once these events are over, the messages linked to 
them disappear into the electronic dustbin and become of interest 
only to the researcher or the abnormally curious, not to mention 
very difficult to retrieve. Indicative here is the fact that one can go 
back only five days in search of past tweets. ‘Last things first’ would 
be an apt slogan for Twitter, a medium which constantly focuses 
users on the very latest news and events.
Besides the evanescence actively nurtured through the use of 
social media, contemporary movements are also characterised by a 
striving for continuity and permanence, as testified to chiefly by their 
long-term occupations of public spaces. The practices conducted in 
the occupied squares come to resemble not only rituals of popular 
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reunions, but also rituals of rootedness, reminiscent of the planting 
of the liberty tree in public squares during the French Revolution. 
The movements’ construction of these centres, whose logic goes 
against the grain of visions of contemporary society as a ‘network 
without centres’, urges us to depart from the apology for dispersion 
which underlies both Castells’ and Hardt and Negri’s theorising, 
and to pay attention to the continuing importance of ‘centring’ 
practices in social groupings (Laclau, 2005).
This commitment to establishing fixed points in public space marks 
a clear break with the practices of the anti-globalisation movement. 
The earlier protests followed the logic of ‘summit-hopping’ – having 
been summoned through mailing lists and Indymedia websites, a 
diverse coalition of activists would converge from different corners 
of the West towards the same location to contest the global order. 
After a week or so of communal life, and fighting with police, 
the participants would return home to their local activist scenes, 
with their squats and occupied social centres. In a reversal of this 
orientation, contemporary popular movements are marked by an 
urge to make themselves semi-permanently visible in public space, 
as a way of sustaining a direct everyday interaction with those 
outside the movement, with passers-by, with the ‘people’. Rejecting 
the nomadic spirit of the anti-globalisation movement, protest 
changes from being an ‘event’ into a durable ‘all-out’ occupation, 
endeavouring to give the movement a physical anchoring so as not 
to be washed away by the vagaries of an era of social liquidity. 
The process of localisation, in which social media communications 
are heavily involved, is understandably not without its risks. 
Occupied squares, protest camps, mass sit-ins and the public 
geographies they construct can also become an object of ‘fixation’, 
as in the sense of ‘mental fixation’. The almost obsessive focus on 
such ‘trending places’ can hinder a social movement’s ability to 
reinvent itself and generalise its practices. Moreover, once deprived 
of that central point of attraction and beacon of coordination which 
the all-out mass sit-in provides, whether because of police repression 
or internal collapse, contemporary movements run the risk of a 
rapid dissipation. The challenge here is well condensed by a tweet 
sent by Egyptian activist Nora Rafea in July 2011, during one of 
the several sit-ins in Tahrir square after the 18-day revolution, in 
which she asserted ‘Tahrir is a state of mind.’ What she meant 
was: ‘Tahrir is beyond the square. Go out of the square. If you 
think that the revolution is all about the square this is wrong.’ The 
word ‘Tahrir’ and the connected Twitter hashtag ‘#Tahrir’ have 
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condensed a revolutionary spirit, which cannot be reduced to the 
site known as ‘Tahrir square’ in Downtown Cairo, but which at the 
same time is difficult to extricate from the place and the experiences 
associated with it. 
To conclude: the strategic question facing contemporary social 
movements and their use of social media today is that of how to 
maintain a degree of continuity once, for whatever reason, they 
can no longer rely on the role played by occupied squares as nodal 
points in their texture of participation. Finding solutions to this 
dilemma will involve a deep organisational rethink (there were signs 
of this already taking place as the book went to print), and at the 
same time a rethink of the ways in which various forms of protest 
communications and social media in particular are utilised as means 
of mobilisation. Whatever the solutions, the commitment of these 
movements to the symbolic reconstruction of a new sense of public 
space will continue to be of fundamental importance in the coming 
years, both in the West and in the Arab World.
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This book draws on 80 interviews conducted with activists, social 
movement participants and sympathisers. Interviewees were 
recruited by spending time at protest sites and identifying possible 
initial interview candidates, and then proceeding through ‘snowball’ 
sampling, with an eye on ensuring diversity and balance in terms of 
gender, age and level of involvement in the movement. Interviews 
followed a semi-structured format, and lasted between half an 
hour and two hours. The interviews began by reconstructing the 
interviewees’ personal background and experience of participation 
in social movements, before moving on to their use of social media 
for protest purposes, and their self-reflections on the opportunities 
and threats of these forms of communication.
Interviewees were later sent interview transcripts via email, to 
make sure everything they said had been correctly transcribed and 
to allow me or them to add any further information. The interviews 
were initially coded with an open-coding method, through which a 
series of key themes and sub-themes were progressively identified. 
None of the interviewees requested anonymity. However, some 
asked to have only their first name used as illustrated by the ensuing 
list of interviewees.  
On top of these interviews, the book draws on ethnographic field 
notes collected during research visits to the different sites covered in 
this volume and on an analysis of archived social media material, 
including Facebook pages and Twitter feeds. At an initial stage 
this material was coded on its own, separately from the interviews. 
Later, some overarching master codes were identified to construct 
a general interpretive narrative.
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uS – Occupy wall STreeT
Name Surname Age City Group Profession
1 Malav Kanuga 32 New York Occupy Researcher
2 Linnea Palmer Paton 23 New York Occupy Student
3 Caiti Lattimer 22 New York Occupy Student
4 Mark – 25 San Diego Occupy Travel Writer
5 Noah – 28 New York Occupy Student
6 Richard – 42 New York Occupy Community organiser
7 Elizabeth – 46 New York Occupy Teacher
8 Thanu – 27 New York Occupy Student
9 Julian – 25 New York Occupy Teacher
10 David Boardman 33 New York – IT designer
11 James – 22 New York Occupy Unemployed
12 Andrew Conner 26 New York Occupy Event organiser
13 Shawn Carrie 23 New York Occupy Unemployed
14 Laurel – 27 New York Occupy Student
15 Emily Kokernak 36 New York – Fundraiser
16 Shane Gill 32 New York Occupy Unemployed
17 Stephanie – 27 New York Occupy Filmmaker
18 Kalle Lasn 70 Vancouver Occupy Adbusters’ main editor
19 Cari – 32 New York Occupy –
20 Michael Premo 30 New York Occupy Community organiser
egypT – revOluTIOnary mOvemenT
Name Surname Age City Group Profession
1 Hannah El-sissi 22 Cairo Student
2 Marwa Hussein 32 Cairo – Journalist
3 Ahmed Samih 38 Cairo – NGO worker
4 Noor Ayman 
Noor
22 Cairo – Musician
5 Kamal – 28 Cairo – Employee
6 Mohammed ‘Saidi’ 22 Cairo – Journalist
7 Nora Rafea 25 Cairo – NGO worker
8 Nora Shalaby 32 Cairo Revolutionary 
Socialist
Archaeologist
9 Sally Zohney 27 Cairo – NGO worker
10 Mahmoud Al-Banna 24 Cairo Socialist Architecture student
11 Mustafa Al-Shamaa 21 Cairo Socialist Student
12 Ahmed Sabry 41 Cairo – Architect
13 Osama Hoon 42 Cairo 6th of April Security guard
14 Abdallah – 26 Cairo El-Ahly ‘ultras’ Accountant
15 Salma Hegab 21 Cairo Tweetashare3 Student
16 Mohammed El-Agati 43 Cairo Arab Forum 
for Alternatives
NGO worker
17 Ahmed Sharquaui 22 Zagazig 6th of April Student
18 Khaled – 24 Cairo – Teacher
19 Carlos Latuff 43 Brazil – Activist cartoonist
20 Ali Hamad 22 Cairo – Tourism worker
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SpaIn – 15-m mOvemenT
Name Surname Age City Group Profession
1 Laura Blanco 28 Madrid – Researcher
2 Taiz – 28 Madrid – Unemployed
3 Luis Ordóñez 37 Madrid – Self-employed
4 Sofia de Roa 32 Madrid EDM Journalist
5 Segundo Gonzales 25 Madrid JSF Student
6 Asun Villar 48 Madrid DRY Unemployed
7 Aitor Tinoco 28 Barcelona DRY Unemployed
8 Gregorio Herrero 72 Malaga – Retired
9 Feliz Herrero 70 Malaga – Retired
10 Fabio Gandara 27 Madrid DRY Lawyer/Unemployed
11 Pablo Gallego 23 Madrid DRY Unemployed





13 Ana Turull 27 Barcelona – Architect
14 Vicente Martin 33 Barcelona – Unemployed
15 Jorge Izquierdo 36 Barcelona – IT worker
16 Helena Candelas 40 Madrid – Unemployed
17 Teresa Marcos 26 Madrid – Freelance web 
designer
18 Carmen Haro 
Barba
24 Madrid Tabacalera Researcher
19 Marina – 28 Madrid – Designer
20 Francisco – 30 Madrid – Teacher
BackgrOund InTervIewS (uk, TunISIa, greece)
Name Surname Age City Group Profession
1 Tim – 28 London UK Uncut Student
2 Bernard Goyer 24 London Student 
Movement
Student
3 Kirsten Forkert 32 London Student 
Movement
Lecturer
4 James Haywood 23 London Student 
Movement
Student
5 John Jordan 43 London Climate Camp Activist
6 Brian – 23 London Student 
Movement
Student
7 Ahmed – 24 Tunis Revolutionary 
movement
Student
8 Mohammed – 42 Tunis Revolutionary 
movement
Accountant
9 Haithem – 28 Tunis Revolutionary 
movement
Lecturer
10 Hamza – 23 Tunis Revolutionary 
movement
Student
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Name Surname Age City Group Profession
12 Fathma Arrighi 26 Tunis Revolutionary 
movement
Employee
13 Ibrahim – 32 Tunis Revolutionary 
movement
Employee
14 Dimitris – 24 Athens Aganaktismenoi Student
15 Krinis – 42 Athens Aganaktismenoi Researcher
16 Erasmos – 37 Athens Aganaktismenoi Student
17 Georgios – 46 Athens Aganaktismenoi Unemployed
18 Nikos – 27 Athens Aganaktismenoi Unemployed
19 Eleni – 32 Athens Aganaktismenoi Teacher
20 Sissy – 48 Athens Aganaktismenoi Politician
Gerbaudo T02575 01 text   172 30/08/2012   11:04
notes
InTrOducTIOn
 1. ‘Tweep’ is an expression used to describe a Twitter user.
 2. Time magazine’s ‘Person of the Year’ cover for 2011 was dedicated to the 
‘protester’.
 3. See for example A. Houslaner, ‘Is Egypt About to Have a Facebook 
Revolution?’, Time, 24 January 2011; http://www.time.com/time/world/
article/0,8599,2044142,00.html
 4. http://www.bambuser.com
 5. J. Halliday, ‘Hillary Clinton Adviser Compares Internet to Che Guevara’, 
Guardian, 22 June 2011; http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/jun/22/
hillary-clinton-adviser-alec-ross
 6. E. Morozov, ‘The Brave New World of Slacktivism’, Foreign Policy (blog), 19 
May 2009); http://neteffect.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/05/19/the_brave_
new_world_of_slacktivism
 7. Subcomandante Marcos, ‘Marcos is Gay’, 5 November 1997; http://www.
greenleft.org.au/node/16118
 8. See for example A. Nunn, ‘Greece: More Than a Demonstration, Less Than a 
Revolt’, Red Pepper, April 2012; http://www.redpepper.org.uk/greece-more-
than-a-demonstration-less-than-a-revolt
 9. See for example Takethesquare.net, ‘Call to Unity’, 2011; http://gst.maito.name/
occupy/squares
10. Expressions like ‘spontaneous’ and ‘leaderless’ to describe the popular 
movements of 2011 abound in many media articles and reports across the 
different countries considered in this study. See for example H. Gautney, ‘What 
is Occupy Wall Street? Story of a Leaderless Movement’, Washington Post, 




 1. L. Penny, ‘Out with the Old Politics’, Guardian, 24 December 2010; http://www.
guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/dec/24/student-protests-young-politics-
voices
 2. A. Callinicos, ‘Student Demonstrators Can’t do it on Their Own’, Guardian, 
26 December 2010; http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/dec/26/
student-protests-laurie-penny
 3. M. Castells, ‘Fearful Around the World, United on the Web’, Lecture delivered 





Gerbaudo T02575 01 text   173 30/08/2012   11:04
174 TweeTS and The STreeTS
chapTer 2
 1. International Telecommunications Union (2011), Yearbook of Statistics 
Telecommunication/ICT Indicators 2001–2010.
 2. See for example F.W. Salah, ‘Bloggers’ Street Movement and the Right to the 
City: (Re)claiming Cairo’s Real and Virtual “Spaces of Freedom”’, Environment 
and Urbanization, 21:1 (January 2009), 89–107.
 3. S.M. Shapiro, ‘Revolution, Facebook Style’, New York Times, 22 January 
2009; http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/25/magazine/25bloggers-t.
html?pagewanted=all
 4. D. Wolman, ‘Cairo Activists Use Facebook to Rattle the Regime’, Wired!, 
12 March 2012; http://www.wired.com/techbiz/startups/magazine/16-11/
ff_facebookegypt?currentPage=all
 5. Tor is the acronym of the Onion Router, which allows users to protect their 
internet privacy by way of a complex process of encryption to hide the origin, 
content and destination of messages. For more information visit the project 
website at https://www.torproject.org
 6. The ‘ultras’ – fans of the Cairo football teams el-Ahly and Zamalek – played a 
crucial role in the revolution against Mubarak. See for example J. Montague, 
‘Egypt’s Revolutionary Soccer Ultras: How Football Fans Toppled Mubarak’ 
CNN, 29 June 2011; http://edition.cnn.com/2011/SPORT/football/06/29/
football.ultras.zamalek.ahly/index.html
 7. A. Mafhouz, ‘Asmaa Mahfouz and the YouTube Video that Helped Spark 
the Egyptian Uprising’, Democracy Now!, 19 January 2012; http://www.
democracynow.org/2011/2/8/asmaa_mahfouz_the_youtube_video_that
 8. http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2011/01/29/18670645.php
 9. Tilly coined the term ‘contentious gatherings’ to describe the actions of modern 
social movements (Tilly 1978: 115). A contentious gathering is fundamentally 
a protest gathering.
10. J. Gilinsky, ‘Egyptian “Sandmonkey” Blogger Unmasks Himself in Cairo’, 
PBS, 14 February 2011; http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2011/02/egyptian-
sandmonkey-blogger-unmasks-himself-in-cairo045.html
11. Z. El-Gundy, ‘Twitter’s Role in Revolutionary Egypt: Isolation or 
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chapTer 5
 1. Excerpt from a flyer collected on 6 November 2011 at Zuccotti Park in New 
York.
 2. In fact the relationships between popular social movements and traditional 
organisations have been more complex than the anti-organisational spirit 
prevalent in activist discourse admits. For example, Occupy Wall Street has 
collaborated with trade unions, while in the Egyptian uprising organisations like 
the 6th of April movement and the Muslim Brotherhood played an important 
role in sustaining the protests.
 3. The figures for internet penetration are taken from the International 
Telecommunications Union (2011), Facebook (2011), and Arab Social Media 
Report (2011).
 4. More information on the ‘N menos uno project’ can be found on the project’s 
website: https://n-1.cc
 5. https://riseup.net
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 6. https://aktivix.org
 7. Tweet by user @Aujo808, 14 November 2011.
cOncluSIOn
 1. The expression ‘anti-leader’ was used by D. Bennett in ‘David Graeber, the 
Anti-Leader of Occupy Wall Street’, Bloomberg Business Week, 26 October 
2011; http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/david-graeber-the-antileader-
of-occupy-wall-street-10262011.html
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Rudé, G.F.E. (1964). The Crowd in History: A Study of Popular Disturbances in 
France and England, 1730–1848. New York: Wiley. 
Sampedro Blanco, V.F. and Haro, C. (2011). Activismo politico en Red: del 
Movimiento por la Vivienda Digna al 15M. Teknokultura: revista de cultura 
digital y movimientos sociales; http://teknokultura.com/index.php/tk/article/
download/14/pdf
Sennett, R. (1977). The Fall of Public Man. New York: Knopf.
Schneekloth, L.H. and Shibley, R.G. (1995). Placemaking: The Art and Practice of 
Building Communities. New York: Wiley.
Shirky, C. (2008). Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without 
Organizations. New York: Penguin Press.
—— (2010). Cognitive Surplus: Creativity and Generosity in a Connected Age. 
New York: Penguin Press.
—— (2011). The Political Power of Social Media. Foreign Affairs, January/February.
Singerman, D. (2009). Cairo Contested: Governance, Urban Space, and Global 
Modernity. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press. 
Singerman, D. and Amar, P. (2006). Cairo Cosmopolitan: Politics, Culture, and 
Urban Space in the New Globalized Middle East. Cairo: American University 
in Cairo Press. 
Sloterdijk, P. and Hoban, W. (2011). Bubbles: Microspherology. Cambridge, MA: 
Semiotext(e).
Snow, S.A., Soule, S.A., and Kriesi, H. (2004). The Blackwell Companion to Social 
Movements, Oxford: Blackwell.
Taylor, A. (2011). Occupy!: Scenes from Occupied America. London: Verso. 
Tarrow, S. (1994). Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and 
Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
—— (1998). Fishnets, Internets, Catnets: Globalization and Transnational Collective 
Action. In M. Hanagan, Page L. Moch, and W.Te Brake (eds), Challenging 
Authority: The Historical Study of Contentious Politics. Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, pp. 228–44. 
Gerbaudo T02575 01 text   186 30/08/2012   11:04
BIBlIOgraphy 187
—— (2005). The New Transnational Activism, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Thompson, J.B. (1995). The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Tilly, C. (1978). From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 
Pub.
—— (2000). Spaces of Contention. Mobilization, 5:2, 135–59.
—— (2003). The Politics of Collective Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
—— (2008). Contentious Performances. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tilly, L. and Tilly, C. (1981). Class Conflict and Collective Action. Beverly Hills: Sage. 
Tufekci, Z. and Wilson, C. (2012). Social Media and the Decision to Participate in 
Political Protest: Observations from Tahrir Square. Journal of Communication, 
62:2, 363–79.
Van de Donk, W., Loader, B.D., Nixon, P.G., and Rucht, D. (2004). Cyberprotest: 
New Media, Citizens and Social Movements. London: Routledge.
Vaneigem, R. and Nicholson-Smith, D. (1983). The Revolution of Everyday Life. 
Seattle: Left Bank Books.
Van Gelder, S. (2011). This Changes Everything: Occupy Wall Street and the 99% 
Movement. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers. 
Virno, P. (2004). A Grammar of the Multitude: For an Analysis of Contemporary 
Forms of Life. New York: Semiotext(e).
Weber, M., Roth, G., and Wittich, C. (1978). Economy and Society: An Outline of 
Interpretive Sociology. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Wellman, B. and Haythornthwaite, C.A. (2002). The Internet in Everyday Life. 
Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Wellman, B., Quan-Haase, A., Boase, J., Chen, W., Hampton, K., de Diaz, I.I. et 
al. (2003). The Social Affordances of the Internet for Networked Individualism. 
Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 8:3.
White, M. (2010). Clicktivism is Ruining Leftist Activism. Guardian, 2 August; 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/aug/12/clicktivism-ruining-
leftist-activism
—— (2011). To the Barricades! Adbusters, 4 March; http://www.adbusters.org/
magazine/94/barricades.html
Wilson, C. and Dunn, A. (2011). Digital Media in the Egyptian Revolution: 
Descriptive Analyses From the Tahrir Data Set. International Journal of 
Communication, 5, 1248–72.
Wright, R. (2011). Rock the Casbah: Rage and Rebellion Across the Islamic World. 
New York: Simon and Schuster.
Writers for the 99%. (2012). Occupying Wall Street: The Inside Story of an Action 
That Changed America. Chicago: Haymarket Books. 
Zuckerman, E. (2008). The Cute Cat Theory (blog entry); http://www.
ethanzuckerman.com/blog/2008/03/08/the-cute-cat-theory-talk-at-etech
Gerbaudo T02575 01 text   187 30/08/2012   11:04
6th of April Youth, Egyptian protest 
group, 53–4, 60–1, 63, 142, 164
16 Beaver, activist space in New York, 
112
‘99%’, Occupy Wall Street slogan, 10, 
102–3, 116–7, 120, 149
ABC No Rio, activist space in New 
York, 112
activism, 5, 19, 25, 40, 107
 activist community, 72–4, 112; 
impact of new media on, 20, 22; 
digital, 53, 56, 65, 75, 80, 92, 96, 
107, 142, 148, 159; clicktivism, 
102; slacktivism, 7, 109
 see also mobilisation, organisation
Adbusters, 102–4, 108–12, 113, 114, 
117, 119–20, 131–2, 142
el-Ahly, football club, Egypt
 ultras, 58, 72, 142
‘ahwa, Egyptian coffee-shops, 51
aktivix, activist mailing list service, 
124
Alexander, Jeffrey, 40
Alexandria, 46, 51, 53, 60, 61, 66, 67
Ali, Zine El Abedine Ben, president of 
Tunisia, 46, 60
Al-Jazeera, 50, 69, 75
 The Stream, 6, 138




 in the anti-globalisation movement, 
23; in contemporary movements, 




anti-globalisation movement, 6, 36, 
99, 139, 143, 150
 and counter-summit protests, 167; 
and minoritarianism, 10–11, 86, 
120; and networks, 23–5; and 
subcultural identity, 85, 119, and 
the valuing of diversity, 11, 14
Anonymous, hacker group, 107–8
Arab Spring, 4, 6, 8, 11, 26, 58, 76, 
112
Arendt, Hannah
 on the space of appearance, 38, 39
ashwaa’iyyat, Egyptian slums, 32
Assange, Julian, 107
assembly
 as a process, 27, 38; right of, 32, 51, 
79, 105, 137; general, G.A., 
94–5, 99, 112–3, 129, 131
 see also gathering, public space
ATTAC, 86
Augé, Marc, 25




Barlow, John Perry, 158
Bastille, square, Paris, 156
Bauman, Zygmunt, 12, 21
 on the crisis of public space, 31–2; 
on individualisation, 12, 29, 30; 
and the notion of ‘liquidity’, 13, 
29, 138; on ‘virtual proximity’, 
33
Beck, Ulrich
 on individualisation, 12, 29, 30,  
120
Benkler, Yochai, 143
blogs, 14, 52, 132, 149, 159
 bloggers, 46, 48, 89; in Egypt, 50, 
51, 52, 55, 57, 68, 73; in Spain, 
80, 83, 89; in the US, 117–19
Bloomberg, Michael, Mayor of New 
York, 105, 112
Bloombergville, protest camp, 112




Gerbaudo T02575 02 index   188 30/08/2012   11:04
INDEX 189
botellon, Spanish festive gathering,  
79
Bouazizi, Mohammed, 46, 57
Bourdieu, Pierre
 on elective affinities, 34, 146, 153; 
on symbolic capital, 146, 152
Bourghiba Avenue, Tunis, 155
Burns, Tom
 on organic organisations, 137
Cairo, 45, 46, 51–6, 60–1, 64, 66–7, 
71–2, 74, 136–7, 154, 168
Cairo University, 51, 53
Callinicos, Alex, 18
Casablanca, social centre, 78, 92
Castells, Manuel, 11, 13, 20, 27–9, 31, 
35–7, 42, 44, 77, 97, 143, 167
 and cognitivism, 25, 160–1; on 
networks, 21–3; on place, 25–6, 
155, 160; on wiki-revolutions,  
26
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),  
163
centres, spatial, 15, 21, 30–1, 167
 social centrality, 13, 37; centring 
practices, 11, 167
choreography of assembly, 12–15, 
40–4, 74–5, 102–3, 131, 139
 and emotionality, 13, 40, 162; and 
identity, 41–2; and leadership, 
43–4, 75, 157, 159, 163, 165; 
and material precipitation, 42–4, 
48, 50, and mediation, 40–3; 
definition of, 40–4
 see also assembly, gathering, 
mediation
citizen journalism, 3
Clausewitz von, Carl, 37
Clinton, Hillary, 6
CNN, 6, 117, 137
Cohen, Jared, 3
Command, Control and 
Communications (C3), 128, 151, 
161
Cooren, Francois, 138
Critical Art Ensemble (CAE), 158
C-squat, activist space in New York, 
112
cyberdemocracy, 149
cyberspace, 11, 18, 107, 158–9
Davis, Michael, 21
 and the ‘fear of crowds’, 21, 31–2, 
105
Debord, Guy, 25
Deleuze, Gilles, 28, 97
Democracia Real Ya (DRY), 76–7, 
81–4, 86, 92, 141, 145, 149, 160
Democratic Party, US, 163
digital divide, 13, 154, 162
 in Egypt, 49, 63, 64; in Spain, 89; 
100
Direct Action Network (DAN), activist 
group, 106
dispersion, spatial, 13, 15, 17, 20–1, 
27, 29, 159, 167
 sprawls, 31–2; and individualism, 
33–4; as an obstacle to 
mobilisation, 35–8, 70, 96
 see also choreography of assembly, 
public space
diversity, 3, 10, 14, 67, 98
DIY culture, 119
Doodle, 40
Dorsey, Mark, Twitter CEO 6
 see also social media, Twitter
Dunn, Alexandra, 49, 143
Durkheim, David Émile, 38–9
Ecologistas en Accion, 86
El Baradei, Mohammed, 56, 61
El Hamalawy Hossam, 53
El Jueves, magazine, Spain, 87, 89
El País, daily newspaper, Spain, 90, 
100
emotions, 9, 39, 41, 114–7, 145, 148, 
155, 159-–62, 165
 emotional attraction, 13, 94, 125, 
161; emotional condensation, 15, 
16, 42, 50, 118, 135, 149; 
emotional conversation, 16, 56, 
104, 123; emotional energy, 41, 
87; emotionality, 14, 135, 159; 
emotional impetus, 87, 104; 
emotional leadership, 157; 
emotional narration, 12, 149, 
162; emotional space, 5, 127
Enszensberger, Magnus, 14
escapism, 158
Estado del Malestar (EDM), activist 
group, Spain, 79, 81, 85, 89
Gerbaudo T02575 02 index   189 30/08/2012   11:04
190 TwEETs aND ThE sTrEETs
Facebook, 2–3, 11–18, 40, 58, 76–7, 
81–4, 99–100, 103–4, 117, 121, 
138–9, 145–6, 151–5, 164, 166
 activist admins, 140, 142; and 
leadership, 135–9, 145; as 
training ground, 145–50
 revolution, 6–8; shabab-al-
Facebook, Egypt, 48–56, 74–5; 
and street agitation, 63–70, 84–6
 as organising platform, 82–9; 
suspicion of, 104, 108–9, 113–6
 see also Kullena Khaled Said, Mark 
Zuckerberg, social media, Twitter
face-to-face, 56
 assemblies, 155; agitation, 63, 154; 
communication, 15, 39, 50, 69, 
154; conversations, 123, 126; 
interactions, 13, 96, 126, 154, 
network, 30, 35, 68, 154
 see also public space, street
Fanon, Frantz, 42–3
Fattah, Alaa Abdel, Egyptian activist, 
53
Fattah, Israa, Abdel, Egyptian activist, 
54
Fawkes, Guy, 76
Foster, Susan Leigh, 40




 on activist elites, 24–5, 43, 165; on 
structurelessness, 140
Front de Libération nationale (FLN), 
42
Fukuyama, Francis, 158
Für eine linke Strömung (Fels), 
political group, Germany, 139
Gallego, Paolo, Spanish activist, 83–5, 
90, 137, 141–2, 149, 161, 163
Galli, Ricardo, internet freedom 
activist, 80
Gandara, Fabio, Spanish activist, 83–5, 
87, 89–90, 92, 137, 141–2, 
148–9, 161, 163
Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchard, 43
gathering, 16, 20, 27, 44
 as a process, 37–9, 45, 100, 155; 
magnetic, 13, 91, 95, 155; places 
of, 32, 44, 66; public, 4–5, 30, 
32, 40, 44, 63, 79, 160–1
 see also assembly, public space




Gladwell, Malcom, 5–6, 8–9, 146
global economic crisis, 10, 45
 in Spain, 76, 78, 83; in the US, 102, 
105–7, 118
 see also neoliberalism
Goodwin, Jeff, 9, 41
Google
 Ghonim as executive of, 46, 55, 56, 
groups, 80, maps, 80
 see also internet
Graeber, David, 106, 110, 113, 117
Gramsci, Antonio, 21, 163
Granovetter, Mark, 30, 146
Great Depression, 106
Grim, Priscilla, editor of the ‘We are 
the 99%’ blog, 118
Habermas, Jürgen, 25, 34
hacking, 92, 124, 158
 see also Anonymous
Hardt, Michael, 13, 15, 20, 26–9, 
35–7, 42–4, 134, 161, 167
 see also Negri, Antonio
Hessel, Stéphane Frédéric, French 
diplomat, 76
Hoover, Herbert, US president, 112
horizontalism, 13, 19–20, 134, 140–1, 
144, 165
 leaderlessness, 6, 13, 17, 75, 101, 
104, 129, 131–2, 139–41, 143–4, 
157, 159
 Tyranny of Structurelessness, 24–5
 see also anarchism, leadership
Ibrahim, Gigi, 6, 71
identity, 9, 27, 42, 55, 83–6, 102, 117, 
139, 142, 157
 -building, 41, 149; collective, 41, 
77, 138; common, 41–2, 44, 87; 
identification, 29, 41, 57, 76, 83, 
122, 148–9; popular, 104, 117, 
120
 see also emotions, mobilisation
Gerbaudo T02575 02 index   190 30/08/2012   11:04
INDEX 191
indignados, 10, 37, 45–7, 75–9, 81–3, 
89, 95, 97–8, 100, 142, 143, 146, 
148, 154, 160, 163
individualisation, 12, 29–30, 32–4
 individualism, 20, 34
Indymedia, 2, 23–4, 145
information, 25, 70–2, 75, 152, 150
 access to, 7, 14, 23, 34, 127; and 
citizen journalism, 72, 75; and 
critique of cognitivism, 40–1, 
160–1; circulation of, 61, 93, 
113, 136, 138; counter-
information, 95, 110, 145, 146, 
151; freedom of information, 80, 
108; overload, 138, 155; tactical 
use of, 72, 128, 161
 see also internet, social media
internet, 18–19, 25, 27, 46, 49–50, 52, 
55–6, 60–1, 87, 89–90, 109–19, 
117, 135–7, 158–60
 access, 64, 63–5, 66, 154; activism, 
52, 109, 159; and anti-
globalisation movement, 23, and 
dispersion, 33–4; and risk of 
isolation, 72–4; cafés, 55; 
freedom, 6, 80, 107; forums, 84, 
96; generation, 48, 50, 58, 155; 
occupiers, 103–4, 124, 132; 
publics, 156, 160; kill switch, 
Egypt, 67–70; users, 114–15, 
142–3, 152; web, 27, 84, 95–6, 
121–2, 143, 158, 162; web 2.0, 
22, 100, 145, 148
 see also information, social media
Jordan, John, 40
JPMorgan, 116
Juris, Jeffrey, 11, 13, 19
 on networks, 24–5; on Occupy, 
36–7
 see also Castells, Manuel
Juventud Sin Futuro (JSF), 81, 83, 85
 see also indignados
el-Karama, Egyptian Party, 50
Kashba, square in Tunis, 155
Kifaya, Egyptian social movement, 
53–4
King, Martin Luther, 43
Klandermans, Bert, 9, 127, 150
Klein, Naomi, 23, 109
Kroll, David, 110, 112, 143
La Sexta, Spanish TV channel, 100
Laclau, Ernesto, 2, 10–11, 21, 36, 167
 on populism, 11, 41–2, 59, 86, 119, 
148, 161
Lasn, Kalle, 109–10, 113, 131, 142
Latuff, Carlos, 57
Lefebvre, Henri, 11, 44, 156, 159
Lenin, Vladimir, 4, 138–9
 Leninism, 25, 83, 165
Ling, Richard, 33
leadership, 13–15, 25, 101, 163, 165
 choreographic, 43, 134–6, 140–5, 
157
Lichterman, Paul
 on personalism, 138
live-streaming, 3, 16, 99
locality, 34, 155, 160, 166
Madrid, 25, 45, 47, 76–9, 82–3, 90–4, 
99
Mahalla el-Kobra, Egyptian industrial 
town, 54
mailing lists, 2, 150, 167
Mafhouz, Asmaa, Egyptian activist, 63
Maher, Ahmed, 6th of April leader, 53, 
60, 164
Makhno, Nestor, Ukranian anarchist, 
143
Malatesta, Errico, Italian anarchist, 
143
Mansour, Abdul Rahman, Egyptian 
activist, 59
Marcos, Subcomandante, leader of the 
Zapatistas, 10
Marx, Karl, 26, 30–1
Mason, Paul, 3, 7, 19, 83, 118





mediation, 15, 43, 154, 163
 disintermediation, 136, 138, 162, 
163; mediatisation, 34, 39, 163; 
organisational, 39
 symbolic, 39, 163; technological, 40
 see also social media
Gerbaudo T02575 02 index   191 30/08/2012   11:04
192 TwEETs aND ThE sTrEETs
MeetUp, social networking site, 40
Melucci, Alberto, 19, 21, 29–30, 37, 
41
mobilisation, 15, 16, 19–21, 43–5, 66, 
69, 77–8, 84, 117, 132, 135, 
140–1, 154, 157, 161, 165
 and assembling, 36–9, 41–2; 
demobilisation, 77; mass, 35, 49, 
75; obstacles to, 29–30; social 
media as means of, 2–5, 18, 81, 
89, 145
 see also choreography of assembly, 
participation
Morozov, Evgeniy, 5, 7–9
Mubarak, Hosni, 1, 6, 15–6, 32, 45–6, 
57–8, 67, 70–2
 public space under Mubarak, 49–55
mukhabarat, Egyptian security 
services, 51
multitude, 20, 26–9, 155
 see also Negri, Antonio, Hardt, 
Michael
Mumble, video-conferencing system, 
160
Muslim Brotherhood, 49, 61, 66, 137, 
142
N-1, alternative social networking site, 
148
National Democratic Party (NDP), 
Egypt, 53, 67
 Electronic Committee, 53
Nazif, Ahmed, Egyptian prime 
minister, 52–3
Negri, Antonio, 15, 20, 26–9, 31, 
35–7, 42–4, 134, 161, 167
 see also Hardt, Michael, Virno, 
Paolo
neoliberalism, 9–11, 31–2, 105–6, 159
 capitalism, 26, 31–2, 106
network, 7, 15, 48, 51, 67–8, 77, 
90–1, 93–5, 146, 154
 theory, 19–24; theory, critique of, 
25–6, 155, 166–7
 individualism, 29–31, 34–7; social 
networking sites, 113–15, 145–6, 
148
new media, 6, 9, 35, 71, 152, 155, 
159, 160
 see also internet, social media
New York
 organising in, 112–4, 117–8, 122–3, 
127–9
 public space in, 103–5
New York Police Department, 105, 
117
New York Times, The, 103
New Yorkers Against Budget Cuts, 112
No les Votes, campaign, 80, 85
Noor, Ayman, Egyptian politician, 54
Obama, Barack, 93, 106–8
Oberschall, Anthony, 37
Occupy Together, activist platform, 
114
Occupy Wall Street (OWS), 10–11, 
36–7, 102–5, 108–17, 120–5, 
127–34, 137, 140–7, 151–5, 
160–1
okupas, Spanish squatters, 101, 143
organisation, 3–4, 10, 30, 32, 40, 50, 
77–9, 81–2, 106–9, 143, 150, 
159, 162–6, 168
 liquid organising, 134–41, 155–7; 
bureaucratic organisations 19, 
21–2, 133, 135; self-organisation, 
23–5; organisational mediation, 
36, 39; organisation and 
leadership, 43–4; protest 
organising, 61, 66, 85–8, 92, 99
participation, 2, 41, 56, 78, 121, 
136–7, 141–2, 146
 and spontaneity, 5, 13, 16, 134, 
149, 163–4; space of, 24–5, 121, 
145, 156, 166
 see also activism, mobilisation
Partido Socialista Obrero Español 
(PSOE), 78, 163
parties, 29, 50, 61, 80, 119, 137, 166
Patio Maravillas, social centre in 
Madrid, 78, 92
Penny, Laurie, 18–19, 21
People’s Park, Berkeley, 105
Plataforma de Afectados por la 
Hipoteca (PAH), 82
Plaza de Catalunya, square, 77, 97–8
political opportunity, 61, 110
post-industrial society, 20–1, 29, 31, 34
 see also new media, internet
Gerbaudo T02575 02 index   192 30/08/2012   11:04
INDEX 193
Poster, Mark, 25, 33
posters, 4, 75, 89–91, 154, 166
Project Chanology, protest campaign, 
107
 see also Anonymous
public space, 2, 5, 15, 45, 145, 157–61
 the appropriation of, 11, 13, 16–17, 
136, 142, 166–8; crisis of, 29, 32, 
37–8
 public space and assembly, 38–9; 
mediation of, 40–1, 43–4, 154–5; 
in Egypt, 50–2, 70, 74
 in Spain, 79–81, 95–6, 99–101; in 
the US, 103–5, 113–14, 122–3, 
133
Publico, daily newspaper, Spain, 90, 
100
Puerta del Sol, square in Madrid,  
76–9, 82, 91–100, 142, 151, 
155–6
Reagan, Ronald, 105–6
Revolutionary Youth Coalition, 61
Rheingold, Howard, 27
riseup, activist mailing list service, 150
rituals, 95, 98
 of popular reunion, 11, 20, 166; 
ritual space, 98
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 106
Ross, Alec, 6
Rudé, George, 30–1
Said Khaled, hero of the Egyptian 
revolution, 46, 55
 Kullena Khaled Said Facebook page, 
50, 54–6, 61–4, 66, 141, 148
 as a source of identification, 56–8
Salem, Mahmoud, Egyptian blogger, 
71, 73
Sampedro Blanco, Victor, 80, 82, 95
Sanchez Almedia, Carlos, internet 
activist, 80
Scientology, Church of, 107
Sennett, Richard, 30, 32, 123
shaabi, lower classes in Egypt, 48, 64
Shirky, Clay, 5–9, 12, 136, 143, 161
el-Shorouq, daily newspaper, Egypt,  
50
Sidi Bouzid, Tunisian town, 46, 57
social factory, theory of the, 31
social media, 2, 13–17, 22, 29, 34, 37, 
148, 150
 and choreography of assembly, 40, 
44–5; and class, 70, 73; and 
isolation, 34–5, 73–4, 153–4; and 
leaderlessness, 18–21, 134–5; and 
leadership; 139–41, 143–4, 146, 
and liquid organising, 137–8; and 
protest camps, 9–12; and techno-
optimism, 5–10; in Egypt, 48–50, 
74–6; in Spain; 76–7, 81–2, 94–6, 
99–101; in the US, 102–4; 
113–14, 116–18, 122–3, 131–3; 
power law distribution, 143
social recomposition, 14, 28, 38, 97
Socialist Workers Party (SWP), 18–19




 agitation, 73–4, 100; campaigning, 
50, 74, 90; communication, 66, 
75, 89–90, 154
Supreme Council of Armed Forces 
(SCAF), Egypt, 46, 70
Suez, city, Egypt, 66–7
swarm, 15, 20, 26, 29, 37, 128, 134, 
161
 intelligence, 27–8
Syntagma Square, Athens, 47, 155
Tabacalera, social centre in Madrid, 
78, 92
tactics
 feeder marches, 64, 66; protest 
camps, 12, 37, 67, 96–7, 151, 
160, 163
 silent stands, 60; mass sit-ins, 1, 5, 
20, 44, 76, 90, 136, 160–1
Tagamma, Egyptian party, 50
Tahrir square, Cairo, 15, 45–6, 48, 61, 
64–5, 67–71, 152, 155–7, 167–8
 as a model, 11, 76, 94, 109, as a 
hashtag, 155
Tantawi, Mohammed Hussein, head of 
the Egyptian SCAF, 70
Tarrow, Sidney, 9, 61, 110, 150
Tea Party, movement in the US, 107
techno-determinism, 9, 161
Thatcher, Margaret, 106, 158
Gerbaudo T02575 02 index   193 30/08/2012   11:04
194 TwEETs aND ThE sTrEETs




trade unions, 29, 49, 76, 78, 84, 106, 
137, 166
Tunisia, 5, 7, 44, 46, 49, 57, 58, 60, 
61, 76, 147, 155
tweetashare3, activist initiative, Egypt, 
152
Twitter, 1–4, 12, 16, 48, 135, 146, 
161, 166
 and leaderlessness, 18, 140; and 
leadership, 142–5; and risk of 
isolation, 152–4, 160; and 
trending places, 155, 167; 
emotional use of, 151–2, 162, 
tactical use of, 141, 127–32, 
150–1, 162; in Egypt, 68, 70–5, 
in Spain, 76–7, 80–1, 89, 92–4, 
98, 100, in the US, 102, 104, 
109, 113–14, 116–17, 121, 
123–4, 127–32; revolution, 5–9, 
26, 49–50
 see also Dorsey, Jack, Facebook, 
social media
UK Uncut, activist group, 140
unity, 11, 20, 18, 19–20, 34–6, 39, 42, 
44, 142
 despite diversity, 14, togetherness, 9, 
14–15, 20, 38, 162
 see also identity
US Day of Rage, activist group, 112
Vaneigem, Raoul, 138
 see also anarchism
Vanity Fair, 113
Vibe, social media service, 103
Virno, Paolo, 28, 155
 see also Negri, Antonio, Hardt, 
Michael
el-Wafd, Egyptian liberal party, 50
Wasik, Bill, 27




White, Micah, 109–10, 142
Wikileaks, 80, 107
Wikipedia, 143
Wilson, Christopher, 49, 143
Winter Palace, 156
Wired!, 27, 121
Wisconsin union protests, 106
Ya Basta, activist group, 106
YouTube, 3, 63, 74, 76, 82, 86, 99, 
107–8
Zamalek, football club, Egypt
 ultras, 58, 72, 142
 see also al-Ahly
Zapatero, José Luis Rodríguez, 78, 80, 
83
Zapatistas, 158
 see also Marcos
Zuccotti Park, in New York, 110, 
112–18, 121, 124–7, 134, 144–5, 
155–7
Zuckerberg, Mark, 6, 48, 145
 see also Facebook
Zuckerman, Ethan, 148
Gerbaudo T02575 02 index   194 30/08/2012   11:04
Gerbaudo T02575 02 index   195 30/08/2012   11:04
Gerbaudo T02575 02 index   196 30/08/2012   11:04
Gerbaudo T02575 02 index   197 30/08/2012   11:04
Gerbaudo T02575 02 index   198 30/08/2012   11:04
Gerbaudo T02575 02 index   199 30/08/2012   11:04
Gerbaudo T02575 02 index   200 30/08/2012   11:04
